Abstract
Jury nullification is the ability of juries to acquit criminal defendants even against the apparent weight of the law and the facts. This commentary asks whether jury nullification is a “bug” or a “feature” of the American criminal trial, a question separate, for example, from whether it is good or bad. The commentary concludes, tentatively, that jury nullification, on one understanding, might be a “feature.” In that understanding, jury nullification reflects the jury’s authority, in exceptional cases, to particularize the applicable law by way of its existential engagement with a live defendant and the unique circumstances of a case. The possibility of jury nullification might therefore represent the legal system’s implicit recognition that law can have a granular as well as a global quality. This power, if it exists, is necessarily controversial, though it has analogues in religious normative systems. Its embrace would require a more complex theory of law.
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