Evaluation of the effectiveness of a firing battery in self-defense and protection in the area of firing positions using constructive simulation

Abstract

The paper describes the results of an experiment based on the use of constructive simulation in the MASA SWORD environment to verify the ability of an artillery firing battery to provide self-defense and protection in the firing position area and to perform the firing task when different types of adversary attack the firing position area. The objective of the experiment is to verify the ability of the artillery battery to survive within the Artillery Reserved Areas/Artillery Maneuver Areas (ARA/AMA) while performing combat tasks and the necessity of allocating additional resources (equipment, personnel, material) to protect and defend the firing position area and the artillery firing unit assets operating within it. The experiment results are the initial basis for follow-on simulations that will assess the impact on the ability to accomplish an artillery battery operation’s planned and unplanned joint fire support tasks.

Keywords

Constructive simulation experiment firing position firing battery artillery

1. Introduction

1.1. Continuity of indirect fire ground support is a key requirement for artillery

Artillery batteries operating in the Artillery Maneuver Areas (AMA), especially artillery direct fire support units, can easily come into contact with the enemy. The experience in the conflict in eastern Ukraine shows that fire batteries, whether on one side or the other, are the most sought-after targets.¹ In such a case, the artillery fire unit must be able, independently or with reinforcements from other types of troops, to conduct combat, defend itself, and maintain sufficient combat capability to accomplish its firing tasks. Thus, the ability to defend itself is directly related to the preservation of the ability to provide fire support, which, based on the experience of recent conflicts, is absolutely critical.

In the context of modern conflicts, Mr. Phillip Karber provides an interesting perspective on the importance of artillery fire support in his article RUS-UKR War Lessons Learned.² Artillery plays an irreplaceable role in this conflict and represents the main combat force for destroying targets and supporting its maneuver or preventing the opponent’s maneuver. At the same time, it causes the greatest amount of casualties on the battlefield. The assessment directly mentions the variant of prepared firing positions regarding their protection and defense. Artillery fire ambushes initiate most combat tasks and missions.

The lessons learned from the ongoing war in Ukraine make clear the key role of artillery. Its protection and defense in ARA/AMA can have a decisive impact on ongoing operations. Therefore, artillery capabilities must be preserved to the maximum extent possible. The conditions of the war in Ukraine and the nature of Western artillery involvement illustrate just how effective artillery is in contemporary conflicts. In the wake of this effectiveness, one can observe the Russian Federation’s desire to seek out and destroy these weapons at any cost.³ Thus, the defense and protection of artillery units can have up to significant impact on the entire conduct of war because protecting one’s forces from enemy action is one of the key factors that significantly affects the value of combat potential and combat power of a military unit/group.⁴

Standardized operational functions establish troop protection as one of their basic categories^5,6 and, together with the ability to conduct the defense of one’s firing position, leads to reduce the impact of adversary activity, vulnerability of personnel, equipment, weapons, and techniques. It is a prerequisite for maintaining one’s own operational capability and combat capability.⁷ The above laws apply to all types of troops, including artillery.

Two different approaches can be found in the current conception of the creation of artillery organizational structures. The first one creates organizational structures of firing units in such a way that they include units of other types of troops (air defense units, anti-tank units, mechanized units, etc.). The second approach assigns these units of other types of troops to artillery units only in a specific situation and at a specified phase of combat operations.

The actual forces dedicated to the protection and defense of the ARA/AMA are usually guard squads in some armies. These are normally armed only with small arms.

As a rule, a firing battery does not have heavy equipment to protect the area of firing positions. Some artillery weapon complexes are equipped with armor-piercing weapons to engage infantry (machine gun) or low-flying targets (anti-aircraft machine gun), and some artillery weapon complexes are capable of direct fire on armored targets that penetrate the ARA/AMA. When the artillery unit does not have assigned combat troops and air defense assets, protection is accomplished solely with its forces. Thus, one of the dilemmas for task force commanders is whether to assign artillery units to combat and air defense units from their own mechanized battalions and troop-type units. However, this move will weaken the combat units and assigned force-type units.

The experiment’s main objective is to verify the necessity to increase the defense and protection capability of the fire battery during the execution of fire tasks in ARA/AMA and to ensure the fulfillment of joint fire support tasks.

Given the fundamental differences in approaches to providing ARA/AMA defenses and the lessons learned from contemporary conflicts, the question arises about what type of defense is best suited to eliminate different types of modern threats. A positive feature of modern times is the availability of various simulation tools that allow different approaches to be evaluated. The key, however, is the correct setting of the parameters of the forces and resources of the simulations. The starting point is to determine the objectives achieved by applying the simulation tool.⁸ Therefore, the author’s collective defined the following objectives in addressing the set problem:

○ Evaluate the artillery fire unit’s ability to counter various types of adversaries;

○ Verify the necessity to allocate protection and defense assets to other types of forces or to integrate organic assets with air defense and anti-tank guns (ATG) capabilities into the artillery unit line-up (e.g. formation of Hunter Killer Teams);

○ Define options for multiplying the combat characteristics of existing fire unit technology to enable the unit to counter contemporary battlefield threats, such as, but not limited to, kinetic gun knockdown, engagement of various types of adversary units, engagement of low-flying targets (Reconnaissance Wing – RW, Unmanned Aerial System – UAS), acquisition of key artillery information that is then used to engage ground-based adversaries, and so on.

All situations considered in the experiment can be identified from reports and actual studies of the ongoing war in Ukraine and other contemporary conflicts.^9,10

The simulation results will facilitate commanders’ decision-making in Tactical Planning (TP) and Troop Leading Procedures (TLP), leading to a greater understanding of the need to protect the Task Force’s (TF) key fire assets. Constructive simulation is used within NATO as an effective tool in TP/TLP.¹¹ The wide application of simulation methods and models has almost unlimited applicability and variability of a suitably developed and implemented software product, which provides its wide use in scientific work and in solving practical issues of military unit/group operations.¹²

2. Experiment design

The experiment was constructed in the MASA SWORD simulator environment, which falls into the category of constructive simulation. Constructive simulation is a computer simulation based on logical-mathematical models where humans, with the help of artificial intelligence, use simulated equipment in a simulated environment. Thus, it offers many applications especially for solving optimization problems in planning various operations.¹³ The MASA SWORD simulator works with probabilistic models and allows the creation of any simulation environment to perform the desired number of simulation iterations. This means that the results of each iteration for the same simulation may vary. To obtain valid results, an associated analysis tool is used to run the simulation repeatedly in an almost unlimited number of iterations. The output of such a simulation is the average of the resulting values for the evaluation criteria under consideration. To avoid bias in the results, the artificial intelligence recognizes significant deviations from the majority and does not include these repetitions in the final average. The user can also modify, create, and adjust all parameters from the weapons, ammunition, equipment, and units to the training level, doctrinal behavior model, time of day, weather, and the terrain itself.^14,15

The experiment was conducted on two baseline scenarios with several adversary variants (types) penetrating the ARA/AMA artillery unit. Within these selected scenarios, the following were subsequently simulated as variants:

○ different types (kinds) of opponent;

○ various actions of the opponent;

○ attacking not only the firing position but also the firing battery command posts, depending on the type of enemy chosen.

The activities of own and adversary units were simulated on a generally applicable tactical basis of the activities of each type of unit with the techniques, material, and equipment available to the purpose-built artillery firing units and the potential adversary. The action variants used are not definitive. Some countless combinations and variations can be employed for a given concept. The selected variants are sufficient for the evaluation and determination of conclusions. The key factors evaluated were the number of casualties on both sides, the number of wounded on both sides and the number of key equipment destroyed (fire assets, command post equipment) that could lead to the inability of the fire unit to accomplish the specified fire tasks. In terms of dead and wounded, greater weight was given to key personnel (commanders, indirect fire specialists) whose losses could again lead to an inability to complete fire tasks.^16,17

Implemented scenarios and variants:

A) Variants of the composition of own forces :

A1) 152 mm Self Propelled Gun-Howitzer (SPGH) battery (firing vehicle with 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft – AA Gun)

A2) Fire battery 152 mm SPGH (fire vehicle without AA Gun)

A3) Fire battery 152 mm SPGH (fire vehicle with 12.7 mm AA Gun) reinforced by 2x Infantry Fighting Vehicle – IFV (type BVP-2) and 1x AA (AA vehicle with the ability to detect and eliminate low-flying targets – SHORAD – Short range air defense)

A4) Fire battery 152 mm SPGH without AA Gun reinforced with 2x IFV and 1x AA

B) Variants, composition and concept of operation (CONOP) of adversary units :

B1) Airborne team (diversionary group)

- Composition: 8 soldiers in two four-person sections.

- Equipment: 7x assault rifle (5.56 mm), 1x machine gun (7.62 mm), 8x pistol (9 mm), 16x universal hand grenade, 2x ATG (type RPG-7).

- CONOP: The airborne team discovers artillery assets during reconnaissance and conducts an ambush to eliminate key assets to limit their activities. The ambush is conducted from the closest possible distance.

B2) Mechanized section

- Composition: 2x IFV (type BVP-2) and 1x command IFV-2 (type BVP-2), including crews according to the table standard.

- Equipment: 3x 30 mm cannon (type 2A42), 3x linked machine gun (7.62 mm), 6x machine gun (7.62 mm), 21x assault rifle (5.56 mm), 27x pistol (9 mm), 54x universal hand grenade, 3x ATG (type RPG-7).

- CONOP: The enemy mechanized section penetrates the depth of the own force assembly through the forward units and discovers the ARA. An immediate engagement occurs.

B3) Attack helicopter

- Composition: 1 attack helicopter with a crew of four.

- Equipment: 1x 30 mm cannon, 1x 12.7 mm machine gun, 2x suspension for 68 mm rockets.

- CONOP: An adversary attack helicopter conducts a low-level patrol. After covering the ARA artillery battery, it conducts an attack pass/raid and leaves the area to ensure its own safety.

C) Variants of attack :

C1) Attacking a battery holding position

- Own forces A1, A2: The battery is in a holding position with a circular defense.

- Own forces A3, A4: The battery is in a holding position with a circular defense including 2x IFV and 1x AA settled nearby.

C2) Attacking a command post (Fire Direction Center – FDC)

- Own forces A1, A2: Fire platoons and reconnaissance squad operate out of holding position.

- Own forces A3, A4: Fire platoons, reconnaissance squad and 1x IFV (type BVP-2) operating outside holding position; holding position defense reinforced by 1x IFV (type BVP-2) and 1x AA settled nearby.

C3) Attack on battery firing position (reconnaissance squad)

- Own forces A1, A2: The reconnaissance squad helps defend the firing position.

- Own forces A3, A4: The reconnaissance squad, 1x IFV (type BVP-2), and 1x AA settled nearby helps defend the firing position.

C4) Attack on battery firing position

- Own forces A1, A2: Defense of the firing position by firing platoon forces only.

- Own forces A3, A4: 2x IFVs (type BVP-2) and 1x AA settled nearby helps defend the firing position.

The created units with the required equipment and capabilities were embedded in an operational environment with predefined tasks. In the case of the actual artillery units the role of the adversary units was to locate and eliminate artillery assets.¹⁸ The simulation used terrain from the actual environment within the training area.

Combining all variants (A, B, C) generated a total of 48 scenarios (SABC) and subsequent simulations. To obtain valid results, each simulation was run in the associated analysis tool with 500 repetitions, with the resulting values for each simulation representing a weighted average. Thus, a total of 24,000 repetitions were simulated.

3. Experiment results

The results of a constructive simulation are always influenced by the quality of the input data and the correct setting of all parameters. In order to achieve maximum realism of the results, the simulator worked with a training structure of artillery units in a real environment according to the established model of behavior and means (equipment).

The main evaluation criteria were:

the number of available works;

the number of wounded and dead on both sides;

the overall combat capability of units.

Combat Capability expresses the percentage of the unit’s condition concerning damage, wounds and casualties caused by combat. The simulator distinguishes the severity of injuries and damage and the effect on the ability of an asset or individual to conduct further combat activity. The simulator evaluates the condition of the unit as a whole and does not fully consider the importance of certain elements. Therefore the results were further analyzed and evaluated by artillery experts to reflect the actual ability of the units to conduct further combat activity. The results of each simulation are presented in Table 3.

3.1. C1—Attacking a battery holding position

By combining the attack variant C1 with all variants of own forces (A1, A2, A3, A4) and adversary forces (B1, B2, B3), 12 scenarios marked Sxx1 were achieved (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Overview of the created scenarios (combination of variants of own forces, adversary, and attack environment).

		Attacking
Own forces	The Adversary	C1	C2	C3	C4
A1	B1	S111	S112	S113	S114
A2	B1	S211	S212	S213	S214
A1	B2	S121	S122	S123	S124
A2	B2	S221	S222	S223	S224
A1	B3	S131	S132	S133	S134
A2	B3	S231	S232	S233	S234
A3	B1	S311	S312	S313	S314
A4	B1	S411	S412	S413	S414
A3	B2	S321	S322	S323	S324
A4	B2	S421	S422	S423	S424
A3	B3	S331	S332	S333	S334
A4	B3	S431	S432	S433	S434

Source: Own.

The firing battery (including the assigned elements) was in a holding position in an engaged ring defense. The battery’s combat formation included a guard squad. The enemy discovered the ARA and, depending on its type and character attacked the artillery units following the established CONOP. The results of the Sxx1 scenarios are shown in Charts 1 –3.

Chart 1.

C1—Fire battery combat capability.

Chart 2.

C1—Adversary’s combat capability.

Chart 3.

C1—Number of available guns.

Within this CONOP, despite the large combat power of the air vehicle, it poses the least threat to artillery units due to the camouflage and nature of the areas occupied (usually in wooded areas). The average casualties inflicted by the aerial vehicle were a command post, 1 gun, and 10 personnel (killed or wounded).

The advantage in these areas is gained by the airborne team or other small infantry units that can ambush the holding position at close range in order to eliminate key elements of the combat formation, especially command and security elements that have weaker protection and are critical to the full operation of the artillery battery. The results of the simulations almost always show the destruction of all supporting units. The ability to perform firing tasks was not lost but severely limited.

In terms of maintaining the ability to provide Joint Fire Support (JFS), the greatest threat is from attack by a mechanized adversary. In this case, the artillery battery lost up to half of its guns, and the support units also suffered a high level of damage. A significant reduction in unit combat capability can be predicted with targets destroyed to this extent.

3.2. C2—Attacking a command post (FDC)

Combining the C2 attack variant with all variants of own forces (A1, A2, A3, A4) and adversary forces (B1, B2, B3) resulted in 12 scenarios, denoted Sxx2 (see Table 1).

The firing platoons of the artillery battery and the reconnaissance squad (and 1x IFV if reinforced) were outside the holding position. The battery command remained in a holding position in a positioned ring defense with guard elements (also 1x IFV and 1x AA when reinforced) with the other elements of the combat formation. The adversary discovered the ARA and, depending on its type, character, and capabilities, made an attack. The results of the Sxx2 scenarios are shown in Charts 4 –6.

Chart 4.

C2—Fire battery combat capability.

Chart 5.

C2—Adversary combat capability.

Chart 6.

C2—Number of available guns.

As in the previous situation, it can be concluded from the simulations that the airborne vehicle poses the least threat.

In a given situation, an airborne team or a mechanized unit represents an almost identical and significant threat. The command, including all supporting units, is destroyed when they attack. The artillery battery has a limited capability to perform firing tasks. When the defenses are strengthened, then the difference occurs with a mechanized unit attack, where the engagement of the elements brought into the fight allows the withdrawal of the command and fire control squad. Thus, fire units can proceed with little restriction when they do not have their own ammunition vehicles and require more service from logistics units.

3.3. C3—Attacking a battery firing position (Reconnaissance Squad)

Combining the C3 attack variant with all variants of own forces (A1, A2, A3, A4) and adversary forces (B1, B2, B3) resulted in 12 scenarios labeled Sxx3 (see Table 1).

In the firing position, in addition to the firing platoon of the artillery battery, there is also a reconnaissance squad (in case of reinforcement, there is also 1x IFV and partially 1x AA in the vicinity). The adversary attacks according to the established CONOP. The results of the Sxx3 scenarios are shown in Charts 7 –9.

Chart 7.

C3—Fire battery combat capability.

Chart 8.

C3—Adversary’s combat capability.

Chart 9.

C3—Number of available guns.

In this variant of attack, based on the results of the simulations, the greatest threat is again posed by the mechanized unit, which causes the greatest damage, mainly due to its firing capabilities and degree of protection. Almost identical results are then generated by an attack by an airborne team or vehicle. In all cases, there is a reduction in firing capabilities, often even an inability to perform firing tasks.

3.4. C4—Attacking a battery firing position

Combining the C4 attack variant with all variants of own forces (A1, A2, A3, A4) and adversary forces (B1, B2, B3) resulted in 12 scenarios labeled Sxx4 (see Table 1).

Only the firing platoons of the artillery battery are in the firing position (in case of reinforcement, also 2x IFV and partially 1x AA in the vicinity). The enemy has discovered this position and is advancing according to the established CONOP. The results of the Sxx4 scenarios are shown in Charts 10 –12.

Chart 10.

C4—Fire battery combat capability.

Chart 11.

C4—Adversary combat capability.

Chart 12.

C4—Number of available guns.

A similar situation to the previous variant with similar results, especially for the airborne team and airborne asset attacks. There was a slight improvement in the case of reinforcements against the enemy mechanized unit due to the presence of an additional IFV. However, after being attacked by any adversary, the artillery battery is left with reduced capabilities or completely unable to provide effective and efficient JFS.

The resulting combat capability of an artillery battery after an enemy attack is expressed as a percentage based on the decrease in the number of men and equipment, considering the degree of their disablement in Table 3. The baseline values are taken from the results of the simulations evaluated by the simulator itself. The values in brackets are the result of the calculation of operational combat capability using the SAW (Simple Additive Weighting) method¹⁹ defined by the following model:

CR = \sum_{i = 1}^{n} (Si \cdot Wi)

CR … combat readiness coefficient;

Si… the normalized value of the i-th criterion;

Wi… the normalized value of the i-th side weight;

n… total number of criteria.

Due to the nature of the combat capability value within the experiment, the combat capability of the battery’s subordinate units derived from the casualties suffered in personnel and equipment were chosen as the criteria. The data were normalized for each criterion for all variants. The weights for each criterion were determined by expert judgment and are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Normalized weights of each criterion for the SAW method.

Criterion (unit)	Weight
Firing squads	0.5
Reconnaissance squad	0.05
Fire direction squad/center (FDC)	0.2
Guarding squad	0.05
Ammunition section (AMMO truck)	0.1
Battery Command (Command Post—CP)	0.1

Source: own.

Comparison of the calculated values (from the specified criteria weights) with the simulator values in Table 3 shows its ability to provide reliable outcome data. Although the simulator partially accounts for the importance of individual units, equipment, or personnel necessary for the continued operation of the artillery battery. To reflect the true extent of capability limitations, the experiment’s results must be further manually evaluated in more detail. A clear comparison of the actual status of the attacked units with consideration of the key elements of the battery for its ability to continue to perform its mission is shown in Table 4.

Table 3.

Combat capability of an artillery battery after an enemy attack according to the simulator (mathematically using the SAW method).

Source: Own.

Table 4.

The ability of an artillery battery to perform fire tasks after an enemy attack, considering the key elements of the battery.

Source: Own.

Basic stages of unit retirement:

— DESTROYED–combat capability ≤ 65%

— REDUCED–65%–80% combat capability

By comparing the values from Tables 3 and 4, it is clear the importance of a detailed evaluation of the simulations performed to obtain appropriate results, where using raw data would lead to distortions.

Table 4 shows that the variants of attacking a firing position (C3, C4) pose a greater risk to further combat activity than attacking a holding position (C1) or a command post (C2). This is mainly related to the terrain and space of the ARA/AMA and the selected staging position,²⁰ the established system of protection and defense of the staging position and the assumed ring defense. There is a direct attack on the guns, a key element of the artillery. By reducing the number of available guns, the ability to effectively perform the required tasks decreases, primarily due to the limited effect on the target. In part, under favorable conditions, the lack of guns can be compensated for by using the MRSI (Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact) method.²¹ Another factor that must be considered is the ability of fire platoon commanders to substitute, to a limited extent, for the actions of the command post in preparing and directing fire in the event of its destruction.¹⁷ In addition, the different types of assets and their capabilities within the various types of Area of Responsibility (AOR) must also be evaluated.

4. Discussion

All activities can be implemented in different conditions and situations with different results within the framework of military tactics in general, and therefore also artillery tactics. For the education and training of artillery commanders, it is advisable to familiarize them with different situations, implement TP, conduct a simulation of the operation, and subsequently evaluate the success of the decisions made. Such training will enable artillery commanders to understand all aspects and key factors for different situations and to predict possible variants of the adversary’s actions and the actions of their own forces. For these purposes, constructive simulation is very effective and it is appropriate to implement simulation mechanisms as a decision support tool for the commander.

From the perspective of the experiment carried out, it is clear that the results supported the logical assumption, when units supported by IFV and AA assets have higher survival capability and possibilities of own protection. However, the allocation of AA and IFV assets to support the self-defense capability of the artillery battery must be evaluated again in terms of the loss of the artillery weapons set and the allocated assets about other task force activities.

Furthermore, the strengthening the guard squad by ATG and the lafetation of AA assets on artillery weapon sets can be evaluated as a simple solution for many combat situations when dealing with self-defense and protection.

In the framework of the simulations, it shows up, that is necessary to evaluate the results by experts so that not only a statistical evaluation is made, but also an evaluation of the impact on the course of combat operations. The key factor will be the ability of the fire battery to perform the planned JFS tasks or the effect of partial or complete loss of this ability on the course of further operations of the supported units.

5. Conclusion and future research

Under the specified conditions of the simulations, the most suitable variant is the variant of the firing battery with artillery weapon sets having 12.7 mm AA. There are better solutions than supplementing with other troop types, such as IFVs and AA assets, due to the possible loss of this equipment and the need to implement additional maneuvers and Transfer of Authority (TOA) between units. A more suitable option may be enhanced guard squads and multiplication of their capabilities toward effective engagement of IFV and UAS/RW adversary assets, i.e. ATG and AA capabilities.

The team will continue to use additional simulations in the MASA SWORD environment with different AOR and resource constraints. Especially it will be interesting to monitor the involvement of drones for own and enemy activities, to evaluate and compare the suitability of their use on all types of battlefield and with different capabilities of the enemy. The results will be evaluated in relation to the TP, JFS, METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and civilian considerations) and MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) so that they can be implemented in (Superior Degree Demonstrator) SDD-type simulation tools to support the decision-making processes of artillery commanders within the TF (Task Force) and JFS mission execution.

Footnotes

Funding

LANDOPS (DZRO-FVL22-LANDOPS) Conduct of land operations.

SGS PEKAŘ(SV23-FVL-K107-PEK) Artillery reconnaissance of firing positions in conditions of autonomous artillery.

ORCID iDs

Tomáš Havlík

Ondřej Pekař

Author biographies

Captain Tomáš Havlík, born in 1993, is a graduate of the Faculty of Economics and Management of the University of Defence in Brno, major in Military Management. In 2017–2020, he served as a mortar platoon commander of a mortar battery in a mechanized battalion and in 2019 he was deployed abroad. Currently, he is working at the Department of Fire Support, Faculty of Military Leadership, University of Defence and is pursuing a PhD in National Defence Theory. He is interested in issues of combat use of artillery, especially the activities of artillery units.

Lieutenant Colonel Michal Šustr, born in 1979, graduated from the Faculty of Economics and Management of the University of Defence in Brno. From 2001 to 2019, he worked in command positions in artillery units within the Artillery Regiment in Jince and at the Artillery Training Department within the Training Command—Military Academy in Vyškov. Currently, he is an assistant professor at the Department of Fire Support of the University of Defence. He deals with issues of combat use of artillery.

Major Jan Ivan, born in 1988, is a graduate of the Faculty of Economics and Management of the University of Defence Brno (major in military management). His academic journey has led him to his current role as an assistant professor at the Department of Fire Support at the University of Defence. His research interests lie in the combat use of artillery, particularly in the area of requiring and coordinating fire support.

Lieutenant Ondřej Pekař, born in 1990, graduate of the Faculty of Military Leadership of the University of Defence in Brno, major in Management and Use of Armed Forces. He also studied geography and cartography at Charles University in Prague. He served in command positions in an artillery regiment. Since 2021 he has been a student of the PhD program in National Defence Theory at the University of Defence. In his research work he focuses on artillery issues, especially on the field of reconnaissance and automation of this process.

Lieutenant Colonel Miroslav Mušinka, born in 1979, graduated from the Military Vocational School, Military Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš, Faculty of Land Forces, Department of Management of Military Systems, Artillery. He defended his doctoral thesis at the Military Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš in the field of Defence and Military. From 2002 to 2009 he served in command positions in artillery units. From 2010 to 2018 he served in staff positions at various organizational levels. Since 2018 he has been working at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš as an Teaching Assistant and Assistant Professor. He deals with combat and operational use of joint fire support.

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Maňas

Rolenec

, et al. On the Czech armed forces’ approach to the development of environmental legislation in the Czech, EU and NATO context. Vojenské Rozhledy-Czech Mil Rev 2022; 31: 172–202.

21.

Šustr

Potužák

Blaha

, et al. Multiple round simultaneous impact fires and possibilities of its application in Czech army. Vojenské Rozhledy-Czech Mil Rev 2020; 29: 84–93.