Abstract
Opposing the treaties signed after the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviet state and the nascent Turkish Republic saw themselves as potential allies. The Treaties of Moscow and Kars in 1921 were the legal expressions of this. Among other things, both signatory powers agreed that a bilateral commission would demarcate their newly established mutual border in the South Caucasus. This article provides insights into the daily work of the Joint Turkish-Soviet Border Commission that met, after repeated delays, from March 1925 to September 1926. Based on the minutes of this commission stored in the National Archive of Armenia, it explores the following questions: Who were its members? What was its daily business? What sort of challenges occurred and how were they dealt with? This allows us to place this commission in context. Even though the Commission members stuck publicly to the terms of friendship and cooperation, they had conflicting geopolitical interests. Potential conflicts were deliberately silenced. Furthermore, regional representatives from the Transcaucasian Federation (on the Soviet side) or from the Kurdish minority (on the Turkish side) were marginalised in the decision-making processes. After one and a half years, the Commission was able to demarcate the bilateral border. From this perspective, its work was a success. The boundaries established in 1925/26 still exist today, separating Turkey from the three South Caucasian republics.
The South Caucasus region was one of the major theatres of World War I. It led to unprecedented atrocities and mass displacement. The genocide against the Armenian population in East Anatolia by Ottoman troops is the most striking example. During the war, the Russian imperial army occupied Erzurum and Trabzon, but the revolutionary events in Petrograd 1 in 1917 led to the dissolution of the Russian forces. After that, the tide turned in favour of the Ottomans. 2
In March 1918, Lenin's revolutionary government signed the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Ottoman Empire and the other Central Powers. In the South Caucasus, the Bolshevik government ceded the provinces of Kars and Batum (Batumi) to the Ottomans. On the ground, the Bolsheviks had already lost control over the region to the Transcaucasian Commissariat that later transformed into the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation. 3 With the split of this federation in May 1918, the Ottomans could force the three now-independent republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign the Treaties of Batum on 4 June 1918. There, the Ottomans gained even more territories, including the Ararat plain and Nakhichevan. Despite this treaty, Ottoman troops kept intervening in the region. The occupation of Baku in September is one prominent example. But, after signing the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, all these Ottoman gains turned to ash. 4 Shortly after, Entente troops occupied Constantinople and the straits.
Following their defeat, parts of the Ottoman army rebelled against the Entente forces. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), they opposed the allied occupation by appealing to Turkish nationalism and, initially, to Islam in order to include the Kurdish population of Anatolia. 5 Organised under the umbrella of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in April 1920, they formed a rival government. Soon after, they publicly opposed the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Sèvres signed by the Ottoman government in August 1920. Among other points, this treaty foresaw the internationalisation of Constantinople and the straits, allied zones of influence in Anatolia and the creation of an Armenian state in East Anatolia, the so-called ‘Wilsonian Armenia’. 6
After the Ottomans were defeated, the three republics in the South Caucasus kept struggling over the borders. The regions of Lori, Nakhichevan, Zangezur, Karabakh and Zakataly were particularly contested. The Republic of Armenia faced skirmishes and small-scale wars with Georgia as well as with Azerbaijan. In the Summer of 1920, the Red Army conquered Azerbaijan. At the end of 1920, as Armenia faced the threat of a Turkish-nationalist invasion, the Soviets took power in Erivan' (Yerevan). 7 In February 1921, the Bolsheviks then invaded Georgia. The sovietisation of the three republics put an end to open territorial conflicts as the Bolsheviks had a preeminent interest in securing Baku oil and its shipping routes for running their economy. 8
Together the Soviet state and the Turkish nationalists found themselves as outcasts in the post-Paris world. The Bolsheviks had been excluded from the peace negotiations altogether. What is more, aside from weakening Germany's power, the main goals of the Paris Peace Conference were to contain the Russian Revolution and to secure Entente’s influence over the Near East. Thus, facing Entente intrusion, the Bolsheviks and the Turkish nationalists evidently shared overlapping interests.
Many researchers have studied the conflict-ridden relations between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, struggling for supremacy in the Black Sea region, and then between the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union. 9 The 1920s and 1930s somehow posed an exception, however, when the young revolutionary states acted as de facto allies against foreign, Western intrusion. 10 It is debatable whether this Turkish-Soviet cooperation was based on an anti-imperial and anti-colonial ideology or whether it was more so based on strategic necessity. 11 Nonetheless, it soon showed significant results. After the Bolsheviks had conquered the South Caucasus, they quickly formalised their bilateral relations with the Turkish nationalists. The Treaty of Moscow between the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and the Turks in March 1921, and then the Treaty of Kars between the latter and the three South Caucasian Soviet republics in October 1921, substantiated this rapprochement. In territorial terms, they significantly revised the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum. According to the Kars Treaty, the Turks would still gain previously Russian imperial territories, but to a smaller extent (article 4). This also included the parts of ‘Wilsonian Armenia’ in East Anatolia. The Bolsheviks agreed to cede the Russian imperial Kars province as well as parts of the imperial Batum and Erivan' provinces to the Turks, whereas the Turks agreed that the port town of Batum and its surrounding areas would be part of Soviet Georgia (article 6). Both sides also agreed that the region of Nakhichevan would be part of Soviet Azerbaijan and that Turkey would share a common border with Azerbaijan there (article 4 and annex 3). Thus, Nakhichevan would eventually form an Azerbaijani exclave between Soviet Armenia, and Persia and a border-strip of about 10 km with Turkey. 12
After formalising their relations, Lenin's government resolutely supported the Turkish nationalists with weaponry, equipment and money in their ongoing war against the Greek army in West Anatolia. 13 With this backing, the Turkish nationalists managed to gain full control over Anatolia. With the dissolution of the Ottoman government in late 1922, Mustafa Kemal forced the Entente powers to revise the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which granted international recognition to the newly established Republic of Turkey. 14
In the east, the Kars Treaty in 1921 only roughly defined the border between Turkey and the Soviet state. In the southern part, the Aras River was chosen as a ‘natural’ marker. Within the treaty, a prospective commission was scheduled to survey the border (article 4). 15 Aside from flowery bilateral declarations, the establishment of this joint border commission was intended to materialise this new friendship. 16
Such a ‘friendly’ border drawing was rather exceptional. After the war, most of the newly formed borders were contested by at least one side and subject to revisionist plans. The Soviet state and the Turkish Republic faced border disputes with nearly all of their neighbouring countries: the Soviet-Romanian and the Greco-Turkish borders were among the most contested. 17 Thus, in contrast to practically all other bilateral commissions that had to survey and redraw state borders in this era, the Turkish-Soviet Commission did not act against a background of poor bilateral relations. 18 However, the practice of this border commission reveals that despite all their declarations, both sides still distrusted each other: they both had contradictory and mutually exclusive political ambitions. The Bolshevik promotion of a world revolution would eventually collide with the Turkish plan to construct a modern nation-state. Nevertheless, both sides saw the potential public display of their mutual commitment in a successful bilateral delimitation.
At least by name, the three South Caucasian Soviet republics, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, were the signatories of the Kars Treaty. In 1922, these three republics were merged into the Transcaucasian Federation which soon became a founding member of the Soviet Union. The territorial concessions on the Soviet side provoked particular opposition in Armenia since such concessions not only included Armenian settlements in the former Kars and parts of the former Erivan' provinces, but also the national symbol, Mount Ararat. Nevertheless, the Armenian Bolsheviks had to agree to these terms. From Moscow's perspective, support for the Turkish nationalists had to be prioritised over Armenian concerns. Only after World War II did Moscow shift towards supporting Armenian claims, which then irreversibly damaged Soviet-Turkish relations. 19
In what follows, I will provide insights into the Joint Turkish-Soviet Border Commission that was tasked with demarcating the border from March 1925 to September 1926. I will address the following questions: Who were its members? What was its daily business? What sort of challenges arose and how were they dealt with? Such challenges can be grouped into varying, but nevertheless entangled layers. First, ‘technical’ problems could arise, for example, there could be a lack of resources or personnel to undertake a given task. Second, the Commission might face topographical problems when the line of a border on the map does not easily correspond to markers in the physical landscape. Such problems could translate into another set of challenges, that is, political-territorial quarrels within the commission itself. Moreover, local uprisings and intrusion by officials from the one or the other side could pose challenges to the security of Commission delegates and their work. Finally, institutional obstruction could diminish the efficiency of the Commission when local functionaries ignored its authority.
The following study is based on an analysis of the Russian-language documents of the Joint Border Commission, stored in the Armenian National Archive (Hayastani Azgyin Arkhiv, HAA) in Yerevan. In contrast to the Archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow (Arkhiv MID) as well as the Georgian Central Historical Archive in Tbilisi, the documents in Yerevan are easily accessible to researchers. While the HAA retains all the documents concerning the Armenian-Turkish border, it does not hold those minutes referring to the works on the Turkish-Georgian border further north. Aside from the minutes of the Border Commission, the source base also includes the minutes of the Soviet delegation's preparatory meetings. These minutes in the HAA are copies, the originals are allegedly stored in Moscow. Although the documents in the HAA only refer to the beginning months of the Commission's activities, they nonetheless allow insights into the spectrum of entangled challenges its members had to face. In addition, I also rely on topical articles published in the leading daily newspaper of the Transcaucasian state and party institutions, Zaria vostoka (Dawn of the East), edited in Tiflis (Tbilisi). Hence, it was the main news medium for the Soviet South Caucasus. Finally, I also take into consideration the foremost Soviet printed news media Izvestiia (News) and Pravda (Truth).
The article develops its argument in a progressive way. It begins with the problems of the considerably weak state powers in the South Caucasus; it then analyses the composition of the Border Commission and its planning of the daily work on the ground. This allows us to subsequently delve into the entangled challenges the Commission had to face. These parts are divided first into technical and topographical challenges and then into aspects of state security and institutional obstruction. The article concludes that, despite obviously conflicting interests and entangled challenges, both sides at least tried to act according to the topoi of friendship and cooperation. Regional actors were in a marginalised position: they could address the Commission but were excluded from the crucial decision-making processes.
Weak states and ubiquitous rebellions
It goes without saying that it was much easier to draw a line on the map of Kars than it was to actually survey the projected border in remote areas and demarcate the new line on the ground. The Kars Treaty between the Soviet state and the Turkish nationalists envisaged forming a bilateral commission to fulfil the task of surveying and demarcating (article 4), but the establishment of the bilateral commission was delayed several times. 20 At the end of 1924, both governments finally agreed to send delegations to the border on 15 January 1925. However, the Turkish side then requested postponement of the Commission's first meeting until 15 February, arguing that cold weather made it impossible to convene earlier. 21
Indeed, inclement weather was most likely a diplomatic excuse. In early 1925, the Turkish Republic began to lose control over large parts of East Anatolia and simultaneously faced a governmental crisis. Between November 1924 and March 1925, the government was reshuffled twice, making it much more difficult to develop a consistent foreign policy. During these months, the government's open repression of the Kurdish language and culture led to unrest in East Anatolia and then triggered a large-scale uprising under Sheikh Said. At the same time, relations between Turkey and Persia soured because the latter supported the Kurdish leaders. 22 Between February and March 1925, the Turkish army eventually crushed this rebellion. During the campaign, the government introduced martial law throughout the country and eventually established a one-party rule. Despite these harsh repressions, East Anatolia would remain in turmoil in the years to come. 23
While they likely knew that invoking the weather in order to delay the Joint Border Commission was a ruse, the Soviet delegation accepted Turkey's excuses as Bolshevik rule over the South Caucasus faced similar challenges. In particular, the Georgian and Armenian governments in exile were vocally agitating with the goal of revising the political status quo and ending Bolshevik supremacy over the region. 24 The idea of exiled politicians conspiring with the Entente powers against the Soviet order was a nightmare for the Bolsheviks. The large-scale uprisings in Ganja in 1920, in Zangezur in 1921 and in the Guria, Imereti, and Kakheti regions of Georgia in mid-1924 are prominent examples, but smaller rebellions occurred throughout the interwar period. 25 Thus, the Bolsheviks and the Turkish nationalists both struggled to maintain control of their peripheries, and neither were fussy about the means of dealing with resistance.
Notwithstanding these troubles, both parties agreed to meet on 15 February 1925 at the very south of their prospective border. This was right at the border triangle with Persia, where the Aras and Karasu rivers meet and that now connect Turkey in a small strip with Azerbaijani Nakhichevan. Unfortunately, the location was far from any road or settlement. On the designated day, the Soviet delegation arrived in the agreed area but was unable to find their Turkish colleagues. They began to search for them when suddenly, someone began shooting at the Soviet surveyors. Luckily, no one was hurt. The Soviet delegation was frightened, however, and decided to abort the mission and to return to Erivan' emptyhanded; they sent a complaint to Georgii Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in Moscow. 26 Later, the Turkish delegation blamed the Kurdish rebels for this incident. 27
Subsequently, both governments exchanged telegrams and agreed that convening at such a remote spot was a bad idea. For their next attempt, they decided to meet at a bridge crossing on the Aras River, and for this purpose, selected the border village Markara (Margara) between Igdir (Iğdır) and Erivan'. There, both parties finally met on 14 March 1925. The encounter in Markara was a success: the two delegations exchanged their credentials and scheduled their first formal session in Erivan' the next day at 2 p.m. 28
The composition of the Joint Border Commission
When comparing the members of the Joint Commission, the most striking discrepancy is that the majority of the Soviet members were civilians (three out of five), whereas the Turkish party was comprised solely of military personnel. This reflects the fact that the Turkish political elite at that time was largely military and that the core of the Bolsheviks was civilian. Each delegation had one head and four regular members, one of them acting as deputy head. If needed, both delegations could draw on additional personnel from among a contingent of secretaries, topographic experts, local representatives, local military staff, military guards, drivers and interpreters who accompanied them. Both delegations directly reported to the head of their respective Foreign Offices. Oto Karklin reported to Chicherin, Fahri Bey to Șürkü Kaya and then Tevfik Rüştü Aras. 29
The heads of both delegations were dedicated representatives of their newly established states. 30 Fahri Bey (later Fahri Belen), the leader of the Turkish delegation, held the rank of major and was a member of the General Staff. He was born in Bolu in north-western Anatolia in 1893 and graduated from an Ottoman military academy. He fought in the Great War and again in the War of Independence when he was awarded high military decorations from the Turkish Republic. However, he had not been the first choice to head the Border Commission. Initially, Galip Bey (later Ali Galip Pasiner), former Turkish ambassador to Bukhara, had been nominated as the head of the delegation. Because Galip Bey was appointed to another position, a general named Nesimi Bey had to replace him. However, Nesimi Bey suddenly fell ill and the Turkish government had to find yet another head of their delegation. 31 On the other side, Oto Karklin presided over the Soviet delegation. He was an experienced old Bolshevik, born in 1884 in the Baltics, and had already served on several high-ranking border-drawing missions. Among other tasks, he had taken part in the creation and demarcation of the Central Asian Soviet republics in 1924. 32 Hence, he was well aware of the questions and challenges that could arise in the course of national delimitation.
Within the Soviet delegation, each member had a distinct function: Galaktion Vashadze represented the Transcaucasian Federation, but he did not regularly join the meetings; Ivan Sharskov and Boris Kuznetsov represented the Red Army in the delegation. Kuznetsov was the head of the Red Army's General Staff in the South Caucasus; Sharskov had a military-technical education and served in the Red Army's reconnaissance department. Last but not least, Iosif Martsinskii, a civilian expert, was an experienced surveyor and scholar in Oriental Studies. 33 On the Soviet side, Sharskov and Martsinskii were the experts appointed to carry out the topographical work. Together with their Turkish colleagues, these two were responsible for transferring the cartographic line onto the physical landscape and agreeing to marker positions. 34
One interpreter from each side then provided the necessary knowledge so that the delegations could understand each other. A man named Idris-Chor translated the Russian statements for the Turkish delegation. On the Soviet side, two men, one named Karapetian and another Izmailov, alternated in translating the Turkish statements into Russian. Due to these translations, the time needed for the discussions inflated. According to the verbatim transcripts of the meeting on 15 March 1925, only about 2,000 words (in 45 statements) were exchanged during the negotiations. Because the translations had to be done simultaneously, this process took almost five hours. 35
Planning the daily work
At the Commission's first formal meeting in Erivan' on 15 March 1925, both sides exchanged notes that proclaimed the good relations between their respective governments. 36 Fahri Bey stated: ‘Whenever Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics experienced turbulent times and were encycled by enemies, they shook each other's hand. Our meeting here is a proof and pledge of the continuing friendship and a pledge for the success of our work’. 37 Vashadze, a representative of the Transcaucasian government, accepted Fahri Bey's declaration and solemnly added: ‘The attempts of the imperialist states to weaken our friendship, to divide us, did not succeed and such attempts are going to fail in the future’. 38 After these notes, Karklin formally protested because of the delays and the shooting incident. Fahri Bey apologised in the name of the Turkish government and these issues were considered closed. 39
Initially, it appeared that the Soviet side would determine the modus operandi of the Border Commission since their members seemed much more experienced in the formal procedures of conducting delicate bilateral meetings and recording minutes. According to these minutes, Fahri Bey did most of the talking for the Turkish side. When present, Oto Karklin led the Soviet side, although he received much more support from other members of his delegation. Karklin was a seasoned Soviet bureaucrat, whereas Fahri Bey—nine years younger than Karklin—was an officer with more experience in combat than in delicate negotiations of this type. While it is clear that the Soviet delegation tried to dominate the discussion of the Commission's formal procedures, Fahri Bey had some understanding of military topography and intervened when he saw the interests of his side at stake.
Both sides agreed on the following procedure: first, delegates from both sides would visit the border area together, and while in the field, they would draw a topographic sketch; 40 later, they would formalise the line drawn on the topographic map in a legal document to be written in French, the lingua franca at that time; 41 afterwards, each side had 24 hours to raise any concerns, otherwise the agreement would be valid and topographers from both sides would place provisional border markers along the agreed line in that locality together. 42 The delegates also agreed that only two members from each side would need to sign the legal documents, thus freeing up others to fulfil different tasks. 43 This meant that, once the work of the Commission began, only two members from each delegation, along with their staff, would be present in the field at any one time. It was hoped that this would expedite the process of surveying, agreeing and delineating the border. 44
Clearly, the Commission's work required that members be mobile, travelling across the provisional bilateral border. It convened once more in Erivan on 22 March; then met again in Igdir on 26 March. As an exceptional bilateral commission, it had to stick to certain diplomatic rules. For instance, the head of the delegation in whose country they convened had to chair the meeting. 45 Furthermore, the hosting side also had to take care of the catering and the well-being of all the Commission's members. Thus, the Border Commission resembled, on a smaller scale, an international political conference with all its rules, prohibitions and etiquette. Both sides had to take such rules into account when interacting with one another. 46
Technical and topographical challenges
Relying on the good will of all participants, the Commission muddled through the many technical difficulties that arose almost instantaneously. After its first formal session in Erivan', both sides realised that they faced major issues in fulfilling the tasks they had agreed upon. First, the Turkish delegation complained of a lack of actual border markers and the Soviets agreed to give them some of theirs. 47 Second, the Soviet side noted that they neither had the proper equipment for printing the legal documents in French nor any interpreters with the appropriate language skills at their disposal. 48 Therefore, both sides agreed that, with the translators’ support, the secretaries from each side should write down a Turkish and a Russian version of every document. 49 These would later be translated into French and then properly signed by all parties. 50
The Commission began surveying the border alongside the Aras River on 18 March 1925. First, this seemed to be an easy task since according to annex 1 of the Kars Treaty, the riverbed, the thalweg, served as a basic marker, 51 but the numerous islands within the river and seasonally changing riverbeds soon posed challenges for the surveyors. 52 In most cases, the Commission quickly solved such issues by attaching the islands to the shore that was the closest. 53 Facing the possibility of changes in nature, the new thalweg should define the border. 54 In other words, like previous bordering commissions, they set the thalweg as the defining standard. 55
However, there were also controversial incidents. In the region south-east of Erivan', at the joining of the Zanga (Hrazdan) River, the Aras formed a larger island of around 2 km2 and neither side could agree where the thalweg actually ran. 56 On this occasion, Fahri Bey showed his Soviet counterparts that he could be a tough negotiator. First conducting his own survey of the river and island, the fairly young Turkish officer then used his soldier's knowledge of landscape topography to assert the Turkish claim for this area. He conclusively showed his Soviet colleagues that the thalweg of the Aras was in the northern arm and according to the Kars Treaty, the island should be attached to Turkey. 57 Karklin and the other Soviet representatives had no evidence to properly counter Fahri Bey's arguments. However, the Armenian government had urged the Soviet delegation to be rigid in this matter as complete access to this Aras island was vital for the irrigation systems on the Armenian side. There, farmers needed unhampered access to the river shores and its tributaries, particularly during the dry season. 58 Karklin refused to concede the island and—evidently having prepared for this eventuality—instead began discussing possible compensations. In the end, they offered other islands in the Aras River further to the north as bargaining tools. 59
Both sides achieved some gains and had to face certain losses. From the records, it is clear that at least the Soviet side was more or less happy with the outcome of the early months of their work. 60 Despite some intense debates, both sides had managed to resolve the political-territorial and the technical challenges of their journey alongside the border. However, they also had to face problems that emanated from concerns of state security and institutional obstruction.
Considerations of state security and cross-border movements
The end of World War I, the Armenian Genocide and the experience of mass displacement in East Anatolia were all still present in the minds of the people in the region. The Armenian government warned the Soviet delegation that many refugees from the former Russian imperial Kars province were now living in the border areas. When the Commission arrived to survey these localities these refugees might urge its members to facilitate their return home. In such an event, Karklin was instructed to call for police assistance. 61
As mentioned above, the border region on both sides was far from being pacified. In the border triangle with Persia, Kurdish rebels simply ignored the newly demarcated borders as they allegedly undertook raids into Soviet territory and stole cattle and other properties from Soviet citizens. 62 Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation downplayed the issue of Kurdish resistance in East Anatolia. 63 In return, they evidently expected that Fahri Bey and his colleagues would say nothing about the challenges Soviet rule faced in the South Caucasus, for instance, about the uprising in Georgia in 1924. 64
Despite the flowery words, there were moments of distrust between the delegations. In particular, the Turkish delegation's freedom of movement on Soviet soil gave their Soviet colleagues some cause for anxiety. On one occasion, Soviet border guards claimed to have observed Dzhamaladdin Bey, Fahri Bey's deputy, talking to people in a border village and inviting them to migrate to Turkey. 65 This was a red flag for the Soviet delegation and they discussed whether they could place their Turkish colleagues under constant guard while on Soviet territory in order to prevent any contact between them and regular Soviet citizens. In the end, the Soviet delegates dropped this idea, but the episode clearly signalled the potential for distrust and conflict. 66
However, obstructive behaviour by Soviet officials posed a much bigger threat. The Soviet border guards were subordinated to the Transcaucasian Cheka, the secret police, in the capital Tiflis. Yet, despite orders from their superiors, the guards refused to provide the Border Commission with horses or to assist them in their work. 67 Sharskov, Karklin's deputy, had several particularly unpleasant run-ins with Oganesian, the head of the border guards in Markara. First, Oganesian harassed Turkish members of the Commission. Then, Ivan Sharskov complained that Oganesian refused to assist the work of the Commission: ‘When he was asked to cross the Aras River, Oganesian declared that he does not want to risk his life. What is this if not opportunism?!’ 68 This was not the last misunderstanding between the Soviet delegation and the Soviet border guards on their journey along the provisional line of the new border. 69 Boris Kuznetsov, the high-ranking military officer in the Commission, tried to defend the border guard's behaviour: ‘Oganesian is not a bad person, but he does not understand all the nuances his work requires’. 70 Nonetheless, Oganesian's disregard for the commission and its work is indicative of the challenges faced on the ground.
The many entangled technical, topographical and political-territorial challenges, including the problems of state security and institutional obstruction, delayed the Turkish-Soviet Border Commission. While its work was still ongoing, both governments concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality on 17 December 1925. In this act, the Soviet Union and Turkey once more underlined their intention of pursuing bilateral cooperation. Both sides also stated their joint determination to resist further interventions by other powers. They underlined that amicable relations would further develop in the future. Thus, the general political background for the practical surveying and drawing of the border remained favourable. 71
On 9 September 1926, the Border Commission met for its 49th and concluding session. A public ceremony took place in the castle of Tiflis, the capital of the Transcaucasian Federation. Despite signs of distrust, both sides publicly declared the work to be a huge success. 72 The lack of appropriate equipment, difficulties with translation, the intricate topography, issues with land and water use and the lack of firm state control over the peripheries on both sides all contributed to the Commission taking much longer than expected. 73 Zaria vostoka as the foremost South Caucasian media outlet, extensively covered the public ceremony on 9 September. Izvestiia and Pravda published simple TASS announcements that the treaty was signed. 74
Both sides underlined that the populations in the borderland areas would not have to worry about the newly demarcated line. They took aspects of what Tim Ingold calls ‘occupation’ and ‘habitation’—the conflict between the geometric line of the international border and the local population's lived-in space—into account and tried to balance them. 75 Trade between Turkey and the Soviet South Caucasus was growing by the end of 1926. 76 Villagers on both banks of the Aras River would be allowed to hunt and fish. Herdsmen from one side of the border would be allowed to use pastures on the other side without harassment. 77
Conclusion
Evaluating processes of border formation always requires analysing the asymmetries of power. For the Soviet state, the borders of its member republics Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at stake. However, as in the negotiations leading to the Kars Treaty in 1921, representatives of these republics were consulted but not involved in the decision-making processes as such. 78 The Soviet delegation reported to Chicherin and not to the Transcaucasian federal government under Mamia Orakhelashvili. The Turkish-Soviet Border Commission and its modus operandi once more underlined the subordinate position of the South Caucasian republics and their representatives. However, they were able to address their concerns to the Soviet delegation as they did in the case of the Aras River island.
Turkey faced similar internal challenges. In 1925 and 1926, Kurdish rebels put Ankara's rule over East Anatolia in jeopardy. Their resistance was met with brute force. For both delegations, concerns over the Kurdish population in the border region were only relevant to the extent that they wanted to avoid getting shot by rebels when surveying the prospective border. In essence, the new bilateral border was discussed and defined by representatives of the centres and their experts. Thus, from the perspectives of the peripheries, the ‘Turkish-Soviet friendship’ was not so much based on anti-colonial ideology, but rather on strategic necessity. 79
Notwithstanding the anxieties on both sides, the Turkish-Soviet border that was defined in 1925 and 1926 functioned without any major problems in the years that followed. Then actions by the Soviet government ultimately led to an increasing border fortification. 80 During the Great Terror and the Stalinist fear of foreign spies, it became impossible for the local population to cross the Soviet-Turkish border. 81 The bilateral relations deteriorated even more after Soviet foreign policy-makers ‘rediscovered’ the Armenian and Georgian claims on the Turkish Kars and Ardahan provinces in 1945. 82 As victorious power, rivalled in its global influence only by the United States, the Soviet Union tried to capitalise on this momentum by demanding the return of the Russian imperial territories ceded in the Kars Treaty. This attempt was the final blow that caused the once celebrated Turkish-Soviet friendship to collapse and set the stage for the Cold War when the United States began to support Turkey against possible Soviet intrusions. This subsequently led to the firm Western orientation of Turkey and its membership in NATO in the second half of the twentieth century. 83
In Armenia, the Kars Treaty of 1921 and its aftermath still reverberate up to the present day. Mount Ararat is the central focus of Armenian nationalism. In combination with the memory of the Ottoman atrocities during World War I, the ‘loss’ of Ararat provides a building block for modern Armenian nationalism. Indeed, Yerevan's city architecture is built in such a way to be ‘looking toward Ararat’. 84 Due to its support for Azerbaijan with regard to the Karabakh question, Turkey completely closed its border with Armenia in 1993. It thus is one of the few international state borders today that cannot be crossed. 85 Recently, Turkey and Armenia announced plans to re-open the border to traffic, but only for non-Turkish and non-Armenian nationals. 86 However, after the fall of the Artsakh state in September 2023 and Turkey's continuous support for Azerbaijan, the prospects for reconciliation in the region turned dark again.
Supplement: The fate of the commissioners
Fahri Bey, later Fahri Belen, remained an important political figure in Turkey. He wrote extensively about his experiences in Atatürk's nationalist army, as well as about the Soviet Union. 87 In 1950, he even served for a short term as minister for public works in Adnan Menderes’ government. Fahri Belen died a renowned military expert and historian in 1975. His Soviet colleagues faced a very different fate. The political leaders of the Soviet delegation, Galaktion Vashadze and Oto Karklin, were both shot during the Stalinist Terror. Ivan Sharskov and Iosif Martsinskii were arrested and died in prison. Boris Kuznetsov was the only member of the Soviet delegation to survive Stalin.
