A number of recent articles (Fiedler, 2011, this issue; Gigerenzer, 2009; Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowen, & Baker, 2009; Vul & Kanwisher, 2010) have highlighted seemingly circular arguments and explanations in psychological research, which suggests that the problem is rife within psychology. The article reviews the literature on circularity, and, in light of this, evaluates these recent examples from psychology to determine whether it is indeed circularity that is the underlying problem and to make suggestions for what paths improvements might pursue.
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