From Bitter Enemies to Political Partners: Shifting Viewpoints of Slovenian Clericals and Liberals during World War I

Abstract

The article examines Slovenian liberal and clerical magazines to analyse the adaptations of the political narratives of the two main Slovenian political parties from the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914 until early in the final stage of World War I in March 1918. Slovenian clericals, who gathered together in the Slovenian People's Party, reacted to the killings in Sarajevo by adopting a strong pro-Habsburg and anti-Serbian position. Their magazines even called for a military invasion of Serbia. In comparison, their primary political competitors on Slovenian soil, the Slovenian liberals congregated in the National Progressive Party and condemned the act of assassination, yet they were critical of the Austrian anti-Serbian policy for having escalated the war. These two Slovenian political parties were also divided on the issue of the future envisioned for the Slovenian nation within South Slavic state formations. The clericals pressed for realization of the trialist idea, which forecast a Croatian–Slovenian state unit within the Habsburg Monarchy with its centre in Zagreb. The liberals, in contrast, dreamed of a larger South Slavic state that would bring all South Slavs together and have its centre in Serbia. The development of the war, chiefly the Entente's foreseeable victory, the threat of implementation of the London Pact, and the fact that Austrian Germans characterized all emancipatory Slovenian political movements as an anti-state element, all worked to force Slovenian clericals to cooperate with their pre-war enemies. The overriding aim was for them to retain their leading position among Slovenians by formally cooperating with the liberal stream, including taking over part of the liberal political strategy, in order to ensure that it was in the best possible position in the South Slavic state at end of the war.

The Slovenian political sphere was relatively cohesive until the late nineteenth century. Yet, a split came when the Habsburg centralist pressure was partly eased during the government of Eduard Taaffe (1879–1893), which somewhat weakened the need for Slovenian political groups’ joint performance. ¹ Separate political parties of Slovenian clericals and liberals were thus only formed in the final decade of the nineteenth century. Both parties utilized public gatherings and, above all, party magazines as the main channels of communication with the public. Given the absence of other media outlets, the magazines retained their significance as the primary tool not only for disseminating the party's ideology during the World War I but also for showcasing intra-party struggles. Consequently, it can be concurred ² that they are the most suitable means for analysing the Slovenian political discourse of that time.

The Catholic People's Party (Katoliška narodna stranka), which was renamed the Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS) in 1905, enjoyed the greatest support in rural Slovenian areas and among the Catholic clergy, which often became directly involved in the party's political activities. ³ Moreover, the most influential person on the Slovenian political stage in the early twentieth century, Ivan Šusteršič, was enabled to take a leading position in the party with the support of the Bishop of Ljubljana, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič. However, the SLS leader also based his legitimacy on his political ties with the highest positions in the hierarchy of the Habsburg Monarchy, and hence often held important state and provincial positions. Until the World War began, clerical journals promoted the trialist idea that implied the unification of South Slavic countries from Trieste to the Drina River. Of vital importance in this strategy was a partnership with the Croatian parties from Istria and Dalmatia. Since the latter were seeking the unification of the Croatian lands through the reformation of the Croatian–Hungarian Settlement of 1868, SLS had to accept the concept of the Croatian right to statehood, a key legal institute for connecting Croatian lands, and was trying to attract as much Slovenian territory as possible under its umbrella. However, the engagement with the idea of a unified Slovene–Croatian nation, the unification of Croatian and Slovenian lands, and the pursuit of support among the Croats were only tactical approaches within SLS for certain members. They served as a part of their defensive strategy against the German and Italian pressures and were partly influenced by ambiguous national perceptions. ⁴ This is exactly what the party's long-time leader Anton Korošec, who would become Šusteršić's biggest intra-party competitor just before the war, ⁵ admitted after the Habsburg Monarchy had collapsed:

The whole time the trialist idea was on the surface the Slovenians were afraid that they would not join the South Slavic group. That is why we Slovenian politicians, perhaps even more than was politically necessary, stuck together with the Croats. […] in our entire policy we maintained the idea that we are one nation with the Croats and that we must share the same destiny. ⁶

The basic ideological component of the SLS political program, alongside pursuing the cultural and political autonomy of Slovenians in relation to the Germans, was Catholicism. The latter coincided with the political goal of creating a Croatian–Slovenian Habsburg state unit in which the Catholics would make up the majority. At the same time, such a concept excluded the possibility of establishing connections with Orthodox Slavs, which ideologically aligned SLS with the views of the Habsburg dynasty, particularly those of the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. While his vision was not clearly defined, it appeared to be in line, at least superficially, with the trialist aspirations of the Slovenian clericals. ⁷ Despite encountering numerous opponents, including among the Habsburg Slavs, such as the Czechs who feared potential isolation within the Austrian part of the Monarchy, ⁸ Franz Ferdinand instilled hope among Slovenian clericals that their idea could still prevail. This was later confirmed by Šusteršič in his memoirs from 1922:

The circumstances at the time offered only one visible real-political possibility for the Habsburg South Slavs: to win over the future Emperor and King with their national visions, to convince him of the mutual interests, and prepare him for a coup d'état after his accession to the throne. ⁹

The second strongest Slovenian political party, the National Progressive Party (Narodna napredna stranka – NNS), held a considerably better position than the clericals in the urban areas of Slovenian territory – first and foremost in Ljubljana, Trieste, and Gorizia. Such an urban status and a strong position in geopolitically important Trieste ¹⁰ gave party members easier access to the world of higher education and the state bureaucracy, which implied greater potential for action in politics on the state level. ¹¹ The most prominent member of NNS then was Ivan Hribar, who had served as the mayor of Ljubljana between 1896 and 1910, and as a member of the Carniola Land Assembly and the Imperial Council in Vienna. After Šusteršič, Hribar was generally the most important Slovenian political figure in this period. In 1906, he formally became the leader of the party whose fundamental determinants were liberalism, anti-clericalism and South Slavic unity as a platform for the defence of Slovenian interests in relation to the Italians and Germans. ¹² For NNS, the belonging of Slovenians to the Slavic world was a far more important ideological element than Catholicism. NNS hence often criticized the clericals for their excessive obedience to the Vatican and Vienna, despite these two centres frequently having political goals contrary to Slovenian interests.

The political battle between clericals and liberals was only occasionally interfered with by the third Slovenian party, the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party (Jugoslovanska socialdemokratska stranka – JSDS). However, members of this party never managed to enter the Austrian parliament, and the Slovenian political scene during World War I was accordingly mostly marked by the activities of SLS and NNS. ¹³ Furthermore, the central Slovenian struggle unfolded within SLS itself, ultimately impacting the relationship between Slovenian clericals and liberals. This article presents an analysis of their most influential journals from that period. Despite censorship and the prevalent use of ‘indirect propaganda’ ¹⁴ – a form of propaganda employed by Habsburg authorities that appeared to be more effective in Slovenian lands compared to the Bohemia lands, ¹⁵ leading to a significant discrepancy between reality and newspaper reports ¹⁶ –, the journals were distinct enough to reflect the diverse ideological orientations of the two main Slovenian political parties. Moreover, these journals offer insights into how these parties adapted their political programs in response to the new circumstances during the war.

1. Proving loyalty to Habsburg crown

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was condemned by practically the entire Slovenian political spectrum, albeit the Slovenian parties were at considerable odds over the issue of the Habsburg's retribution measures. Slovenian clericals were inclined to strong punishment of the Serbian regime. They held the majority in the Carniolan provincial assembly which, on 1 July 1914, strongly denounced the assassination and the Great Serbia propaganda, while Ivan Šusteršič also demanded that the SLS commissioner report on all Greater Serbia and anti-dynasty activities and statements in the province. Moreover, Šusteršič publicly called for a military response, ¹⁷ which aligned with the prevailing atmosphere of war enthusiasm throughout the Empire. ¹⁸ At the same time, the main clerical journal, Slovenec, had no doubt about the motives for the assassination in Sarajevo:

The son of the Serbian nation destroyed the life of the greatest friend of the Austrian Yugoslavs. It was black hatred that struck Franz Ferdinand […] who wanted to consolidate Austria and above all to settle the Yugoslav question by supporting Croatian and Slovenian elements who do not like Greater Serbia, but in the interest of their national existence and their cultural progress they would rather choose a great Austria in which all Croats and Slovenians would be united as a solid border between West and East. ¹⁹

From the clerical perspective, the Great Serbia ideology was both the cause of the assassination and a source of future threats, and:

[…] is striving to create a great Serbia state on the ruins of Austria, negotiating with the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians. In doing so, the Croats and Slovenians would be partly sacrificed to their worst enemies, the Germans, Italians and Hungarians, while another part would end up under the yoke of the intolerant, liberal and at the same time Byzantine Serbs. […] that would not be ‘national liberation’, but national slavery and death. ²⁰

The journal Slovenec clearly distinguished between two fundamentally different Yugoslav ideologies. The Slovenian and Croatian ones insisted on a Croatian–Slovenian state unit within the Habsburg Monarchy based on the Croatian historical right to statehood, including it being administratively centred in Zagreb. The Greater Serbia state concept represented the other Yugoslav ideology:

Propaganda is carried out for the imperialist purposes of the Kingdom of Serbia to the detriment of Austria, the Croatian national consciousness and the national independence of the Slovenians. […] Those who followed these ideas in good faith, out of ignorance, out of hazy idealism, now have the opportunity to think about where the Great Serbia thinking is actually aiming, what it wants, what its true intentions are. It wants to hit the Habsburgs […], us Croats and Slovenians who as an independent, culturally advanced, and united nation can only exist in the Austrian Monarchy. […] we want to preserve our Christian culture and civilization which is being threatened by Byzantine Serbia, we do not want to have anything with anarchist Serbian liberalism, which has an ally in Slavic liberalism. ²¹

The Slovenian clericals therefore placed the Great Serbia ideology in the framework of liberalism, which supposedly was forcing small nations to assimilate and thereby aspired for their disappearance. Along with identifying the biggest external enemy, Slovenec firmly pointed to the political option that was deemed the main internal rival of SLS – the liberals. In this context, calls were made not only to bring about an end to the Great Serbia state idea; they also put forth revenge and retributive measures that Austria-Hungary should have taken against Serbia.

Beyond the aim of establishing a Catholic South Slavic state within the Habsburg Monarchy, the insistence on punishing Serbia served as a means for Slovenians to demonstrate their loyalty to the Habsburg Crown. In fact, a conservative majority of Slovenians were indeed loyal to their emperor. ²² Specifically, following the assassination in Sarajevo, German politicians in Austria attempted to link the Slovenians with the Serbs based on their Slavic identity, thereby framing the trialist within the context of anti-Habsburg and anti-Austrian politics. As a result, Slovenec sought to clear up the stain after such accusations:

We cannot tolerate our national enemies abusing the act of the hands a Serbian, denigrating the loyal Croatian and Slovenian people in order to direct the authoritative circles to an anti-Slavic course in our countries in general, to accelerate Germanization, and suppress our just national demands. Therefore, all the Catholic Slovenians and Croats must decide with all their strength to destroy the Great Serbia imperialist idea […] Our enemy is the Great Serbia imperialist thought – it must be suppressed. ²³

Frustrated by the writings of German magazines, Slovenec explicitly wrote that SLS had always advocated for the creation of a Croatian–Slovenian unit that would have a defensive function against an expansive Greater Serbia, and that the Slovenians and the Croats were the most loyal defenders of the Austrian state. ²⁴ Šusteršič repeated these ideas at an SLS meeting on 5 July 1914:

The conspirators got the bombs in Belgrade. The bombs they threw were from the military arsenal in Kragujevac. […] bombs and revolvers, even money was given in Belgrade to these young men who committed the crime. That criminal conspiracy was cooked up there because they were afraid that if Franz Ferdinand became emperor, that would be the end of the Great Serbia propaganda. […] We Austrians, thank God, have an emperor by the grace of God, and the Serbs have their king by the grace of murderers. […] and when the emperor calls us to deal with the criminals who caused the Sarajevo disaster, then these so-called ‘Serb brothers’ should remind us of those janissaries who once slaughtered their brothers […], then these ‘brothers’ will feel our fists. ²⁵

Bishop Jeglič of Ljubljana viewed Šusteršič's speech as harsh but fair, ²⁶ writing in his memoirs: ‘I hope that the central government will see how its violent treatment of the Slavs in general and the Croats in particular supports Serbophilism. Let them also see that the Yugoslav elements are not trustworthy, only we, the Catholics who fear God and therefore love our homeland, are trustworthy’. ²⁷

The Catholic journal Zora was also very clear about the assassination and the distinction between the two ‘Yugoslavisms’:

The cursed hand of a mad bandit killed the most noble friend of the Yugoslavs in the name of Serbia. […] The goddess of vengeance, dira dea, will cruelly persecute those who have touched blood with an evil hand, until the sinister act is avenged … Maybe now the Slovenians and Croats will see and allow the third ‘brother’ to go his way past the threshold of our house. ²⁸

From the clericals’ perspective, the rejection of the Yugoslav idea under the leadership of Serbia was needed for the survival of both the Slovenians and the Croats. Consenting to the broader (South) Slavic ideology would, according to them, lead to a position where their fate would be decided by the Orthodox centres of power:

We are convinced from the bottom of our hearts that official Russia will sell the Slovenians for the Dardanelles, and official Serbia will do the same for a bowl of lentils on the eastern Adriatic coast. We have no friends outside the Monarchy. ‘No illusions! […] the survival of the Slovenians is guaranteed only under the Habsburg eagle.’ ²⁹

Interestingly, as an alternative to the trialist vision, Zora proposed the idea of a broader association of the Habsburg Catholic Slavs: ‘We can be proud of our tradition, our organization which includes not only southern but also northern brothers; let us connect even closer with our fellow Croats, let us have even closer contacts with the Czechs and Poles’. ³⁰

The Carinthian Slovenians were in a very delicate position after the Sarajevo assassination. For them, the assassination was a shot at their hopes for a demarcation between the German and Slovenian territories in Carinthia and, at the same time, German accusations that Slovenians were anti-Austrians were growing. It is therefore no surprise that the Slovenian Catholic magazine Mir (Peace) wrote:

Especially we Slovenians and Croats have a specific reason to mourn over the open grave of the deceased heir to the throne. […] he saw that the power of the country in the south must rest on the Slovenians and Croats […], who were always the most faithful pillar of the Monarchy and dynasty, who in difficult and unfortunate days always unwaveringly stood by their emperor, even when oppressed by other nations and oppressed by the German and Hungarian governments, although we were stepchildren in the same house, we Slovenians and Croats always served the state and the dynasty with loyalty and love for the firstborn! ³¹

Despite such statements, the Carinthian German nationalists did not give up linking Slovenians with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and thus called Slovenians’ loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria into question. Moreover, Slovenian efforts towards political emancipation were equated with the Greater Serbia program, meaning that the Carinthian Slovenians, like their compatriots from Carniola, had to prove their loyalty to the existing state on a daily basis and stress the distinction between the program of the Croatian–Slovenian state and the Greater Serbia concept:

We know why we hold Austria with open hearts; we know that outside of it we have nothing to look for, outside of its borders we have no blood brothers, unlike the Germans and Italians […] now they want to teach us patriotism and loyalty! Those people who make a pilgrimage to Bismarck's grave […], these worshipers of everything that smells like Prussia […] they are putting on a cloak of Austrian patriotism and dare to disgrace our patriotic feelings full of sympathy and provoke the loyal Slovenian population in this outrageous way! ³²

In the summer of 1914, even Straža, the clerical Slovenian magazine from Maribor, then under the influence of Anton Korošec, conveyed similar anti-Serb views. It emphasized that the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy had, for example, much better conditions for national autonomy than the Bulgarians in the ‘New Serbia’ (Macedonia), and despite the repression the Bulgarians were trying to improve their status through legal means, unlike the Serbs who were inclined to criminal efforts. ³³ In less than one month, the atmosphere at Slovenian clerical journals heated up to such an extent that Slovenec published the song ‘Bojni grom’ that called for revenge: ‘We greet you with canons, you Serbs; let's set up a cool home for you next to the willow tree…’ ³⁴ Slovenian clerical journals therefore did not react significantly differently regarding Franz Ferdinand's death.

2. Liberals as the enemy of the state

While the killing of Franz Ferdinand and his wife brought condemnation from Slovenian liberals, the criticism referred to the act of murder itself, not its political motives. Furthermore, individuals such as Ivan Lah considered the assassination as proof that Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was Serbian and wanted to remain that way. Accordingly, the culprits for the murders were those who provoked the Serbian people on their major national anniversaries. ³⁵ Ivan Hribar shared this opinion and blamed the politics of Franz Ferdinand, whom he labelled an autocrat and absolutist of the worst kind. In his memoirs written after the war, Hribar admitted that Ferdinand's death triggered the bloodiest war up to that time, but, from his perspective, freedom for the oppressed peoples subsequently arose. Hribar added:

If Franz Ferdinand had remained alive […] the world would still not have been deprived of a great slaughter, but in all likelihood this would not bring freedom to the oppressed and the culture of new growth which is now fortunately beginning to be noticed, but would follow even worse slavery and, as a result, the dangerous decay of spiritual good. ³⁶

Therefore, Hribar saw the war as inevitable, although his memoirs can also be understood as acknowledging that Franz Ferdinand would manage to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy and hence prevent the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (the Kingdom of SCS). ‘Fortunately’, Hribar wrote, in 1914 Gavrilo Princip appeared and, with his ‘heroic act’, created a chance for unification. ³⁷ Of course, there were no such strong outpourings of anti-Habsburg thoughts at the beginning of the war among Slovenian liberals. Slovenski narod, the most influential Slovenian liberal journal, initially described Franz Ferdinand's death as an irreparable loss for the country, ³⁸ but was opposed to the ultimatum given to Serbia and the resulting military invasion. The same journal also strongly criticized the anti-Serbian reactions:

This mob attacks the Serbs, kills and slaughters them, destroys their property, demolishes their houses, apartments, and workshops and steals, steals, steals … The official reports write extensively on this, but say nothing about what was done against it. […] Assassinations of national representatives and rulers are not uncommon […] but never and nowhere has the whole nation taken responsibility for the actions of individuals. ³⁹

NNS remained in its pre-war positions, considering Serbia an essential part of the envisioned South Slavic state. As a result, the party and its journals faced attacks from the Austrian authorities, which involved censorship and propaganda interventions. It is noteworthy that even less subversive political magazines could not evade the reach of censorship and propaganda, thereby limiting and distorting communication from all Slovenian politicians to the Slovenian people. However, the harshest interventions were observed in the political publications of Slovenian liberals. ⁴⁰ Ivan Hribar was imprisoned as early as August 1914 in Ljubljana, despite the Slovenian liberals holding power in that city at that time. ⁴¹ In Gorizia county, the liberals faced an even stricter regime as the Italian authorities portrayed all Slovenians as a pro-Serbian fifth column, leading to the imprisonment of numerous influential Slovenian politicians. ⁴² These actions eroded loyalty to the dynasty and state patriotism, particularly among liberal Slovenians, ⁴³ and contributed to ethnic tensions within the army at the front lines. ⁴⁴ Considering the subsequent role of Italy in the war, it sounds paradoxical that Italians from Gorizia even organized ‘patriotic’ rallies in 1914 at which pro-Austrian and anti-Slavic slogans were shouted. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the liberal Slovenian press showed sympathy for the Serbs and Serbia, which, from their point of view, still represented the Piedmont of Yugoslavia ⁴⁵ and that ‘a Slovenian priest is neither a Slovenian nor a Slav’. ⁴⁶ The beginning of the war was therefore not marked by a change in the ideological orientation of either dominant Slovenian political stream. In fact, it seemed as if the differences between the clericals and liberals had even deepened.

3. Demands for the Slovenian–Croatian state unit

From the Slovenian clericals’ perspective, Italy joining the war on the side of the Entente had a dual impact. On one side, it directly threatened Slovenian western territories. On the other side, it also caused difficulties in the relationship with the supreme authority – the Pope – because he was located in enemy territory. The initial reaction of Janez Evangelist Krek, the main strategist of SLS, was directed at strengthening the ties with the Croats. ⁴⁷ In agreement with its Croatian partners, SLS addressed the Pope directly with a memorandum ⁴⁸ in order to remind the Vatican of the Slovenian and Croatian demands, their national and religious unity, and the importance that they attributed to the presence of the Catholic element in the Balkans. This memorandum was revolutionary for the Slovenian clerical political stream because it mentioned for the first time the possible dissolution of Austria-Hungary. A priest named Anton Mahnič, who drafted the memorandum, proposed that all Slovenians and Croats be included in the Croatian kingdom without Serbia. ⁴⁹ The same was demanded by Croatian and Slovenian priests at a meeting in Rijeka in which Krek also participated. The memorandum emerging from that meeting proposed the already well-known trialist model. However, although it assumed that the Habsburg Monarchy would survive, it stressed that the Slovenians and Croats had the right to freely choose their own ruler. Based on the testimony of Russian agents, the Slovenian historian Janko Pleterski speculated that the meeting had also discussed the possibility of annexing Croatian and Slovenian territories to Serbia under the rule of Karađorđević, which he explained as disingenuous tactics carried out in collusion with Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo with the aim of rushing the Austro-Hungarian authorities to merge the Slovenian and Croatian territories. ⁵⁰ Still, while the latter is merely speculation, this option was certainly not discussed at a meeting of the Croatian–Slovenian parliamentary club in October 1915 in Maribor, where only the need for a Croatian–Slovenian unit within the Habsburg Monarchy was expressly mentioned. In November of the same year, Šusteršič and Jeglič, who was the Bishop of Ljubljana, also spoke about the Croatian-Slovenian connection. They assessed German nationalism as the greatest threat to the Slovenians and its Hungarian version to the Croats, and therefore both once again emphasized the need for Croatian–Slovenian unification. ⁵¹ They also adopted a draft for a memorandum addressed to the new heir to the throne. Its final version was sent in January 1916 to Karl I and contained an appeal from Slovenian bishops for the necessity of equality for all nations in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Still, the situation did not develop in line with the wishes of SLS. This was reflected in a more pessimistic approach to the possibility of uniting the Croats and Slovenians, which was already noticeable on 16 December 1915, at a meeting of the Croatian–Slovenian Club in Maribor. When Vjekoslav Spinčić proposed that all provincial assemblies should be prepared for an agreed approach for the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, BiH and the Slovenian territories, Krek commented that the Slovenians and Croats alone would be unable to achieve that without either German or Hungarian support. In case of relying on Budapest, a sub-dualistic solution should be sought with the first step of ensuring a special status for BiH such as Croatia-Slavonia held within Hungary. Spinčić, in contrast, believed that the establishment of a special unit gathered around Croatia should be sought together with the support of the Poles. According to him, the Croatian–Slovenian Club should also seek the support of other South Slavic parties, including the Slovenian liberals. Krek was, however, reserved regarding this question because he believed that Šusteršič could use SLS's association with the liberals in the context of their internal clerical disputes. ⁵² The disunity of the SLS therefore somewhat slowed the Slovenian convergence efforts down and the consequent connection on a broader South Slavic basis, although Krek's reticence was also understandable from the aspect of the Austrian government's hesitation. Indeed, in January 1916 the Minister of the Interior Hohenlohe presented the government's plans and thoughts on the reform of Austria after, as the minister himself had predicted, the victory of the Central Powers in the war. ⁵³ In addition to the German-Czech unit, the plan also included the formation of a Polish and South Slavic or Croatian unit. The latter, however, would not include Slovenian territories. Krek most likely anticipated this attitude of the rulers, and thus his insistence on seeking non-South Slavic support may be considered a consequence of realpolitik, as well as the realization that neither outcome of the war offered an optimistic perspective for Slovenians. The victory of the Entente implied Italy's annexing of a large swathe of Slovenian territory by Italy, while the Central Powers’ victory would cause even stronger pressure from the Austrian Germans.

Despite the supervision of the state authorities, in accordance with their pan-Slavic orientation, the Slovenian liberals managed to establish contacts with the Russian government and ask for help in preventing the division of Slovenian and Croatian territories between the Great Powers if the Entente were to win the war. Hence, in the winter of 1914, Dr Karel Kramař, a Czech politician and neo-Slav companion of Ivan Hribar, tried to use the geopolitical realignment to make Russia interested in the issue of Trieste. He proposed an idea to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Sazonov, whereby Trieste, if the city became a Yugoslav port, would also become a port that the Russian navy could use. ⁵⁴ Hribar also attempted to raise Pašić's interest in the idea of a Slavic bank with French capital, while in October 1914, Andrej Munih, the editor of the Trieste magazine Jugoslavija, and Leopold Lenard, a priest in the village of Slap near Vipava, wrote to the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs about the Slovenian desire to unite with the Serbs and Croats. Simultaneously, they expressed a wish to form a relationship between the Slovenians and Serbia similar to the one Bavaria had with Prussia. As an alternative, they stated that Slovenia would be a protectorate of the Great Powers until the circumstances would allow it to merge with Yugoslavia. In that letter, Trieste was marked as primarily Slovenian territory. Moreover, it was emphasized that autonomy belonged not only to the Croats, but to the Slovenians too. A similar note was presented to the Russian consul in Venice. ⁵⁵ In the end, NNS was left empty-handed. Namely, Russia decided not to tighten its relations within the Entente at the expense of, from its point of view, marginal Balkan interests. ⁵⁶ Despite their failure, these attempts, both by SLS towards the Vatican and by NNS towards Russia, in the first year of the war show the leading geopolitical goal of the two strongest Slovenian parties. It was to secure the Slovenian–Croatian territories in a single state formation, while wider Yugoslavia (outside of the Habsburg Monarchy) may have been thought of in liberal circles, but, given the situation, this vision was beyond the scope of the realpolitik. Yet, the fact that neither the diplomatic activities of SLS nor those of NNS brought positive results influenced the orientation of both parties towards achieving stronger intra-Slovenian cohesiveness.

4. The convergence

For Slovenians, the second turning point, after Italy's entrance to the war, was marked by the death of Franz Joseph. It newly animated the Slovenian political sphere due to a large number of members of the ‘Belvedere circle’ becoming advisers to the new Austrian emperor and Hungarian King Karl I. For a moment, it seemed that the new ruler would begin to implement the plans drawn up by Franz Ferdinand. Krek thus continued to cooperate with the Croatian Starčević's Party of Rights, which was supposed to make a new request in the Croatian Parliament to unite the Croatian and Slovenian territories. The majority at the Croatian–Slovenian Club's meeting on 28 November 1916 supported the idea that the request towards Vienna should be aligned with the Czechs. Moreover, Krek received the support of Spinčić, who advocated the broader South Slavic action which, in addition to 20 members of SLS, four Dalmatian and three Istrian Croats from the party of rights, also led to the inclusion of the Dalmatian Club (five Dalmatian Croats and two Serbian representatives) and the Slovenian liberal representatives.

Slovenian liberals, in contrast, tried to win support on a lower level, mostly in the liberal group gathered around the Slovenian society from Trieste – Edinost (Unity). It is thus not surprising that the Edinost magazine commented on the meeting of the Croatian–Slovenian Club with a conclusion about the imperative of all measures with the aim of unifying the entire Slovenian and Croatian people under the scepter of the Habsburgs, ⁵⁷ even though they had rejected the trialist idea before the war. ⁵⁸ A large number of Trieste's Slovenians were intimately on the side of Serbia at the commencement of the war, but when Italy joined the Entente, the fear of Austria-Hungary's eventual defeat and consequent annexation by Italy of the Austrian Littoral prevailed. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that some liberals’ hatred of Austria was so strong that, paradoxically, they even hoped the Italians would reach Ljubljana soon and thereby encourage the Habsburg Monarchy's capitulation and the creation of a South Slavic state around Serbia. Therefore, radical movements such as Preporod (Rebirth) did not consider the loss of some Slovenian territory to be more important than the wider South Slavic picture. ⁵⁹ The Italian side tried to use this in January 1915 when the diplomat Carlo Galli failed to convince the Slovenians gathered around Edinost to remain passive when Italy entered the war and ultimately to agree to Italy's annexation of both Trieste and Rijeka. The representatives of Edinost were against this after Ante Trumbić had advised them to persist on the idea of a Slovenian Trieste, while in the north the border should run along the Soča River. Although they could not neither accept nor reject Galli's proposal, because they had no authority to decide on it, ⁶⁰ this represented a considerably different attitude to the Austrian Littoral issue from that in the Croatian ‘New Course’ in 1905. ⁶¹ Therefore, Trieste liberals (Otokar Rybář, Gustav Gregorin, and Josip Wilfan) supported Trumbić and authorized him to be the representative of the littoral Slovenians. They highlighted that the fundamental mission of joint political action was the indivisibility of the Slovenian and Croatian territories. ⁶² Despite the repression of the state authorities during the war, Slovenian liberals still managed to remain on the political stage. Furthermore, their activity was very dynamic, with the bans apparently stimulating them even more to look for new political partnerships. In this setting, the greatest success was their penetration of the clerical SLS.

Korošec and Krek, on the other hand, saw the cooperation with the liberals as a lever for increasing their own legitimacy as pan-South Slavic representatives within the framework of coordinating the actions of the Croatian–Slovenian Club (later the Yugoslav Club) and the Croatian Parliament vis-à-vis the emperor. Due to the broader coalition potential, they had an advantage over Šusteršič, who remained in his pre-war positions and did not have contact with liberals at all. ⁶³ SLS’ gradual distancing of itself from Šusteršič's course was also influenced by the development of the macro situation. The threat of the state disintegrating and, consequently, much greater dependence on Germany, turned the policy of Karl I in the opposite direction from the Slovenian pre-war hopes. The Habsburg Germans were not keen on the idea of a South Slavic unit and instead sought stronger ties with the Hungarians in order to consolidate the dualism. As a result, Karl I was crowned King of Hungary, and his oath to the Hungarian constitution prevented him from changing the dualistic system of the Monarchy. ⁶⁴ While this implied solving the Croatian question within the framework of the sub-dualist model, Karl I postponed his oath to the Austrian constitution, which opened the way for reform of the western part of the Monarchy. From the Slovenian point of view, this did not bode well because at that time the German political parties were demanding a constitutional change that would declare the Austrian part of the Monarchy, except for Dalmatia, which would be ceded to Hungary, ⁶⁵ a German national state. ⁶⁶

The manoeuvring space for Slovenian political parties narrowed with the new battlefield on the Soča River and the crystallization of the Entente's war goals, which indicated that the ‘liberation’ of the South Slavs would actually mean Italy's annexation of the Littoral Slovenians. Linked to this issue, Šusteršič published a public letter in a newspaper and also addressed it to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister with a request to forward it to the American President Wilson:

The Slovenian people do not live under any foreign domination, but under the hereditary rule of the Habsburg dynasty to which they are loyal with endless love and unshakable devotion as they show in this war on all battlefields. In contrast, it is the agreement that wants to impose foreign domination on the Croatian-Slovenian people because it wants to annex a large part of the Croatian-Slovenian territory partly to Serbia, partly to Italy. ⁶⁷

The Entente's goals were no less criticized by Korošec, who in a letter to Czernin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, labelled the Entente's ‘liberation of the Slavs’ a hypocrisy and repeated the notion of Croatian–Slovenian loyalty to the Habsburgs. ⁶⁸ There were thus no substantive differences in the declarative attitudes of Korošec and Šusteršič. Bigger differences existed in the strategic part related to connecting with Croatian parties. Šusteršič had a narrower manoeuvring space, as he confirmed in November 1915 at a meeting with Bishop Jeglič when he named members of the Croatian Pure Party of Rights the only trustworthy party in Croatia. Yet, this party formed its own version of the Croatian Parliament's address to the emperor, which focused solely on the unification of Croatia and BiH, while mentioning the connection with Slovenian territories as merely a possibility. The reason for this lay in the party's belief that the Austrian Germans would not allow the separation of a large chunk of Slovenian territory from Austria. After that, Šusteršič found it increasingly difficult to explain to Slovenian clerical circles why SLS should support this Croatian political option. Since the Serbian part of the Croatian–Serbian Coalition (Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija – HSK) was also against mentioning Slovenian territories in the address to the emperor, this meant that the Slovenians could then only count on the Starčević’ Party of Rights, to which Anton Korošec was much closer than Šusteršič.

The unfavourable international situation therefore did not encourage cohesion within SLS. Moreover, the gap between the two inner poles was expanding, and the wider space for Krek and Korošec in terms of gaining support from the Croats and building partnerships with the liberals gave the duo a much better starting point. Krek's final victory in the intra-party struggle was cemented on 30 September 1916 by the Bishop of Ljubljana, who then withdrew his support for Šusteršič because, as explained in his diary, Šusteršič lacked the potential for creating a pan-Slovenian unity. Jeglič was principally dissatisfied with Šusteršič's inability to find a common language with the liberals, ⁶⁹ his negative influence on the editorial policy of Slovenec, ⁷⁰ his loss of influence among other Slavs and, hence, his diminishing influence on the Austrian government. ⁷¹ The last straw was Šusteršič's open dispute with Krek, which also manifested outside SLS and tarnished the party's reputation. Given that Krek refused to reconcile with Šusteršič, ⁷² Jeglič began to rely more on Korošec. Even though he had labelled Korošec as ‘spiritually weak’ ⁷³ at the start of 1914, the bishop's opinion changed due to Korošec's political talent as seen in his ability to build broader cooperation with the Slovenian liberals as well as with the Croats and Serbs. Another limiting factor for Šusteršič was his unwavering loyalty to the Habsburg crown, whereas Korošec was more cautious when it came to Vienna. His declarative views on loyalty to Habsburg Crown were purely tactical. From this point of view, he was more flexible, which was crucially important in the case of the Central Powers’ possible defeat. At the same time, the younger generation of liberals managed to impose themselves as a link between SLS and the Yugoslav Committee, and thereby enabled the active shaping of Slovenian politics. While Bogumil Vošnjak was an active member of the Yugoslav Committee, an extremely important role was played internally by Gregor Žerjav who, as Korošec's secretary, contributed to the SLS leader's (re)direction from the search for a Croatian–Slovenian union within the Habsburg Monarchy to the idea of forming a wider Yugoslav state. It appears that the pivotal moment in this transformation occurred in October 1917 during Korošec's visit to Czech politicians, where he discerned strong anti-German sentiments ⁷⁴ and witnessed the already strong roots of Masaryk's myth. ⁷⁵ After that, even Hribar stated that ‘Korošec, confirmed in his faith by his visit to Prague, represented national aspirations in a straight line and without yielding in a way that we could not have wished for better’. ⁷⁶

5. The May Declaration as a cohesive minimum

The change in the SLS hierarchy had a significant impact on the activities of the Croatian–Slovenian Club, which decided to adopt a more radical approach to the Austrian authorities. On 9 March 1917, at a meeting with Prime Minister Clam Martinic, Korošec, Krek and Spinčić again proposed a state unit of Croats and Slovenians that would act as a barrier to the Italian and Serbian pretensions. However, at neither that meeting nor the meeting with the emperor later in May did the rulers show any inclination for such a reform. They largely used the meetings as a way to feel the pulse of the Croatian and Slovenian representatives in the event of Austria-Hungary concluding separate peace agreements. However, Krek was then still against any association of the Orthodox South Slavs, considering that the interests of the Slovenians and Croats in the Monarchy and the Serbs in Serbia were completely different. Nonetheless, this did not mean that he was not ready to make concessions in the direction of recognizing the Serbian national distinctiveness in the south-east part of the Monarchy. This is also indicated by his consent to form the Yugoslav Club (instead of the Croatian–Slovenian Club), which chiefly aimed to satisfy the two Serbian representatives from Dalmatia, who were asked to support the subsequent May Declaration. According to Šusteršič's magazine Resnica (the Truth), after the proposal of a declaration had already been adopted, Krek agreed with the Serbian deputy from Dalmatia, Dušan Baljak. However, he mentioned only the Slovenians and Croats who should gather on the basis of the Croatian right to statehood within the Habsburg Monarchy. ⁷⁷ Still, it is a fact that the mentioning of Serbs in the statement was also demanded by the Slovenian liberals. At that time, Korošec had already come into contact with Žerjav and the Styrian Slovenian ‘progressives’, while Spinčić had taken on the role of attracting influential liberals among the Croats. In accordance with them, an amended declaration was formed and read by Korošec in Vienna on 30 May 1917:

The undersigned representatives united in the Yugoslav Club declare that, on the basis of the national principle and the Croatian right to statehood, they demand the unification of all areas of the Monarchy under the sceptre of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty inhabited by Slovenians, Croats and Serbs into an independent state body that will be free from any government of foreigners and be built on democratic foundations. They will use all their strength to fulfil this request of our unique nation. With this reservation, the signatories will participate in the work of the parliament. ⁷⁸

The declaration was relatively radical for that time ⁷⁹ by trying to unify the national principle, that is, the Croatian historical right to statehood, and to connect the entire South Slavic area in the Monarchy. Despite advocating the idea of preserving the Monarchy, it strongly opposed the interests of the two most influential nations. Considering that the declaration threatened both the Germans and the Hungarians with the potential loss of access to the Adriatic Sea, it was expected that these demands would be rejected in the Vienna parliament. This rejection also undermined the claims made by certain individuals from the then-Slovenian social democrats that the declaration was instigated by the Austrian authorities. ⁸⁰ Yet, this act meant much more for intra-Slovenian cohesion. The declaration sparked real euphoria and was mentioned in practically every public speech. On 15 September 1917, Bishop Jeglič also expressed his support for the declaration and later explained his reasons for so doing in a letter to the Austrian government:

I took that step a) to protest against the plans of those Yugoslavs in London, Paris, etc., who want to have a Yugoslav state under the crown of Karađorđević, b) to protest against the injustice of the Germans and Hungarians that has already been committed and is still threatening us, and c) as a means of consolidating Austria in the south against external opponents. ⁸¹

Finally, Jeglič also persuaded Šusteršič, probably with the same arguments, to give his support for the declaration.

Despite mentioning the Croatian historical right to statehood and the Habsburg Monarchy, Slovenian liberals also almost unanimously expressed their support for the document. Among the first was the Ljubljana branch of NNS, which conveyed its interpretation of the declaration in the main liberal journal Slovenski narod: ‘The Yugoslav declaration is based on the principle of a common national right, we only want what is truly nationally ours, that our country includes only the Yugoslav national territory, the Croatian right to statehood serves us only as an organizational tool’. ⁸² This was a response to claims made in German magazines that the demands of the Austrian Slavs were incompatible because the Czechs appealed to national natural rights and the South Slavs to the Croatian historical right to statehood. The latter had been rejected by Slovenian liberals as an institute around which the South Slavs should gather already before the war. Through this lens, their agreement to the text of the May Declaration thus represented a certain deviation from the initial demands. Yet, the Slovenian liberals clearly prioritized the ‘natural’ national right over the historical one, while the Slovenian clerical press ignored such texts in the liberal journals. This was a sign that the Slovenian clericals were slowly withdrawing from the concept of the Croatian historical right to statehood, a concept that was used mainly in communications with Vienna and in order to satisfy the Croatian partners. The winner hence emerged in one of the main ideological disputes between the Slovenian liberals and clericals concerned with the basic postulate on which the Yugoslav state should be built. It came as no surprise that subsequently even Edinost from Trieste expressed its support for the May Declaration, even though it was one of the Slovenian political forces strongly against the concept of the Croatian right to statehood because the latter did not cover the Austrian Littoral ⁸³ : ‘Our declaration also refers to the statehood right, to the Croatian right; but this right also exclusively covers the Slavic provinces and therefore supports our demand for unification based on the national principle’. ⁸⁴ Following some rhetorical acrobatics, a consensus was reached between the two main Slovenian parties on the acceptance of the Declaration, and the document gained considerable legitimacy among Slovenians after social democrats from JSDS also expressed support in December 1917. ⁸⁵

6. Acceptance of the ‘natural’ principle and turning back to the Habsburg Monarchy

Although the May Declaration united the Slovenian parties, it failed to consolidate SLS. Ideological intra-party disagreements were transferred to the attitude to the Yugoslav vision and manifested in the public. As early as 4 July 1917, in the context of the threats brought by Nikola Pašić's aspirations to build a centralist Greater Serbia, Slovenec wrote:

We resolutely reject any interference by the ‘Yugoslav committee’, which includes several defectors from our nation who did not have the right to speak on behalf of the nation […] our nation […] condemns and eliminates such attempts most strongly. […] Our program is […] the unification of Croats and Slovenians under Habsburg rule. Such unification would be the best and strongest barrier of the state in the south against the Greater Serbia aspirations which are equally hostile to Catholic Austria as well as to the Catholic Croatian-Slovenian people! ⁸⁶

Slovenec tellingly did not reject the idea of temporal autonomy for the Croat-Slovenian areas, that is, the unification of Croats and Slovenians in the framework of a dualistic arrangement, which was in harmony with Šusteršić's successive approach to the Yugoslav issue. However, a few weeks later, on 28 July, Slovenec already referred to the May Declaration as the minimum of Slovenian demands, ⁸⁷ implying a firm rejection of dualism and reflecting the shared position of both Krek and Korošec that SLS should not participate in any kind of Austrian government that ignored the Declaration's demands. Moreover, in July 1917, Slovenec began to publish extremely anti-German articles similar to those in Slovenian liberal journals. ⁸⁸ Finally, Slovenec confirmed the victory of Korošec and Krek by explicitly rejecting the institute of a historical right to statehood and calling for the implementation of the national principle:

Slovenians in Cisleithania were divided into four provinces: Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Littoral, and they also gave our Pomeranian Slovenians to the Hungarian half to make us more controllable. Today, various invited and uninvited German statesmen still explain the sanctity and inviolability of provincial borders – nollite tangere historiam – do not touch history. Necessity forced them to invent a kind of combination of provincial and national autonomy …  They hint that they are ready to offer us some concessions in the form of crumbs, but there is no question of any national autonomy for the entire nation, of violating sacred borders and history – God forbid. […] But if they think they will erase the rights of the broad masses and nations, won with blood on the battlefields, with various invented rights written on dusty documents and donkey skins, they are wrong. Today, our future will not be dictated by dead letters on paper on a dusty parchment, but by the living needs of the nation, the actual situation of the current time. ⁸⁹

Such articles were something new for the leading Slovenian clerical journal, acting as a clear sign that Šusteršič no longer held a significant influence on its editorial policy. In addition, Krek's actions immediately before his death show that the concept of autonomy was unacceptable to him to the extent that the declaratory movement could easily reject the Habsburg framework if the territorial unification of the South Slavic provinces within the Monarchy were not recognized. This can be seen in his last announcement in the Croatian journal Hrvatska država (Croatian State) on 4 September 1917: ‘Let the dynasty know that the Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian people can only be satisfied with an independent state. The demand for an independent state is not the Entente's policy, aspirations for freedom and independence are older than the Entente, such efforts are not treason. Slavery, however, is high treason’. ⁹⁰ It may therefore be concluded that the new leadership of SLS was then planning two possibilities. The first possibility was the case of the Habsburg Monarchy's survival, which, unlike the majority of Slovenians, for most of the leading Slovenian politicians, with the exception of Šusteršič, was the relatively unlikely outcome of the war late in 1917. For this scenario, the third unit should unite all South Slavic areas in spring 1918. ⁹¹ While this was communicated to Vienna as a minimum requirement, SLS signalled that Yugoslavia could exist from Trieste to the Drina River also as an independent state. Following Krek's death, although initially implicitly, Korošec continued to pursue this policy himself and through other members of the Yugoslav Club.

The turn of SLS from a historical to a national/natural right cannot be attributed with certainty to the influence of the Corfu Declaration because news of its final contents had not yet reached the Slovenian territories. When the agreement between Trumbić and Pašić became known, Slovenec did not show an extremely negative attitude to the Yugoslav Committee's activities as it had been doing at the time of Šusteršić's interference in its editorial politics. ⁹² Furthermore, in the context of describing Italy's aspirations concerning the eastern coast of the Adriatic and parts of Carniola, Slovenec affirmatively commented on the Corfu Declaration due to its restraining role with respect to the Italians. Of course, every time the Corfu Declaration was mentioned, the editors added the positions of SLS on the May Declaration.

In comparison, the liberal Edinost clearly held a negative view of the Corfu Declaration due to fears of negotiating behind the backs of the Slovenians in Trieste:

While reading the Corfu agreement, we immediately noticed the lack of a clear provision on the relationship with Italy. […] Italy's aspirations are not limited to the city of Trieste, the Italians also demand the entire Gorizia area up to Romon and Triglav […] yes, they also want a big part of Notranjska (Inner Carniola), roughly as far as Logatec, all of Istria and all those Istrian and Dalmatian islands that they consider necessary for their dominance over the Adriatic for strategic reasons. […] The fact that the Italians have not given up their aspirations for our coastal regions is obvious from the force which they use while attacking the Soča River front. Therefore, we conclude that […] the signatory parties had already given up these areas to Italy. […] Just as we can never agree to sell Dalmatia, so, of course, we will never willingly allow our Littoral to be handed over to be at the mercy of Italy. Contrary to the ‘agreement’, which is understandably silent on this issue, we refer with all determination to the declaration of the ‘Yugoslav Club’ from 30 May this year. ⁹³

The Trieste Slovenian liberals thus firmly rejected the Yugoslav Committee's agreement with Serbia, despite having their member on the Committee (Bogumil Vošnjak) and the authorization given to Trumbić to represent the Littoral Slovenians. At the same time, they had accepted the Yugoslav Club's May Declaration in which the Slovenian clericals had the main say. At the same time, these writings of Edinost strongly revealed that the Littoral Slovenians would not agree to be a bartering item between Pašić and the Italians. This also shows that they were not ready to accept the Yugoslav options negotiated with Rome if this would mean leaving a significant part of Slovenian territories to Italy. Therefore, on 28 August 1917 Edinost formally protested against ‘any disposal of Dalmatia and the Austrian Littoral (…) without the participation and against the will of the great majority of the population of these provinces’. ⁹⁴

Italy's defeat in the Battle of the Soča River brought short-lived hope to the Slovenians that the Italians would be unable to demand what the Treaty of London had promised them. The Trieste liberal Otokar Rybář expressed his joy and asserted that this victory had finally allowed Slovenians from the conquered territories to reunite with the motherland. ⁹⁵ Gregor Žerjav also thought that the victory over Italy and peace with Russia should even have guaranteed new territorial acquisitions, while the former liberal Henrik Tuma, who had switched to the social democrats in the meantime, warned that, from a strategic aspect, the current situation did not mean much for the Slovenians, should the Entente win the war. ⁹⁶ Edinost apparently realized this in March 1918:

we know very well […] that the victory of the Entente would mean not only for a large part of Slovenia (the entire Littoral and a large part of Carniola) secession from the rest of Yugoslavia, and thus national death, but also the unlimited domination of imperialist Italy on the Adriatic Sea and all its shores, which implies complete economic dependence […] of Yugoslavia within the narrowest borders. ⁹⁷

While the obvious victory of the Entente pushed the Slovenian liberals towards the clericals given the need for national consolidation, the impending defeat of the Central Powers forced the clericals to review their relations with the Habsburg dynasty. With the growing possibility of Vienna's defeat, the party, in addition to the Croatian statehood right, began to slide away from the second postulate of its pre-war political strategy. Even Krek's death did not divert the party from that course, which could be outlined in the memorandum of the Yugoslav Club of 31 January 1918 in the context of the peace agreement between the Central Powers and the new Russian authorities. Within the framework of stressing the right of self-determination, it no longer mentioned the ‘Habsburg clause’. ⁹⁸ Certain historians believe the clause was insincere from the moment it was adopted and that it primarily served to secure unanimous support of the SLS membership. ⁹⁹ Rahten ¹⁰⁰ suggests that the abandonment of the clause was a gradual process that began in the autumn of 1917. Soon after, in March 1918 at a meeting in Zagreb (that gathered politicians from Croatia and Slavonia, Dalmatia, BiH, Istria, Međimurje, Carniola, and other Habsburg Slavic areas), Korošec explicitly stated that he did not believe in an unresolved outcome of the war. He thus urged the Croatian and Serbian partners to quickly confirm their own legitimacy in order to act unitedly towards Vienna and the Entente. Although Korošec obviously predicted the defeat of the Central Powers, this did not mean that he also foresaw the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nevertheless, while believing that the circumstances were leading to a peace conference at which the Yugoslav issue would be resolved, he wanted to unify positions and strengthen the legitimacy of the Yugoslav Club and himself as its president. In this respect, Korošec had done his homework in the Slovenian field. The two strongest Slovenian political options were then already acting completely united in terms of the fundamental determinants, while the third, JSDS, did not obstruct their work.

7. Conclusion

Slovenian clericals and liberals entered World War I holding opposite ideological positions, including different views on the Yugoslav question. While the primary political goal of SLS was to form a Habsburg Slovenian–Croatian unit based on the Croatian historical right to statehood, Slovenian liberals had perceived Serbia as the Yugoslav Piedmont since the end of the Balkan wars. After the assassination in Sarajevo, the journals of the most influential Slovenian political party expressed a unanimous anti-Serb attitude. Slovenian liberals, however, despite condemning the act of assassination, also denounced the anti-Serb demonstrations and stressed the responsibility of the Austro-Hungarian policy for the escalation of violence. The war had a significant impact on the attitude of the Austrian authorities towards the Slovenians, and strong censorship was especially focused on any mention of the formation of a South Slavic unit. Every reform proposal was viewed as an attempt at weakening the Monarchy, which narrowed the manoeuvring space for SLS. At the same time, the Slovenian peripheral South Slavic position obviously acted as a strong cohesive factor because the future of the Slovenian territories was unclear. The Entente's possible victory also brought the likelihood of implementation of the London Treaty, which encouraged the liberals to push some of their disagreements with SLS under the carpet. In contrast, the outcome of the intra-party struggle between Šusteršič on one side and Krek and Korošec on the other facilitated the convergence of the clericals and the liberals. The new SLS leadership set out on a path of consolidating its own political legitimacy by occupying the leading positions in the representative bodies of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs. As part of this process, Gregor Žerjav became Korošec's right-hand man, and under these circumstances SLS gradually first extended the idea of Slovene-Croat to the Yugoslav people up to the Drina. Subsequently, they rejected the notion of the Croatian historical right to statehood and eventually also renounced the Habsburg state framework. This shift propelled the party towards a broader South Slavic concept, which was favoured by the liberals.

Importantly, during the war, a growing disparity emerged between the amount of information accessible to Slovenian politicians in prominent positions and the general Slovenian population. The Habsburg Monarchy's state apparatus effectively censored the media, making it challenging for Slovenian politicians to disseminate comprehensive information through their political publications, particularly if they contradicted the political climate in Vienna at the time. Moreover, publications in magazines of that era often served state propaganda and did not reflect the actual situation. Although insufficient to secure victory in the war or counteract the enemy propaganda, ¹⁰¹ such publications led readers to receive inaccurate information. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Slovenian people had greater faith not only in the survival of the Habsburg Monarchy but also in its triumph in the war. At the same time, as portrayed in this article, the upper echelons of Slovenian politics were more realistic in assessing the outcome of the war.