Good science requires both reliable methods and rigorous theory. Theory allows us to build a unified structure of knowledge, to connect the dots of individual studies and reveal the bigger picture. Some have criticized the proliferation of pet “Theories,” but generic “theory” is essential to healthy science, because questions of theory are ultimately those of validity. Although reliable methods and rigorous theory are synergistic, Action Identification suggests psychological tension between them: The more we focus on methodological details, the less we notice the broader connections. Therefore, psychology needs to supplement training in methods (how to design studies and analyze data) with training in theory (how to connect studies and synthesize ideas). This article provides a technique for visually outlining theory: theory mapping. Theory mapping contains five elements, which are illustrated with moral judgment and with cars. Also included are 15 additional theory maps provided by experts in emotion, culture, priming, power, stress, ideology, morality, marketing, decision-making, and more (see all at theorymaps.org). Theory mapping provides both precision and synthesis, which helps to resolve arguments, prevent redundancies, assess the theoretical contribution of papers, and evaluate the likelihood of surprising effects.
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