Invited Commentary on “No Correlation Between Ethical Judgment in Trolley Dilemmas and Vaccine Scenarios for Nurse Specialist Students”

Abstract

Keywords

moral judgment realistic dilemmas analogies literature constitutes neurosciences

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Andrade

(2019). Medical ethics and the trolley problem. Journal of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, 12, 1–15.

Bauman

C. W.

McGraw

A. P.

Bartels

D. M.

Warren

(2014). Revisiting external validity: Concerns about Trolley problems and other sacrificial dilemmas in moral psychology. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8, 536–554.

Bengson

(2014). How philosophers use intuition and ‘intuition’. Philosophical Studies, 171, 555–576.

Cappelen

(2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Dahl

F. A.

Oftedal

(2019). Trolley dilemmas fail to predict ethical judgment in a hypothetical vaccination context. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, 14, 23–32.

Foot

(1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5–15.

Greene

J. D.

Sommerville

R. B.

Nystrom

L. E.

Darley

J. M.

Cohen

J. D.

(2001). An fMRI investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science, 293, 2105–2108.

Singer

(2005). Ethics and Intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9, 331–352.

Thompson

J. J.

(1985). The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94, 1395–1415.

10.

Woodcock

(2017). When will a consequentialist push you in front of a Trolley? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95, 299–316.