Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) defend the dual-processing theories of higher cognition after first criticizing them on fundamental grounds. To make that possible, they resurrect the very distinctions between the two alleged “types” of processing that they formerly had rejected. At the end, however, the default-interventionist model they embrace, seems similar to the single-process unimodel they contest.
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