Genetically modified foods (GMFs) have met with strong opposition for most of their existence. According to one account—the consequence-based perspective (CP)—lay people oppose GMFs because they deem them unsafe as well as of dubious value. The CP is backed by the data and offers a clear solution for easing GMF opposition. However, several scholars have claimed that the CP is faulty, that lay opposition derives from largely nonrational factors and is consequence blind. One recent statement of this, the moral-absolutism perspective (MAP), contends that GMFs’ opponents are principled “moral absolutists” who think that GMFs should be banned no matter their value or risk. Herein we critically weigh key arguments for this proposal. We also present five new studies that probed the clearest data that seem to favor the MAP—opponents affirming the statement that GMFs should be “prohibited,” no matter their value or risk. These studies jointly show that (a) most presumed absolutists do not understand the key question and/or (b) cannot validly answer it. We show that taking due steps in clarifying the question and screening for those participants who cannot validly answer it cuts down absolutism to near zero. Finally, we demonstrate that helping GMFs’ opponents imagine a world wherein GMFs are safe and constructive makes the majority willing to welcome GMFs in this context.
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