Abstract
World of Warcraft (WoW) is a massively multi-player online role-playing game (MMORPG). The end-game consists of complex encounters requiring highly organized groups (raids). This complexity has caused the organizing of raiding guilds (self-governing player communities). Raiding guilds have hierarchical political structures in which leaders must legitimate their positions to demand participation. In a symbiotic relationship of political structure and individual desire, guilds must guarantee advancement in tandem with individuals' acquisition of items (loot); but game mechanics make this problematic. Each end-game encounter defeated offers less loot than players needed. To compensate for this raiding guilds use DKP (intra-guild economic systems). It is DKP, I argue, that generates the political cohesion necessary for guilds to successfully engage the end-game. DKP is guild specific, but important for its effects on value and reciprocity. It creates player obligation through a rationalized system measuring commitment.
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