On 6 June 2014, it will be 70 years since D-Day. This article, drawn from my book on the topic (Grint, 2008), reconfigures the operation as a contest between two different approaches to war that embody different assumptions about the importance of leadership, management and command. Taking Archilocus’ phrase – ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’ – I suggest that the success of the Allies was dependent upon their greater attention to all three decision modes and their related problems than their German foes, whose penchant for the Cult of Combat led them to be more effective in battle but less effective in the pursuit of war. I relate this to the difference between Tame, Wicked and Critical problems and comment on the difference between Deficit and Asset models of organizations.
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