Our beliefs are inextricably shaped through communication with others. Furthermore, even conversation we conduct in pairs may itself be taking place across a wider, connected social network. Our communications, and with that our thoughts, are consequently typically those of individuals in collectives. This has fundamental consequences with respect to how our beliefs are shaped. This article examines the role of dependence on our beliefs and seeks to demonstrate its importance with respect to key phenomena involving collectives that have been taken to indicate irrationality. It is argued that (with the benefit of hindsight) these phenomena no longer seem surprising when one considers the multiple dependencies that govern information acquisition and the evaluation of cognitive agents in their normal (i.e., social) context.
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