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Abstract

Compared with England, where new implementations and programmes in the education system are often introduced at a striking pace, the German education system seems to be rather stable in its features and less dynamic in terms of reform and change. Hence, a phenomenon called ‘reform bottleneck’ (Reformstau) has often been observed. This also applies to the field of Vocational Education and Training (VET), where the dual apprenticeship system with its traditional structural characteristics is still the central institution to prepare young people for work and employment. Although fundamental changes in the system as a result of sudden reform processes have not happened in recent decades, subtle developments have influenced the German VET system and its functioning. The specific legal and institutional construction of the dual apprenticeship system with its two main and interrelated features, federalism and corporatism, is the backbone of the specific approaches of policy-making and governance in German VET. This paper provides an overview of the institutional and legal characteristics of the dual apprenticeship system and discusses the associated approaches of policy-making and governance. Considering the different responsibilities of the public and the private sphere, contextual features of the labour market and of the school system, the paper analyses political reform initiatives, changing stakeholder interests and configurations (in particular of the so-called social partners), and their relevance for the functioning and development of the German dual apprenticeship system.

Keywords

Dual apprenticeship social partnership approach federalism corporatism governance VET Germany

Introduction

In international discourses, German Vocational Education and Training (VET) is often directly associated with the dual apprenticeship system (Duales System). During the recent crises of the European labour market this system once again earned the reputation of being a marker for a high-quality qualification system that efficiently integrates young people into the labour market and, hence, ensures low youth unemployment rates. The dual apprenticeship system, which combines school-based and in-company training, is seen as the central pillar of VET in Germany. However, the German VET system includes two other relevant routes: the ‘transition system’ (Übergangssystem) and full-time school-based VET (Schulberufssystem).

The transition system (Übergangssystem) offers training programmes mainly for those who do not have the relevant competences to start a dual apprenticeship and/or were unsuccessful in their application. These programmes are largely seen as a preparation for further vocational training, as they generally do not lead to state-recognised vocational qualifications valid in the labour market. Those taking part usually reapply for a place in the dual apprenticeship system at a later stage (see Granato et al., in this issue for more details and problems of the system).

Full-time school-based VET (Schulberufssystem) covers programmes which lead to full state-recognised vocational qualifications, traditionally in specific occupational fields such as in the health care or the social sector.

These three sub-systems – the apprenticeship system, the transition system, and full-time school-based VET – provide initial vocational education and training in Germany, which takes place after general education and ranks below higher education and certain further education provisions (e.g. Baethge, 2014; for changes in the relation of VET and higher education see Wolter and Kerst, and for the English comparison see Parry, in this issue). These three sub-systems are interdependent in their specific development and roles within the VET system, and are to a certain degree complementary. Over the past decades there have been distinct shifts in the share of students in each sub-system. The extension of transition programmes as an alternative for young people without an apprenticeship contract, for example, promoted by policy-makers from the 1990s onwards, can be seen as a political reaction to the highly unbalanced relation between the demand for apprenticeship places by young people and the supply of such places by private enterprises (see below).

Overall, the German VET system can be described as ‘dominated’ by the dual apprenticeship system not only in terms of qualitative measures and public awareness, but even more so in terms of political decision-making and reform intentions with regard to the VET system (Baethge, 2014: 43). Nevertheless, the dual apprenticeship system has not experienced fundamental changes as the result of sudden political reform initiatives as often seen, for example, in the English VET system (see Keep, in this issue). Political initiatives in this respect have been rather ‘defensive’, as Greinert (2012: 276) puts it when evaluating, for example, the 2005 amendments to the Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz (BBiG)). Changes over recent decades have been rather subtle and slow. They show different intentions and dynamics in the school-based and the workplace-based training parts of the dual apprenticeship system. To understand the policy-making and governance processes within the dual apprenticeship system it is essential to consider the underlying dual assignment of responsibility to the public and the private sectors for the two training provisions, and their corresponding different legal and institutional structures. In this respect, federalism and corporatism are central institutional features because: (1) the traditional tripartite ‘social partnership approach’ determines in particular the in-company training; and (2) German federalism, especially in its relevance for the German school system, affects most of the developments in the vocational school sector. However, both institutional structures are interconnected. Within these structures, changing interests, positions and power of the main stakeholders, in particular the state, the unions and employers, have determined the policy-making and governance processes in the system and have hence generated this rather ‘defensive’ approach with regard to innovation and change.

The paper analyses these issues in more detail, asking about the functionality of this policy-making and governance approach today. It outlines the main legal and institutional features of the dual apprenticeship system as well as its underlying concepts. It then looks into recent reform initiatives in vocational schools and their effects. Those initiatives have been considerably influenced by neo-liberal reform measures similar to those in public administration from the 1990s onwards. The paper then analyses policy-making and governance processes in the tripartite social partnership approach, and looks at the shifts in the interests and coalitions of stakeholders, and their consequences. To illustrate these processes, the two main crises in the market for apprenticeship places are discussed, the one between the 1970s and 1980s and the one between the 1990s and 2010s. The concluding remarks summarise the underlying changes in society, the economy, and industrial relations to locate reform initiatives and shifts in policy-making, concluding with a discussion of the functioning of the system today.

Duality as the central feature: the legal and institutional structure of the dual apprenticeship system

In the German apprenticeship system the term ‘dual’ is typically associated with the two main places of learning and training: vocational schools and companies. More importantly, this duality is linked to a dual responsibility of the public and the private sphere for these aspects of vocational education. This ‘divided’ responsibility is rooted in the historical development of the system.

Owing to the emergent separation of general and vocational education in the context of the neo-humanistic education philosophy, the development of Germany’s vocational training structures came about as a result of economic and social policy changes at the end of the nineteenth century, when ‘Chambers of Craft’ (Handwerkskammern) were introduced and appointed for regulating and controlling traditional apprenticeship training. Today’s responsibility of private enterprises for the provision of in-company training within dual apprenticeships reflects these nineteenth century developments. Additional vocational education in special vocational schools eventually became a compulsory and integral ‘dual’ part of apprenticeships in 1938. Since then, apprentices have been required to attend vocational education in vocational schools as part of their training and qualification. It is important to note that vocational schools are part of the German school system; hence the responsibility for vocational education at these schools lies with the state. In this way, the basis of the dual structure of the current system was formed (for more details see Blankertz, 1985; Heidenreich, 1998; Greinert 2012: 50ff., 83ff.).

The next section investigates this state and, hence, public responsibility in its legal justification and its relevance for the institutional design of vocational schools today, followed by a similar analysis of in-company training and the associated responsibility of private enterprises.

Vocational schools as a part of state administration

Vocational schools serve a public function in terms of education. Part-time vocational school attendance within the apprenticeship scheme is driven not only by the goal of qualification but also by an educational mission. It supports young people in their qualification processes and in their development as individuals and citizens. This means that the state’s education mandate (staatlicher Erziehungs- und Bildungsauftrag) and the public supervision of schools also apply to vocational schools (Avenarius, 2010b: 58ff.; Hufen, 2003: 61ff.), as both are derived from Article 7 (1) of the German constitution. This article defines the ‘comprehensive … legislative powers of the state regarding the organisation, planning, leadership, and supervision of the school system’ (BVerwGE 6, 101, 104, quoted after Richter, 2013: 261, translated). Thereby even today ‘supervision is not [understood] in the usual meaning of supervision ‘of’ institutions that retain their own scope of action but rather as state sovereignty over schools’ (Reuter, 2000: 21, translated). Accordingly, schooling in Germany is the responsibility of the state (Staatsaufgabe), including the administrative implementation of this task. In Germany, schools are publicly administered. They are part of the public administration just like the tax office or police stations (Füssel, 2002: 127).¹

The fundamental ideal of the German constitutional state is a state in which ‘political power is only executed on the basis of and in the context of the law’ (Grimm, 1990: 291, translated) and administration is always subject to the legal possibility of control (Kaufmann, 2011: 5f.). Owing to this construction, main decisions about schools and the education system, such as general educational objectives, structures of the school system, subjects, and even school attendance, have to be made by the legislative authorities. They cannot be delegated to the school administration. This ensures the democratic legitimisation of decision-making (Richter, 2013: 259; Wißmann, 2012: 311). Further decrees, guidelines, and regulations are developed from that legislative framework.

In Germany’s federal system, exclusive legislative and administrative power over the school system lies with the states (Länder) (Article 30 and Article 70ff. German constitution). The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) considers this to be the ‘core of the statehood of the states’ (BVerfGE 6, 309, quoted by Richter, 2013: 258, translated). Most states have incorporated their responsibility for the school system into their constitutions. As Wißmann (2012: 309f., translated) outlines in a nutshell:

…those regulations seem to be an emergent and remarkably stable fact unaffected by the otherwise diverse discussions on privatisation. A fact which seems to be a necessity for German school politics: School education is a genuine state task in the hand of the Länder; its administration is the responsibility of the state governments.

This federal principle requires a rather extensive co-ordination and negotiation structure to ensure a certain degree of uniformity of the 16 separate German school systems. The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Cultural Affairs of the Länder (Kultusministerkonferenz, (KMK)) is the central institution for these complex co-ordination and negotiation processes. The broad range of topics addressed by the KMK includes regulations of the design of teacher training (KMK, 2013a), special regulations about the recruitment of teachers (KMK, 2013b), regulations on educational standards (e.g. KMK, 2004a), or regulations on holiday schedules (KMK, 2008). The KMK also negotiates the core curriculum (Rahmenlehrplan) for the school-based vocational education component in the dual apprenticeship scheme for every state-recognised occupation (Beruf). This is done in conjunction with the in-company training component and the relevant stakeholders (see below). The KMK resolutions as such, however, are only legally binding if formally enacted by the state governments.

Within this complex federal structure and its associated negotiation procedures, introducing policy reforms and amendments in the German school system and, hence, in vocational schools can be rather difficult and time-consuming.

In-company training – collective responsibility of the private enterprises

On the other side, the supply of in-company training in the dual apprenticeship scheme is not a task of the state; it is the responsibility of private enterprises, who provide apprenticeship places and finance them.² The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) interprets in-company training as part of the commercial activity of enterprises and, hence, part of the economy (Richter, 2013: 269). Whatever might lead an individual enterprise to offer apprenticeship places, that decision is primarily motivated by its private interests. The government cannot force individual private enterprises to offer training places, but the Federal Constitutional Court stresses the fact that private enterprises as a collective group have to make sure that a sufficient number of apprenticeship places are offered to meet the overall demand (Richter, 2013: 269).

Once enterprises decide to provide apprenticeship places, they have to follow certain standards and regulations. The legislative power with regard to those regulations is held by the German federal government, since in-company training is part of the economic sector (Article 74 (1) no. 11 and Article 72 (2) German constitution) (for more detail see Sondermann, 2004: 297ff.; Richter 2013, 269). The federal government sets the regulatory structure for the apprenticeship system, thereby ensuring the quality of the training. This regulatory structure includes training regulations for each of the state-recognised occupations (Ausbildungsordnung), the definition of occupational profiles (Berufsbilder), and the duration of training (Ausbildungsdauer). Within this framework, private enterprises train and qualify young people as their employees.

Chambers (e.g. the chambers of industry and commerce), so-called responsible authorities (zuständige Stellen), are authorised to control and supervise private enterprises in the practical realisation of their in-company training. They ensure that in-company training practice at different enterprises adheres to the regulations. Their responsibilities include controlling and supervision as well as examinations and assessments of apprentices and their certification. Chambers are statutory corporations under public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) and therefore part of the public administration established by the state. Chamber membership of private companies is obligatory. ‘Self-monitoring’ of in-company training at private enterprises, as performed by the chambers, is a state-enforced institutional concept that delegates sovereign responsibilities to private enterprises (Klenk, 2008: 26f.; Koch and Reuling, 1998).

The Federal Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz (BBiG)) is the legislative act that outlines, among other things, these roles and different tasks of the chambers and the regulatory structure of the apprenticeship system. Passed in 1969, the Act retained and modernised the historically grown features of the dual apprenticeship scheme. This legislation defines Berufskonzept as the central organising principle of the dual apprenticeship system, which incorporates state-recognised occupations with their respective training regulations, occupational profiles and the duration of training (see, for example, Clarke and Winch in this issue). The Vocational Training Act also specifies the way in which the apprenticeship system is to be governed: the oft-quoted tripartite social partnership scheme based on the idea of corporatism. Regulations set by the federal government as mentioned before are therefore negotiated by the relevant stakeholders: the federal government, the states, unions, and employer associations. Decision-making has traditionally been achieved by consensus.

Generally, within the idea of corporatism, political processes are seen as rather closed. Only interest groups recognised by the state are allowed to take part in the political negotiation processes. The state is rather strict in the way it organises and defines its co-operation with these interest groups (e.g. Schmitter, 1979). For the dual apprenticeship system this means a regulated structure of institutions, committees and working groups, and a clear definition of the role and number of representatives of each stakeholder group, in particular the states, the federal government, the unions, and the employer associations. This institutional structure is consolidated in the Federal Institute of Vocational Education (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB)). This general approach applies thereby not only to negotiation and decision-making processes at the federal level as, for example, on the negotiation processes on occupational profiles and training regulations. It also applies to processes at the regional level, for instance in the chambers’ vocational education and examination committees (Berufsbildungs- und Prüfungsausschüsse) (Baethge, 2006: 439; BIBB, 2015: 16).

With the enactment of the Vocational Training Act, however, ‘the government gained a level of authorisation to regulate the system which was not known before’ (Schütte, 2012: 474, translated). At the same time, the institutional construction of the governance approach assumes the existence of collective interests within each interest group which can be clearly defined and differentiated to function properly.

In summary, the dual apprenticeship system incorporates two central governance approaches: (1) the traditional ‘steering-by-law’ approach for the vocational schools as part of the school system, where the fulfilment of the government’s responsibility is formally bound to the public administration in each state, and (2) the tripartite social partnership approach regarding in-company training in private enterprises where policy-making and governance is achieved by a co-operative procedure based on consensus. The formal features and basic conditions, however, are again regulated by the government. Within this system one would not expect rapid reforms and fast changes, much less so within policy-making and governance approaches. In the past two decades, however, reform initiatives and changes did take place in both sectors, albeit with different targets and effects. Those reforms are discussed below taking into account relevant developments in society, public administration, the economy, and industrial relations.

The ‘new steering’ approach (Neue Steuerung): reform of the schools’ state administration in general and vocational schools

In the following, reform processes within the school system, including vocational schools, as part of public administration, are further examined. In this context, it has to be mentioned that according to the German understanding of the state under the rule of law, the traditional interpretation of public administration in general sees this administration as a strictly executive institution. This is connected to the conventional notion of the state as a central player who steers society and its development based on legislation (Mayntz, 2008: 47). In that notion, public administration takes action strictly along the requirements of the legislation and has a distinct hierarchical structure (Schulze-Fielitz, 1992: 238; on problems arising out from this approach see, for example, Schulze-Fielitz, 2009: 24f.).

With regard to the school system, Edelstein (2011: 149, translated) criticises that:

[the school system is] designed from top-down as an exemplary administrative system according to the perspective and the order of the Prussian state. […] And that is precisely the major problem we have, as it were, as a Prussian school system that has accumulated conservative structures.

This notion of the state and its administration underwent a transformation process, especially in the past two decades, owing to different developments in government, society, and the economy, which also influenced the school sector and, hence, vocational schools. The first development included a shift from the notion of steering to the notion of governance, maintained by changes within the nation state and its functions. Examples of those changes include the nation state’s diminishing ability to control and solve problems, especially those of a transnational nature (e.g. environmental problems), and the increasing co-operation between the state, private stakeholders, and civil society to fulfil public tasks (see Kuhlee, 2014: 179ff.). In addition, neo-liberal philosophy not only led to intensified privatisation but also to reforms in public administration from the 1990s onwards following the idea of New Public Management under the so-called new steering approach (Neues Steuerungsmodell) (see Kuhlee, 2014: 85ff.). And finally, the ‘PISA shock’ in Germany led to new public awareness of the school system and provided the possibility to push for political reform in the school system, following the line of the aforementioned public administration reforms.

In this context, the two central and interconnected reform initiatives in the school system, including vocational schools, were (1) adjustments of the strategic concepts and the work of the KMK along the lines of transparency, comparability, and accountability, and (2) the intention to enhance the decision-making and action scope of individual schools.

At least until the late 1990s, the work of the KMK was characterised by a rather rigid and detailed top-down approach; it was criticised for being cumbersome and for achieving only the smallest common denominator between the states. Adjustments started with the Constance resolution of 24 October 1997 (Konstanzer Beschluss) (Baumert and Füssel, 2012: 258ff.), in which the KMK defined a new goal: to make the performance of the federal education system more transparent using national and international student assessments and benchmarks. The strategy developed in the following years focused on more transparency, the use of comparable educational standards, the introduction of quality development and assurance systems, and the implementation of the necessary infrastructure to go with it. In practical terms, this included, for example, the development of educational standards for selected subjects and educational levels (e.g. KMK, 2003, 2004a), the provision of a national education report every second year jointly compiled by the federal and state governments, and the creation of the Institute of Quality Development in Education (Institut für Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB)) (Baumert and Füssel, 2012: 260). The overall educational monitoring strategy of the KMK included (Döbert, 2010: 159; KMK, 2006): participation in international student assessment tests, centralised control and comparison of whether the states have met the educational standards, the application of comparative testing to monitor the performance of individual schools, and the joint report on education by the federal and state governments.³ In addition, the state governments and the local authorities also established further reporting systems on education (Döbert, 2010: 160).

This strategic orientation of the KMK was strengthened within the context of the 2006 federalism reform. The newly defined Article 91b (2) of the German constitution codifies the co-operation of federal and state governments in the assessment of the efficiency of the education system by international and national student assessments and reports (Guckelberger, 2008).

Overall, the redefined KMK strategy focuses on monitoring and accountability combined with the explicit intention to increase the decision-making power of individual schools (including vocational schools) and to delegate more responsibility for school processes to the schools. For the individual school, however, the scope of this enhanced decision-making power does not seem to be very broad. This is especially because the legal status of individual schools and their traditional affiliation with public administration was not changed (Avenarius, 2010a: 140; Wißmann, 2012: 320f.). Under the concept of erweiterte Eigenständigkeit, the states did decentralise certain tasks and decision-making powers, but scope and orientation vary widely between the 16 states, and there is no evidence of a shared concept or strategy. However, across all states, three different fields emerge where individual schools gained more decision-making power and action scope (Blossfeld et al., 2010). Firstly, individual schools gained more latitude in curricular and pedagogical matters. They are able to develop school-specific pedagogical concepts and decide on curricular matters such as alternative time schedules, school-specific curricula in certain subjects, or class size (Blossfeld et al., 2010: 19; Rürup, 2007: 148ff.). Their concepts, aims, and intentions have to be included in a school programme which forms the framework for evaluating the school and for its accountability to the school authority. Secondly, in financial matters most states now allow their schools to decide on some financial resources independently, although this power is noticeably restricted to selected expenses (e.g. Avenarius, 2010c: 261). Thirdly, in personnel matters schools in most states have a say in recruiting their headteachers. Schools also have the possibility to define job specifications for teachers or to have school-specific job advertisements to ensure a better matching in the assignment of teachers by the school authority (Avenarius, 2010c: 262f.; Nebel, 2011: 264ff.). However, all of this is linked to instruments of quality assurance and accountability, such as internal evaluations undertaken by individual schools themselves. These internal evaluations are combined with external evaluations undertaken directly by the school authority. In Hamburg and Berlin, for example, this external evaluation is explicitly called school inspection. At the same time, reform initiatives are also connected to a changed understanding of the school authorities themselves. Their former approach of top-down control in the sense of a traditional ministerial bureaucracy has been changed by most states into a more advisory and co-operative approach (Füssel, 2010: 184). In Bremen, Hessen and Lower Saxony, for example, interventions in a school’s pedagogical and teaching decisions by the school authority are now bound to defined preconditions (Nebel, 2011: 58).

Overall, compared with countries like England (see for example Keep, in this issue), these reforms may not qualify as high-stake assessment and monitoring mechanisms. After all, a general or vocational school’s failure to meet benchmarks or evaluations does not lead to school closures, the replacement of school management, or the dismissal of teaching staff (even in very critical cases); rather, the focus is on improvement and support.

The small extent of autonomy granted to individual schools as part of these reforms has been discussed in the literature (e.g. Wißmann, 2012: 321ff.; Kussau, 2007: 190f.). Wißmann (2012: 324, translated) sees a rather ‘gradual shift of responsibility’; a genuine output-based governing approach has not been implemented. Furthermore, the efficiency of the reform measures has been the subject of concern. As with reform processes in other parts of public administration, where the accumulation of ‘death data’ not used for any decision-making and governance processes has been much criticised (e.g. Holtkamp, 2008), critics wonder whether data generated in the school system, and hence in vocational schools, are actually used to improve decision-making processes. As Tillmann et al. (2008), for example, indicate, the states often use PISA data to legitimise educational policy-making although it is difficult to make an analytical connection between these data, their interpretation and the content of the policies. Eventually, the aforementioned reforms led to more administrative work for the individual school management, which in turn could impact negatively on pedagogical leadership, as Saalfrank (2012) argues. Indeed, empirical data on the leadership in vocational schools show a strong orientation of school managements towards accountability tasks and the associated instruments, and simultaneously a much reduced focus on pedagogical questions and professional development, indicating a lack of leadership and support for teaching as the schools’ core responsibility (Wagner and Kuhlee, 2015: 256ff.).

VET developments under the ‘social partnership approach’: the change of stakeholders’ interests and coalition groups and its effects

In the past two decades the dual apprenticeship system, and in particular the associated tripartite social partnership scheme as the guiding policy-making and governance approach, has been criticised for its resistance to reform and innovation. Indeed, a successful introduction of politically initiated reform processes is rare. The last serious attempts to introduce wide-ranging reforms go back to the 1970s. Schütte (2012: 475) identifies a governance deficit in the system where necessary amendments are left out. Yet in the past decades subtle changes of the system can be identified (Busemeyer, 2009) in the functioning of the tripartite social partnership approach, and in the structure and design of the apprenticeship scheme.

The shift in the performance of the tripartite social partnership approach can be illustrated by looking at the two main crises of the market for apprenticeship places: the first during the mid-1970s and the 1980s, the second from the late 1990s until about 2010. During the first time period, between 1976 and 1986, the demand for apprenticeship places grew as a result of larger birth cohorts leaving school and entering the VET system. Compared with the early 1970s, the demand for apprenticeship places in 1983–1985 increased by 50 percent (Baethge, 2006: 444ff., 2014: 44). The intense corporatist negotiation processes between the different stakeholders eventually led to an expansion of the supply of apprenticeship places in most sectors of the economy, and to a reasonable adjustment of supply and demand. It is important to note that this expansion did not happen as the result of an anticipated demand for a qualified workforce by the enterprises, but that they offered additional places to cope with the crisis (Greinert, 1999). To Baethge (2006: 446), this is an example of the successful work of the corporatist approach to policy-making. It was based on involved stakeholders’ shared belief that the dual apprenticeship system and its principle of state-recognised occupations are a valuable asset for the German economy.

A similar situation emerged in the second time period. Starting in the late 1990s, Germany saw a growing demand for apprenticeship places due to demographic factors. Again, larger birth cohorts entered the VET system. But this time, the supply of apprenticeship places remained constant at about 550,000 places per year, regardless of the growing demand. An adjustment between supply and demand could not be mediated politically, and no consensual alliance between the different interest groups on that matter was achieved. Employers and employer associations did not fear a loss of credibility in society due to the low supply of training places (Baethge, 2014: 46, 2006: 449). As documented many times in the literature, the political ‘solution’ in this situation was the broad extension of the transition system (Übergangssystem), offering mainly publicly financed school-based vocational programmes which do not lead to full vocational qualifications. In addition, subsidies for extra-company training, especially in the East German states, were expanded (e.g. Schütte, 2012: 475; Busemeyer, 2009: 28ff., 53ff.; Granato et al., in this issue). During the early 2000s the transition system (Übergangssystem) eventually reached its peak at around 450,000 participants. The problematic effects of this development have been intensively discussed. They include aspects such as increased numbers of young people kept in the transition system for longer periods (Warteschleife) and the rise of the average age of those entering apprenticeships to 19.5 years in 2010. Linked to this was also a rising tendency of social selection and differentiation within the VET system (Greinert, 2012: 248ff.; Baethge 2014: 46ff.).

Different political measures were discussed but not implemented in a feasible manner. They included, for example, the introduction of a training levy, and the opening of the VET system for more fully qualifying school-based training options, which will be discussed in the following.

In Germany, the issue of a training levy has frequently been discussed over recent decades as a strategy to pressure private enterprises into providing more training places. A training levy would be compatible with the German constitution and is within the legislative authority of the federal government (BVerfG, 1981). In February 2004, the governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens decided to introduce such a levy (Feuchthofen, 2004: 3). Unsurprisingly, employer and business associations protested, but an overall boycott of the supply of training places by the corporate sector was realistically not to be expected. Neither the opposition of Liberal and Christian Democrats nor some of the state governments and local authorities supported the introduction of a levy. The latter were critical because their training rate also lagged behind expectations (Busemeyer, 2009: 154).

The main reason why the introduction failed, however, were diverging positions among the unions and the Social Democrats, even though both groups had strongly advocated for the introduction of a training levy during past decades. The German mining, chemistry, and energy workers’ union (IG BCE) and the construction workers’ union (IG Bau) argued against the levy as they feared they would lose out on already existing special arrangements for their industries. They therefore took a different position than, for example, the metal workers’ union (IG Metall) (Busemeyer, 2012: 702). The levy also lost support among the Social Democrats; the then federal chancellor Schröder, for example, supported a so-called training pact (Ausbildungspakt) with employers instead, which was eventually signed in 2004. The employer associations signed the pact on the condition that the levy be dropped (Busemeyer, 2009: 151ff.; critically Greinert, 2012: 276) while the unions did not sign the pact at all (BMBF, 2010).⁴ This can be seen as an indication of the decreasing relevance of the co-operative tripartite partnership scheme under the consensual principle. As discussed earlier, the outcome of the training pact regarding the supply of training places has to be seen critically.

Given the persistent shortage of training places, the 2005 amendment to the Vocational Training Act offered the possibility to adapt the VET system and to solve some of its problems. There also seemed to be a certain willingness among the federal government coalition of Social Democrats and Greens at the time to open the system to more full-time school-based vocational training and, hence, to strengthen its position, as Greinert (2012: 278) states. Therefore, the draft of the revised Vocational Training Act, in particular Articles 7 and 43 (2) BBiG, would have given the states more authority to recognise full-time school-based training programmes as an alternative to dual apprenticeships and to ensure a parity of the two pathways. Moreover, it would have enabled graduates of school-based programmes to take examinations held by the chambers. This would have offered students in full-time school-based training and those in extra-company training the opportunity to gain the same qualification as students in a dual apprenticeship, or at least to gain credits for their achievements in school-based programmes (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004).

This intention was criticised by employers and the unions. Employers argued this would generate strong competition between full-time school-based vocational training and apprenticeship training. It would also strengthen school-like teaching in the VET system, which was not seen as a desirable development. The unions claimed that students in full-time school-based alternatives would be disadvantaged since the labour market favoured young people with a traditional apprenticeship qualification. They feared a fragmentation of the VET system and more school-like instruction processes, and argued strongly for in-company training and against a further increase of its state regulation, which indicates a shift of union interests over time. In the 1970s the unions had strongly supported political reform efforts to enhance the role of the government within the system and strengthen school-based vocational education to ensure vocational education for all (Busemeyer, 2009: 163f., 2012: 703f.), but this did not seem to be the case any longer.

At the end of the negotiation process, the stakeholders pronounced their uniform disapproval of further government involvement in the dual apprenticeship system and a ‘sunset clause’ was implemented (Busemeyer, 2012: 705). Articles 7 and 43 (2) of the Vocational Training Act opened the system for full-time school-based vocational training in combination with a stronger responsibility of the states to recognise such programmes, but only for a limited period of time. In fact, that regulation terminated as early as 1 August 2011 (Article 43 (2), 3 & 4 BBiG). It was hoped that within this period the market for apprenticeship places would rebalance and enrolment in the transition system (Übergangssystem) would be reduced. This way, a wide-ranging reform of the system had been avoided (Greinert, 2012: 288).

These examples, that is, the introduction of a training levy and the revision of the Vocational Training Act, indicate the powerful role of stakeholder interests and coalitions in the negotiation processes of that governance approach. They show how interests and interest coalitions associated with different policies changed over the years. In recent years, this has led to rather unexpected cross-party coalitions and alliances. This applies, for example, to the alliance between the governing Social Democrats and the employers in the case of the training levy and the enactment of the training pact in 2004 against the interest of the unions. In the case of the strengthening of full-time school-based vocational training in context of the 2005 revision of the Vocational Training Act, unions and employers created a powerful alliance. Such cross-party coalitions and alliances, however, have countered the introduction of major reforms in the system over the past decade (Busemeyer, 2012).

Nevertheless, some modifications in design and structure of in-company training in the apprenticeship system can be found in recent years. They include the introduction of more flexibility in occupational profiles and training regulations which allow a stronger orientation to meet the specific needs of individual enterprises. The modernisation of training regulations, for instance, from 1995 onwards established a revised training structure for certain apprenticeships: a combination of core occupational training in the first year of an apprenticeship (Kernberufe) followed by specialised training for specific occupational areas in the following years. While this trend was reinforced by the 2005 amended Vocational Training Act, it does not apply to all of the currently ca. 340 state-recognised occupations; most apprenticeships are still provided without a specialisation (Monoberufe).

The modernisation of and the increase in the number of two-year apprenticeships is another example of this trend towards more flexible training provisions. Compared with traditional three-year apprenticeships, these shorter apprenticeships are geared towards the integration of more practically oriented young people in the system. It was the intervention of the federal government under the Social Democrats, who promoted those apprenticeships in 2003 against the strong resistance of the unions. This political intervention was seen as a radical step as it broke with the idea of consensus in the system, and this was again highly criticised by the unions. The parliamentary groups, however, emphasised that the principle of consensus should not be used to hinder reform processes. Indirectly criticising the position of the unions, they argued that the principle should be applied as a ‘motor for progress and innovation’ and should be strengthened in this direction (Fraktionen, 2004: 5, translated; Busemeyer, 2009: 160ff.).

Other options to gain more flexibility, such as the inner modularisation of apprenticeships – once more discussed in the context of Europeanisation – have been debated in a similarly controversial way (see Deissinger, in this issue). Overall, the trend to develop a more flexible and open system takes especially the needs of individual enterprises into account. It is therefore evaluated differently by and within different interest groups. While crafts, chambers and unions are keen to retain traditional structures, large-scale industrial enterprises favour more flexibility and are supported by the current federal government in this. These coalition structures divide the employer’s side (Busemeyer, 2009: 202ff.) and, once again, indicate shifting interests and stakeholder alliances over time. In the 1970s the unions, for instance, were on the reformers side, although with the intention to strengthen the role of the state and unions and to reduce in particular the power of the chambers (Greinert and Schütte, 1997: 81f.).

Thelen and Busemeyer (2012) identify the development towards more flexibility and differentiation as a first shift to a stronger segmentation of the apprenticeship system, away from a traditional collective system where ‘broad and portable occupational skills’ (p. 69) are trained for a national labour market based on clearly defined occupational profiles. This means that training is to a certain extent, but potentially more so in the future, adapted to the specific requirements of individual, mainly large-scale, enterprises, rather than rigidly following set occupational profiles.

Reasons for the previously discussed changes within the market for apprenticeship places and the subtle shift in the inner arrangements of apprenticeships are manifold. They are related to broader developments in the economy and industrial relations from the 1990s onwards and include three important aspects (Baethge, 2014: 56ff.), namely:

a significant change in the management philosophy in enterprises along stronger competition and shareholder-value oriented leadership and control (e.g. Kuhlee, 2014: 127ff.) led also to a changed organisation of working processes. The closer alignment of work organisation along business processes (Geschäftsprozessorientierung) led in turn to changes in the qualification structure required by enterprises. Therefore, a decreased relevance of the specific qualification profiles of state-recognised occupations for the operational work organisation can be identified.

the structural change from an industrial to a service sector economy strongly affected the dual apprenticeship system, as it had been developed within a context of industrialisation to meet the demands of the industrial sector. The service sector, however, traditionally uses different strategies of recruitment and qualification. This sector recruits high-skilled academically qualified staff on the one hand and low- or non-qualified staff on the other, but comparatively fewer people with traditional vocational qualifications. And closely related,

the structural change also led to a stronger relevance of knowledge-based work profiles – associated with a shift in the requirement of competences. Creativity, problem solving ability, self-management, communication and language skills, and the ability to self-reflect are important complementary competences in addition to professional expertise today. It could be argued that training within the dual apprenticeship system so far does not reflect these dimensions sufficiently (Baethge, 2014: 56ff.).

These developments are linked to other structural changes and result in a loss of impact for the governance approach. This includes the decreasing power of the unions and the employer associations as corporatist stakeholders to organise and enforce their interests in a consistent manner (e.g. Streeck and Hassel, 2003). From the 1990s onwards, there has been an expansion in interest coalitions with higher specificity and diversity, compounded by a stronger regionalised and decentralised orientation of these coalitions (Priddat, 1999: 588; Streeck and Hassel, 2003: 112ff.). This is reflected by the negotiations in the dual system as discussed before. But the loss of power of the unions and employer associations also influences those processes indirectly.

An example of this are developments in wage bargaining. In the recent decades, Germany saw the emergence of an increasing bargaining decentralisation of industries in terms of wages, resulting in a fall in the number of workers affected by new wage agreements, and a growing low-wage sector. This has led to a fragmentation of the collective bargaining system and a growing differentiation in wages (e.g. Thelen and Busemeyer, 2012). As Thelen and Busemeyer (2012) argue, ‘wage compression’ (p. 69) due to collective bargaining for skilled and unskilled workers holds back the wages for skilled workers and therefore makes training financially attractive for enterprises. At the same time it raises the incentives to enhance the productivity of the unskilled but still relatively expensive workers, which favours training as well. A stronger wage differentiation, however, lowers the incentives for enterprises to train to high and uniform standards and, hence, to over-train workers compared with the specific requirements of their workplaces. The latter, however, has been a key element to develop a ‘high-quality, high-wage, high-value added production’ system in Germany (Thelen and Busemeyer, 2012: 69). Under these conditions, the interest of enterprises to train may drop. They may also demand a higher degree of differentiation and flexibility within training schemes to meet their individual needs and the requirements of their different work profiles.

In the long run, these developments could even further undermine the position of low- and unskilled individuals in the labour market. A growing dualism of skilled and unskilled workforce is already evident in the context of the latest labour market reforms (Hartzreformen) (see Ebner, in this issue).

Concluding remarks

In the last three decades Germany has experienced social and economic change, noticeably influenced by neo-liberal ideas and concepts. This has resulted in alterations to established relationships between state and society. In this context, the state’s ability to govern society and its development by using a traditional steering-by-law approach has been challenged. And, at the same time, as the result of privatisation and administrative reforms, new arrangements emerged for the co-operation of state and non-state stakeholders to fulfil public tasks, to provide public services, and to solve problems of social relevance.

These changes have also influenced the dual apprenticeship system, which in itself is anchored in the state school sector on the one hand and the economic sector on the other. Vocational schools as part of the state school sector belong to the public administration and have been subject to its reform processes. Alongside a ‘new steering’ approach, recent reforms intended an enhanced decision-making power and action scope for individual schools, combined with modified monitoring and accountability strategies by the state governments and school authorities. Although these reforms did not result in a wide-ranging redefinition of the responsibilities and legal structures of individual schools, they nevertheless influenced actions of school stakeholders and impacted on their decision-making as, for example, in school leadership and management. Wißmann (2012: 324) concludes that ‘even if there is no legal change associated with the topos of a broadened school autonomy, in the medium-term it can change at least the mentality of school stakeholders and hence their orientation for action.’

Although wide-ranging reforms for in-company training in the dual apprenticeship system have not taken place, certain dynamics and subtle changes during the past decades can be found. These are important, as they indicate particular alterations within the system which were achieved over a longer period of time, and affect the traditional tripartite social partnership scheme and the design of in-company training. As the discussion on higher flexibility shows, there is a trend to align dual apprenticeship training with the requirements of the enterprises and the labour market even more, which nowadays include an increasing focus on the requirements of individual enterprises and their specific work profiles. The first has always been the strength of the system, where occupational profiles and training regulations are developed in co-operation with social partners (Baethge, 2006: 459) while the latter indicates a shift of the system to the needs of the economy on account of its social duty and responsibility (see also Busemeyer, 2009).

This development is reflected and explained in the operation of the corporatist social partnership approach in recent years, where one of the main features of the system is diminishing: the power of the employer associations, but even more so that of the unions, as organised corporatist stakeholders. This goes hand in hand with changed coalition structures which are more specialised, regionalised and often show cross-party characteristics. This eventually leads to institutional changes within the system and shifts in the incentives for the different stakeholders and their courses of action, as the discussion of the collective bargaining system and on the wage structures shows. Overall, these developments show the strong and growing dependence of the government and the unions on the co-operation of private enterprises as a result of the specific institutional design of the corporatist dual apprenticeship system.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Dina Kuhlee is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Oldenburg in the Department of Vocational Education and Professional Studies at the School of Computing Science, Business Administration, Economics, and Law. She holds degrees in Comparative and International Education, Business Administration, and in Vocational Education and Professional Studies from Humboldt University, Berlin, and the University of Oxford, UK. Over the years Dina’s work has focused on further education, teacher education, and educational policy and governance from an international and comparative perspective. Her research work includes studies on, for example, the implementation of the Bologna reform process in Germany and its effects on university-based teacher education, and the approaches of governance and their relevance to the dual apprenticeship system in Germany. Her latest book, Governance in Initial Teacher Education: Perspectives on England and Germany (Springer VS, 2015), co-edited by Christopher Winch and Jürgen van Buer, takes a comparative view on educational reform policies in England and Germany and their effects on teacher education.

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Federalism and corporatism: On the approaches of policy-making and governance in the dual apprenticeship system in Germany and their functioning today

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Duality as the central feature: the legal and institutional structure of the dual apprenticeship system

Vocational schools as a part of state administration

In-company training – collective responsibility of the private enterprises

The ‘new steering’ approach (Neue Steuerung): reform of the schools’ state administration in general and vocational schools

VET developments under the ‘social partnership approach’: the change of stakeholders’ interests and coalition groups and its effects

Concluding remarks

Footnotes

Funding

Notes

Author biography

References