Abstract
The downstream consequences of a priming induction range from changes in the perception of objects in the environment to the initiation of prime-related behavior and goal striving. Although each of these outcomes has been accounted for by separate mechanisms, we argue that a single process could produce all three priming effects. In this article, we introduce the situated inference model of priming, discuss its potential to account for these divergent outcomes with one mechanism, and demonstrate its ability to organize the priming literatures surrounding these effects. According to the model, primes often do not cause direct effects, instead altering only the accessibility of prime-related mental content. This information produces downstream effects on judgment, behavior, or motivation when it is mistakenly viewed as originating from one’s own internal thought processes. When this misattribution occurs, the prime-related mental content becomes a possible source of information for solving whatever problems are afforded by the current situation. Because different situations afford very different questions and concerns, the inferred meaning of this prime-related content can vary greatly. The use of this information to answer qualitatively different questions can lead a single prime to produce varied effects on judgment, behavior, and motivation.
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