Legal Judgment and Cape Colonial Law

Abstract

Judgment is a complex matter, with particular nuances in the context of juridical decision-making. The following commentary explores legal judgment at a particular juncture via a Cape colonial case in 1798 and through Foucault’s often overlooked essay, “Truth and Juridical Forms.” Noting the legacy of the test and the inquiry as knowledge formations that have significantly influenced judgment in European and colonial law, this discussion highlights how legal judgment might usefully be viewed as a shifting product of local and wider power-knowledge formations. Viewing a Cape record at some historical distance enables one to see colonial legal judgment as a process of its time and place. It also enables a more general, if admittedly exploratory, comment on judgment as an authorized, violent process that cuts and countersigns itself through complex transcriptions. As well, a performative contradiction attaches indecision to the heart of legal decisions, thereby disabling apodictic judgments and intimating a potential escape from totalitarian judgmental systems.