Abstract
This article uses the Sinthasomphone opinions to argue that courts are generally unable to or, otherwise, refuse to hear intersectional injustice. Fittingly, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined “intersectionality” in her article, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” only a few years before the Sinthasomphone opinions were issued. Her article served, and continues to serve, as a chilling reminder of the need for legal discourse to develop intersectional theory. This article builds on Crenshaw’s initial argument and stresses the need for legal actors to lean into their discomfort in cases involving non-normative identities. Although the opinions in Sinthasomphone were issued almost thirty years ago, courts have progressed little in their analyses of similar cases. The Sinthasomphone opinions are also an appropriate case study given the notoriety of Jeffrey Dahmer and the public’s familiarity with Sinthasomphone’s killing.
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