Abstract
The article explores the systematic expropriation of Jewish property in the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), led by the Ustaša regime. Croatia's expropriations began rapidly and were legally reinforced through numerous decrees. Despite the NDH's intrinsic corruption, which meant that many Jewish assets were stolen by individuals, I focus on the actions of the most powerful actor: the state. Although hindered by many obstacles, the authorities of the NDH remained focused on the appropriation of Jewish property throughout its existence. This article examines these institutions—their evolution, and their efforts to increase efficiency in seizing and securing expropriated property for the state. The NDH's primary agencies, including the State Directorate for Renewal and the Office for Nationalised Property, orchestrated the confiscation and redistribution of assets, aiming to consolidate Jewish property into state ownership. Ante Barić, a key figure, drove efforts to streamline expropriations, overcoming obstacles and centralising assets under state control. By the end of this process, the NDH had stolen Jewish property worth at least 5.14 billion kuna and destroyed the economic foundations of Jewish life across the state.
The expropriation of Jewish property, as an important part of the Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), has long received limited scholarly attention. 1 However, that has started to change. Mostly, the articles and book chapters that address the persecution of Jews often concentrate on the local level of persecution. 2 The newly published book on the appropriation of Jewish property in Croatia by Michal Brandl also examines Zagreb as a case study. 3 While the robbery of Jewish property was a chaotic process (as was every other process in the NDH), research has so far paid insufficient attention to the work of the state institutions responsible for the appropriation of Jewish property. While it is undeniable that personal enrichment played a significant role within a notoriously corrupt and dysfunctional state, this represents only part of the picture and risks obscuring the involvement of a plethora of state and non-state institutions pursuing one goal: to deprive the Jews of everything they possessed and to transfer it to the treasury. Although it was a chaotic process, documents from the institutions in charge of appropriation reveal that they sought to contain the chaos as much as possible. Some local actions that might have appeared to contemporaries to be the unauthorised actions of those responsible in the provinces were in fact well-coordinated actions devised by the central institutions in Zagreb. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how the authorities of the NDH went to extreme lengths to seize every possible asset from the Jewish population within its borders—a quest that started with the establishment of the NDH and was orchestrated from central institutions to the remotest areas. With some help from German advisers, 4 these authorities not only enabled individual acts of expropriation but also systematically targeted all Jews in the country. This was achieved despite formidable obstacles, including a quasi-occupation by Italy and Germany, internal ethnic conflicts, the presence of a powerful resistance movement, as well as widespread looting of Jewish property by individuals. 5 As the expropriation of Jewish property began immediately after the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, the new government had to act quickly to create a quasi-legal framework and establish institutions to ensure that the looted property was transferred to state ownership. I will focus on these institutions: their evolution, as well as their efforts to seize and secure as much of the expropriated property as possible for the state.
The expression ‘for the state’ should be understood as in opposition to ‘private’ robbery, which served only personal enrichment. The actions and developments examined here focus on the first form of robbery—that for the state. Although the two are sometimes difficult to separate (e.g., the takeover of Jewish-owned houses by the highest Ustaša officials, which consequently served as their homes as well as for representative purposes), the robbery carried out by the examined institutions had one purpose: to accumulate as much money (and other valuables) as possible for the treasury.
In order to achieve this goal, the ‘legal’ framework, that is, the decrees issued by the so called “poglavnik” Ante Pavelić relating to the appropriation of Jewish property, was examined. The central part of the study relies on the extensive ‘Ponova’ collection 6 in the Croatian State Archives. It contains numerous documents that reveal the activities of the most important authorities that were responsible for appropriating Jewish property in the NDH. They show that all actors were in agreement on the question of the expropriation of Jews—the differences generally concerned who was entitled to the looted property.
The documents show that the state had to contend with a variety of problems in the looting of Jewish property—from pervasive corruption to understaffing and poorly qualified employees in its looting institutions—as well as chaotic conditions in the provinces. Furthermore, they show how the reorganisation of the institutions went hand in hand with efforts to contain the chaos that the new rulers had unleashed in April 1941, as well as the looting by individuals, and to gain better access to the property of the Jews that was to be looted or had been looted, despite the nepotism and cronyism emanating from the top of the state. 7 The focus on the ‘perpetrators and their institutions’ is both important and necessary. Most of the activities, internal discussions, and even basic details, such as the date when certain institutions began operations, had to be pieced together from primary sources—and even then, some gaps remain. For example, we still lack a thorough analysis of the men in the second tier of the state apparatus. In the case of Ante Barić and Ćiril Ćudina, two figures who had an enormous impact on the appropriation of Jewish property and thus also the persecution of Jews in the NDH, we still lack even basic information. This gap reflects the poor state of research on the appropriation of Jewish property since the end of the Second World War. At the same time, it shows methodological shortcomings in research concerning the NDH. As Alexander Korb has argued, collaboration has often been portrayed in a way that downplays the agency and responsibility of collaborators. 8 For far too long, the Ustaša were treated like monsters whose actions could not be explained rationally and/or as mere German vassals. Both assumptions lead to the neglect of Ustaša-actors, their motives, choices, and possibilities.
A comprehensive understanding of the events, as well as the evolution and progression of the expropriations, provides the essential foundation upon which further analyses can be constructed. Without this groundwork, other historiographical questions cannot be accurately addressed. This article seeks to address part of that gap by examining the state apparatus behind the expropriations, the reorganisations, new directives, and the commitment of the individuals leading the institutions involved.
Legal framework and institutions of appropriation
Following the partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Italy and Germany established the Independent State of Croatia, elevating the small fascist group, the Ustaša, to power. Its leader, Ante Pavelić, assumed the role of dictatorial head of state (poglavnik) in the style of his allies, Hitler and Mussolini. Italy and Germany subsequently agreed on a demarcation line dividing the NDH from north-west to south-east into respective German and Italian zones of interest. While the Italians soon assumed control over most of ‘their’ territory, thereby impeding the persecution of Jews and other minorities, the Germans initially refrained from openly intervening in Croatian internal affairs. 9 The Ustaša quickly launched campaigns against Serbs, Jews, Roma and other ‘undesirable’ groups. As the persecution of Jews aligned closely with German methods, the Germans had little cause for objection, though they did advise the Ustaša from the outset.
In many countries, the persecution of Jews escalated gradually over time; however, in the NDH, multiple measures affected the Jewish population all at once, with Jewish property targeted from the beginning. The new authorities needed almost everything—from offices and housing to furniture, radios, and cars. The simplest way to acquire these was to seize them from Jews (and, at times, Serbs).
The actual expropriation took relatively little time. In parallel with appointing commissioners to oversee Jewish businesses and organisations, Jews in various cities were forced to make ‘contributions’ and vacate their homes and apartments. 10 Bank accounts were frozen, and all securities were handed over by the banks to the state institution responsible for appropriation. When entire families were deported to concentration camps, their homes were first looted by individuals and then sealed by Ustaša authorities. With the owners removed, the authorities merely had to complete the paperwork to nationalise Jewish-owned shops and industrial enterprises. With the decree of 30 October 1942, the NDH completed the looting of Jewish property by fully nationalising it. This involved instructing cadastral offices to transfer ownership from private individuals to the state. 11 The few valuables that individuals managed to hide and carry with them were subsequently confiscated at the concentration camp gates.
In its quest for international recognition, the leadership of the newly established state sought to legitimise its anti-Jewish measures by issuing numerous decrees, often applied retroactively, to provide a legal framework for its actions. An exhaustive review of all these decrees would require extensive analysis; therefore, this article focuses on the most significant measures.
The first decree targeting the Jews was issued on 19 April 1941 and aimed to preserve ‘Croatian national property’. 12 It declared null and void all transactions concluded with Jews in the two months prior to the establishment of the NDH and that exceeded the value of 100,000 Kuna. The decree targeted real estate in particular. Only a few days later, an additional decree governed similar transactions thereafter. 13 Many other decrees, targeting all kinds of Jewish property, followed.
On 2 May, a ‘Decree on the proper conduct of business and the prevention of sabotage in commercial enterprises’ was published. Although it did not refer to Jews, in practice it was primarily directed against them. To underline this, on the same day, the Office for the Renewal of the Economy (Ured za obnovu privrede) was established within the Ministry of National Economy (Ministarstvo narodnog gospodarstva). Its main task was to supervise the work of companies in general, manage them, if necessary, buy and sell them, and dispose of nationalised property. Although Jewish property was—again—not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the entire text of the decree, the Office was mainly involved in the robbery of Jewish businesses. 14 The euphemistic name pointed to one important aspect—the desired economic renewal of the Croatian state—while omitting that this would be achieved by robbing Jews and other non-Croats. The Office's activities and results remain obscure, as hardly any documents from this agency have survived. 15 The lack of sources reflects the chaotic situation in the first months of the state's existence.
Although it remains unclear who led the Office for the Renewal of the Economy, its deputy director was Ante Barić 16 —a name unfamiliar to most historians but one worth noting. 17 Barić remained with the institution through all its reorganisations and was a quintessential mastermind behind the scenes orchestrating the appropriation of Jewish property. Only after the greater part of this task had been completed did he transfer to the Directorate for Public Order and Security (Ravnateljstvo za javni red i sigurnost, Ravsigur).
While the Office began the robbery by appointing the first administrators to Jewish businesses in Zagreb, the government continued issuing new decrees. The decree published on 3 June 1941 stipulated that ‘undesirable’ persons and those ‘dangerous to public safety’ could be removed from their homes or businesses or from entire streets or neighbourhoods without compensation. 18 Only 2 days later, Jews were forced to identify themselves and their businesses, while on 6 June they learned that they also had to report their assets and those of their companies to the Office for the Renewal of the Economy within 20 days. 19 The Ustaša now sought to establish a comprehensive inventory of all assets belonging to Jews, aiming to close any conceivable legal loopholes that would have made it possible for Jews to secure these assets. Additionally, on 5 June, a decree came into effect that made concealing Jewish property punishable by imprisonment. 20 With the Extraordinary Decree of 26 June 1941, Pavelić announced the transfer of Jews to concentration camps. 21 While the looting of Jewish property had already begun, it became significantly easier to finalise after the deportations. Furthermore, although no legal framework existed, an internal circular from August 1941 stipulated that the property of deported Jews would also be transferred to the state. 22 The deportations continued until 1943, leaving only a small number of Jews outside of the concentration camps—those with special status 23 and those in mixed marriages.
The new decrees cited above led to an ‘explosion’ of work that outstripped the resources of the Office for the Renewal of the Economy. Furthermore, in parallel with the anti-Jewish legislation and the legislative preparations for the theft of Jewish property, the persecution and expropriation of the Serbs continued, which also provided impetus for the expropriation of the Jews. On 4 June 1941, the NDH and the German Reich agreed on a large population transfer. The Reich would expel around 200,000 Slovenes, whom it wanted to remove from the annexed Slovenian territories, to Croatia. In return, the NDH could deport the same number of Serbs to Serbia, which was under German military administration. 24 To manage this task, a completely new institution was formed on 24 June 1941—the ‘State Directorate for Renewal’ (Državno ravnateljstvo za ponovu). It oversaw the expulsion of the Serbs as well as the settlement of the Slovenes. 25 It was also responsible for taking over the property of the expelled Serbs and its subsequent distribution. To support the latter task, two further decrees regulated the nationalisation of the property of those persons who had been resettled or had left the territory of the NDH (in other ways). 26
Only one week after the creation of the State Directorate for Renewal, the ‘State Directorate for Economic Renewal’ (Državno ravnateljstvo za gospodarstvenu ponovu) was founded on 1 July 1941 with Ćiril Ćudina appointed to lead it. 27 More precisely, the law-decree establishing the Directorate was published, while behind the scenes Ćudina was tasked with setting it up. He belonged to those Ustaša-supporters whom Pavelić trusted and whom he therefore appointed to run various offices, regardless of their actual skills. 28
The State Directorate for Economic Renewal absorbed the Office for Economic Renewal. Ante Barić remained in his position and became Ćudina's deputy. The State Directorate for Economic Renewal was headquartered in Zagreb, with important branch offices established later in Osijek, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo. Three months after the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, this constituted the first broader attempt to get ahead of the robbery in the provinces.
The new institution was responsible for the exclusion of Jews from the economy and for the takeover, administration, and sale of Jewish property, which is why it was usually referred to as ‘Jewish renewal’. 29 Both, the State Directorate for Renewal and the State Directorate for Economic Renewal were directly subordinate to the government. However, there was an overlap of responsibilities between the two institutions. After two and a half months of parallel existence, they were finally merged on 15 September 1941 under the name State Directorate for Renewal, with Ćiril Ćudina as its new head. Ante Barić remained as his deputy. However, not much changed at first.
During this period, between June and September 1941, all Croatian Jews were required to report their property; many of them, especially in Zagreb, had to leave their homes, while many others were simply robbed of various belongings or forced to ‘donate’ them in the so-called ‘contributions’. At the same time, all entrepreneurs were confronted with commissioners in their companies who were now in charge of everything.
The next step entailed the transfer of Jewish companies into ‘Croatian hands’. Two important preconditions had to be met for this: first, this property had to be transferred into state ownership, 30 and second, it was necessary to know how much the property that was to be sold was worth. There were two ways to fulfil the first point. The first involved the purchase of Jewish companies by the Office for the Renewal of the Economy (and later the State Directorate for Economic Renewal). This applied to Jews who had so far remained in their companies. They had to be persuaded to sell their companies to the state. 31 It should be stressed that this occurred in spring/summer of 1941, when many Jews had not yet been deported. Those who owned businesses usually still worked there, as their expertise was appreciated, although they were stripped of their ownership rights by the commissioners. The second option envisaged the use of regulations on expropriation, ‘interpreted and applied as widely as possible where even the smallest legal basis exist[ed]’. 32 This option must have been used to nationalise the entire property of the Zagreb industrialist Leo Miler—which included a brick factory, an orchard, and various properties—as early as June 1941. 33
At the beginning of September 1941, with the decree on the expropriation of commercial enterprises, the state created the basis for the expropriation of any company for the benefit of ‘the state and the people’. 34 With the Decree on the Nationalisation of the Property of Jews and Jewish Companies, published on 10 October 1941, the state finally legalised all expropriation of Jewish property. The newly merged State Directorate for Renewal was put in charge of it. 35 However, there were no regulations on how the State Directorate for Renewal was to organise its work around the administration and utilisation of the nationalised property. Directives in this regard shifted with the political situation, and the work of the State Directorate for Renewal changed accordingly. 36 The nationalisation of the companies took place across the entire NDH between November 1941 and April 1942. 37 After nationalisation, they could be sold.
As swiftly as the robbery of businesses began with the appointment of commissioners, the appropriation of Jewish real estate also intensified. At the end of May and the beginning of June 1941, new legal decrees stipulated that anyone could be removed from their home or business at any time and without compensation—either for reasons of ‘public safety’ or because the state needed these buildings. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior determined that mayors of towns could dispose of empty apartments. 38 The police directorate could then decide which apartments had to be evacuated for reasons of ‘public safety’. 39
A year later, a comprehensive final decree on the appropriation of Jewish property was issued. Unlike the previous year's decrees, this one spanned several pages and included 19 detailed articles. 40 It stipulated that all remaining Jewish property not yet nationalised would become the property of the Independent State of Croatia, with no right to compensation for former owners. From this point onward, ‘Jewish property’ was considered to no longer exist.
Reorganisations of state institutions in charge with appropriation
The State Directorate for (Economic) Renewal (‘Ponova’) had already gained a reputation among contemporaries as an inefficient and corrupt authority, a view later reinforced by contemporary witnesses and historians. Its leaders were well aware of these problems. On the one hand, it continuously struggled with inadequate staffing. On the other, clientelism—and thus corruption—could not be effectively combated. As this problem was systemic, it affected all institutions, especially those dealing with the distribution of looted property, until the collapse of the NDH. Despite this, the state leadership repeatedly tried to make its bureaucracy more efficient. Regarding the expropriation of Jewish property, this meant securing as much of the loot as possible for the state treasury.
On 29 August 1941, the State Directorate for Economic Renewal was authorised by Pavelić to independently administer all Jewish property, which had to be reported under the decree of 5 June 1941, and to undertake ‘at its own discretion’ (‘po slobodnoj razsudbi’) everything that served to preserve and secure it. As a result, on 30 August, the head of the State Directorate for Economic Renewal transferred the administration of all Jewish real estate to city magistrates or district offices. 41 All managers, residents, and tenants of Jewish properties now had to pay the rent and lease fees to the relevant municipal or district administrative offices. The aim behind this step was to prevent anyone from enriching themselves from Jewish properties by bypassing the state. The daily newspapers were instructed to publish the new regulations in highly visible places and to add that violations could result in penalties of one to five years in prison and the confiscation of all property. 42
As the real estate was not sold—except in a few rare cases—but remained state property, the state tried to gain as much as possible by renting it to ‘Croats’. Given the severe housing crisis 43 in the larger cities of the NDH, the municipalities received many requests from people seeking housing (especially Jewish). 44 Despite considerable effort, this proved to be a zero-sum game, as the new elite seized the larger apartments and many houses. Renting the remaining properties proved to be unprofitable, as most of the income had to be spent on their maintenance.
Another major issue for the State Directorate for (Economic) Renewal was the sale of Jewish businesses. While real estate remained with the state, the Jewish businesses were to be sold as soon as possible to ‘capable Croats’, completing the desired transition of the economy into ‘Croatian hands’. The state was, however, unable to cope with the task of selling companies across the entire national territory for two main reasons: first, it had no appropriate staff 45 ; and second, there was no state institution that could carry out this work in the provinces. Therefore, on 15 November 1941, the entire portfolio relating to the sale of Jewish and Serbian businesses was outsourced to the two major Croatian cooperatives Savez Napredkovih Zadruga (Napredak) and Hrvatski Radiša. These were not bodies created by the state after the founding of the NDH, and they were not subordinate to a ministry. Both cooperatives had been long established and were well-known and respected by the population. Napredak was assigned Slavonia and Bosnia, while Radiša handled sales in the rest of the NDH, particularly in the capital. They were joined by the Muslim society Narodna Uzdanica. Although the latter did not have a contract with the state, it handled applications from Muslim applicants and buyers under special agreements. 46 The three institutions were to play an inglorious role in the theft of Jewish businesses.
However, the biggest reorganisation occurred at the turn of the year 1941/1942, when the government attempted to dissolve the many special authorities that had been created during the ‘revolutionary upheavals’ in 1941 or to subordinate them to traditional state offices. In the course of this reorganisation the State Directorate for Renewal was dissolved. Its tasks—insofar as they concerned ‘non-Aryans’, or the administration of and decisions regarding the property of all resettled persons—were transferred to the newly founded Office for Nationalised Property (Ured za podržavljeni imetak). The Office, based at 23 Dorlićeva Street in Zagreb, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. However, regardless of the reorganisations, the Office for Nationalised Property was in no way inferior to the State Directorate for Renewal in linking the robbery with the destruction of the Jews. Yet there was one significant difference: while the State Directorate for Renewal was in charge when the actual robbing happened, the main task for the Office for Nationalised Property lay in securing as much of the stolen property for the state treasury as possible, as well as in the redistribution of the already stolen property.
The former deputy director of the State Directorate for Renewal, Ante Barić, was promoted to head of the Office for Nationalised Property. 47 Barić was the perfect choice for this post, as he was a loyal follower of the Ustaša government and a member of the Ustaša. During the previous six months he had shown his superiors that he was a capable civil servant who worked tirelessly to maximise state revenues. On top of all this, he was an anti-Semite to the core. 48
With the two big issues of real estate and businesses gone, one could assume that the workload of the new office had decreased significantly. This was not yet the case, as the Office for Nationalised Property was still overseeing both tasks, as well as dealing with all the other stolen property, especially the movables, bank accounts, and all kinds of financial papers, etc. Barić and his staff were extraordinarily busy. Including the province, the State Directorate for Renewal had a total of 350 employees. This number was reduced when the Office for Nationalised Property was founded, so that in the summer of 1942 there were 130 employees working there. In view of the amount of work involved, Barić considered the number of employees to be far too low. 49
‘The main reason that led to the Ministry of State Treasury taking over the affairs of the former Directorate for Renewal was the effort to protect the state's fiscal revenues in the best possible way during nationalisation’. 50 Barić wasted no time in putting a stop to the hitherto practiced ‘waste at state expense’, so the Office for Nationalised Property started the new year with numerous decrees, requests, and instructions. They all aimed at increasing efficiency and securing state revenue. Barić was supported by his superior, Finance Minister Vladimir Košak, to whom he repeatedly turned with requests for new circulars.
First, Barić asked the Ministry of Finance for a circular to secure the rental income from the Serbian and Jewish properties used by state offices, Ustaša institutions, organs of the ethnic Germans and some societies. None of them had been paying any rent up to that point. Furthermore, all Ustaša units were to help prevent the ‘wild’, i.e., personal, robbery of Jewish and Serbian property. 51 The surveillance of the province increased as well. Only a little later, Košak instructed all tax officials in the province to send him an overview of the income from the sale of movables and the management of real estate. 52
In addition to other properties, the deposit books now also came into focus. At the end of January 1942, Barić sent another circular to all city magistrates, district offices, municipal authorities, and tax offices, repeating the (hitherto not fully executed) instruction from September 1941 to send all deposit books of Serbs and Jews to his office. This time, it seems to have worked better, because most of the deposits and debt claims were nationalised in the spring of 1942. 53
In order to concentrate on maximising profits from the looted property, Barić instructed his employees as early as February 1942 to shelve Jewish requests for maintenance. Money should not be given to Jews so that they could spend it ‘uncontrollably’. Instead, the state treasury in Zagreb gave the Jewish community a certain amount of money to feed the Jews. The province should have followed Zagreb's example. 54 As a matter of principle, the Office was extremely cautious in dealing with all matters where a solution in the interests of the injured parties was pending due to the legal situation. The aim was always to get the maximum for the state. It fits that, after the war, the Commission for the Handover of the Office for Nationalised Property noticed that the long-standing head of the Legal Department for Jewish Affairs had held back cases in which injured parties might have received some compensation, so that they remained unresolved. 55
After the decree of 20 October 1942, which nationalised all Jewish property in one fell swoop, the workload at the Office increased even further. Because new office space was needed, even the former head of the State Directorate for Renewal, Ćudina, had to vacate his apartment above the Office. 56 There was a lot of work and not enough staff, which is why some staff members had to work overtime at the end of the year. 57 At the same time, some of the staff were still unwilling or unable to carry out the work to Barić's satisfaction. Complaints and threats of dismissal were a recurring theme throughout the Office's existence. 58 However, due to corruption and a lack of skilled workers, the situation remained the same until the collapse of the regime.
While a new wind seemed to be blowing after the takeover by the Office for Nationalised Property, corruption and personal enrichment could not be eradicated. However, it soon became clear that these were part of the nature of the NDH. This is particularly, though not exclusively, evident in personal interventions. As Deputy Director of the State Directorate for Renewal, Barić had already tried to curb the many interventions that had led to major delays in work. As head of the Office, he was still struggling with the same problem. In June 1942, he asked all department heads to resolve sponsored cases as quickly as possible so as not to waste additional valuable time with phone calls, visits, etc. He needed 27 ushers, as, due to the heavy ‘party traffic’, one had to stand outside the office of each head of department and each independent consultant.
59
In September, the government tried to solve the problem by decreeing that, among other things, only department heads were allowed to receive parties and that the latter had to leave the building immediately after the meeting.
60
As with similar measures a year earlier, these actions bore no fruit. The head of the Office was so powerless against the interference of high-ranking personalities that he sometimes did not show up at the Office, simply to avoid receiving certain persons and accepting their cases. Barić's conclusion after a year of the Office's work was devastating. He still saw no progress towards completing the work. He therefore urged the department heads to decide the cases more quickly and not to allow their work to be disrupted by third parties pursuing their own interests: I cannot conclude without mentioning on this occasion that it is essential to distinguish between what is important for the state's interests and what is not. Whether someone, be it, I don't know, a high personality, will get a nicely furnished apartment sooner or later, or at all, is completely irrelevant to the Office; however, it is not irrelevant to it whether more or fewer investigations are carried out to identify hidden and undeclared properties. Nor does the Office care whether someone will buy what they want sooner or later; but it does care that endless negotiations and information will take away its time from managing nationalised property. And it does not matter to the Office whether someone will buy what they want sooner or later, but it does matter that endless negotiations and information take up its time in the administration of state-owned property.
61
In 1943, there were again major changes. In June 1943, Košak had to vacate his post as the head of the Ministry of Finance. Ante Barić moved to Ravsigur at the end of the year, where he became deputy head. 64 He was succeeded by his deputy, Hugo Crnojević. In addition to these personnel changes, the Ministry of Finance was reorganised and the Office for Nationalised Property was to be abolished, with its areas of work being transferred to the relevant departments of the Ministry of Finance. This was not possible immediately, as the work in the office was not yet ready to be handed over. Even after 2 years in which Barić, as head of the Office, had tried everything to complete the work on the nationalisation of the economy, there was still no end in sight. While unsolved cases piled up, ideas about a reduction in staff and the removal of all unfit employees spread again. 65
At the end of the year, the new Minister of Finance, Dragutin Toth, ordered the establishment of an advisory committee for matters relating to nationalised property. This was exactly what Barić had repeatedly called for. The committee consisted of five members, including Barić. 66 From January 1944 onwards, the committee met every eight days to discuss all issues brought to it by the Office. It dealt with difficult questions that arose in connection with the sale of formerly Jewish, now nationalised property. This committee met until the collapse of the NDH—the last meeting took place on 12 April 1945. Ultimately, however, the work on the ‘nationalisation of the economy’ was not completed by the end of the war. The Office was only wound up by the new Yugoslav authorities in 1945–1946.
Appropriation and persecution
The State Directorate for (Economic) Renewal was supposed to regulate the economic aspect of the persecution of the Jews and was therefore deeply embedded in the network of persecuting institutions right from the start. One thing in which it engaged was to obstruct Jewish pleas. At the beginning of the persecution, as many Croatians still tried to help their Jewish friends and co-workers by putting in a good word for them with the authorities, the newspapers announced that the State Directorate for Economic Renewal would not consider any questions or topics concerning Jews. In autumn 1941, on the same day that the decree on the nationalisation of the assets of Jews and Jewish companies was published, the head of the State Directorate for Renewal issued a ‘very secret’ letter to all its department heads. In it, he ordered his staff not to process any applications from Jews, their spouses, and children relating to maintenance, removal of administrators, etc., until further notice. Only if the applications concerned state revenues could his staff process them. As he put it, there was ‘now neither time nor [were there] ways of resolving Jewish concerns’.
67
Just a few days later, Ćudina reaffirmed his statement and made it clear to his subordinates: Money in Jewish hands is their most dangerous weapon and every kuna [Croatian currency] in Jewish hands turns into bombs that are used against the Independent State of Croatia. The permit
68
means nothing other than that the Jew will not go to a concentration camp. These permits have nothing to do with the property of the Jews.
69
After the State Directorate for Renewal was replaced by the Office for Nationalised Property in January 1942, the situation for Jews did not change. In line with the existing policy, the new director ordered that Jewish applications should be shelved. Barić also immediately issued an instruction to the Zagreb Housing Office, which stipulated that ‘the most necessary clothing and shoes’ could be given to Jews, but that each case had to be examined individually. 71 He ignored applications for compensation for expropriated businesses or for a livelihood. As he considered the issue to be a political one, he wanted the State Directorate for Public Order and Security (Ravsigur) and the State Economic Directorate (Državno gospodarstveno povjerenstvo) to make a decision on the matter. 72
In addition to obstruction, from the very beginning, the work of the institutions concerned with robbery could also threaten the lives of Jews. On 11 August 1941, the State Directorate for Renewal sent a letter to the Ustaša police requesting that passes not be issued to the Jews until they had confirmed that their property issues had been clarified. In plain language, this was intended to secure their property for the state and prevent Jews who wanted to leave the state from selling their possessions to third parties ‘at the last minute’ and taking the money abroad.
73
The delay in issuing passes was a further obstacle for those fleeing, and could ultimately mean death if their escape routes closed in the meantime or they were deported to concentration camps. A letter by Ćudina from October 1941 shows how deeply the heads of the authorities responsible for appropriation were anchored in the logic of the ‘extermination’ of the Jews. At this time, the sale of the expropriated Jewish businesses had already begun in Zagreb. Dissatisfied with his employees, he scolded them for their handling of Jews: Despite my repeated requests, it still happens today that individual Jews are not treated in the manner that was intended. Every Jew, if he is selected for processing, must be stripped of everything so that all his property can be nationalised. […] As soon as the decision has been handed over to the Jew, the State Directorate for Public Order and Security must be informed that the Jew has been deprived of all his property without compensation and that he is to be taken to a concentration camp.
74
Jelka Ivanović is a Serb, wife of the Jew Kraus, allegedly both still in Zagreb, but it is absolutely certain that neither of them love the Independent State of Croatia and do nothing in its interest.
75
Conclusion
The expropriation of Jewish property was a process systematically carried out by the government and authorities from the first to the last day of the existence of the Independent State of Croatia. The actual confiscation took place between April 1941 and October 1942, during which time all Jewish assets were ultimately nationalised by decree. The redistribution of the seized property overlapped with the period of confiscation but continued until the end of the war. When the Ustaša regime was defeated and the Independent State of Croatia finally dissolved in May 1945, nearly all Jewish property had been seized and redistributed. While the Ustaša had failed disastrously in nearly every other domain, they were, aside from the German National Socialists, unmatched in their persecution of the Jewish population.
Taking the example of expropriated and sold businesses, this dysfunctional state nonetheless managed to sell most of them. Out of approximately 2525 businesses, only around 339 remained unsold. 76 This outcome reflects the thoroughness with which the NDH authorities ‘redistributed’ Jewish businesses to non-Jews.
The agencies—the State Directorate for (Economic) Renewal and the Office for Nationalised Property—played leading roles in orchestrating the expropriations, receiving support from other government bodies, cooperatives, and private organisations. Likely from as early as summer 1941, and certainly by January 1942, Ante Barić emerged as the primary architect behind the implementation of state-organised expropriations. He relentlessly overcame internal and external obstacles to seize as much as possible and extract maximum gains from these expropriations for the state. In the end, the NDH had stolen Jewish property in worth of at least 5.14 billion Kuna. 77 This is the official number documenting the revenue of the state from all kinds of appropriated Jewish property (real estate, valuable objects, companies, and household goods). Some of the valuable objects—from money to jewellery to shares and insurance policies—were stored in banks and used to build national reserves, while some of it was used to balance the Croatian budget, among other things. For this purpose, gold, silver, and other valuables were to be collected and deposited with the Croatian State Bank. 78
Considering that the state grappled with many other challenges—from resource shortages and two allies who not only drained it financially but also interfered politically, to widespread distrust among its own population expressed through partisan warfare—the central importance of ‘nationalisation’ becomes apparent. It is clear, however, that this process did not ‘renew’ the Croatian economy but instead inflicted substantial damage on the Croatian Economy and more importantly, it was an important step in destroying the Jewish community in Croatia.
