Is Sustainable Peace in Ukraine Possible? Contributions of Quality Peace Theory

Introduction

The war in Ukraine has transitioned from an unspeakable disaster that preoccupies the minds of many people around the globe to a protracted conflict with an evident degree of fatigue both among politicians and ordinary people. This is one of the many reasons behind the rapid popularization of the argument that Ukraine must negotiate a peace agreement with Russia, which has replaced the debate about Ukraine pursuing victory on the battlefield at any cost. This policy brief apply's Wallensteen's Quality Peace Theory to demonstrate that at this point in time and with current conditions such a peace would not be sustainable and long-lasting. The theory itself offers a clear and comprehensive framework for evaluating the sustainability of peace agreements; and based on the analysis of open-source data and abundant scholarly research about the contemporary political, economic, and social realities in Ukraine, Russia, and the war itself we are able to assess the possibility and quality of the potential peace settlement between these countries.

February 24, 2022 Russian Federation launched a “special military operation” (SMO) in Donetsk and Luhansk to protect the pro-Russian population allegedly targeted by “discriminative policies” of Kyiv. This is the continuation of events of 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and instigated separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Despite being successful in annexing Crimea, Russia did not proceed with annexing Donetsk and Luhansk, leaving them as unrecognized quasi-states. The anti-terroristic operation initiated by the interim acting head of state Turchinov in 2014 and continued by President Poroshenko did not yield significant results and led to casualties. In 2018, the ATO (Anti-Terroristic Operation) was formally concluded, resulting in a more stable status quo with minimal civilian casualties with less than 25 people killed in 2021 (OHCHR, 2022).

However, intensifying international pressure on Russia due to chemical weapon scandals and the poisoning of political opponents has resulted in a more aggressive foreign policy agenda. The deteriorating internal political situation and lack of support from the population have pushed the Russian political establishment to seek another quick victory, similar to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which boosted support for the government and Putin with the so-called “Crimean Consensus” (Nikolskaya & Dmitriev, 2020). Personnel changes within the government, including the rotation of Vladislav Surkov, who was criticized for his lack of proactive approach towards Ukraine, have also contributed to the shift towards a more aggressive foreign policy paradigm and the ensuing full-scale warfare against Ukraine by February 2022. Given the complex nature of the political reasons behind the Russian aggression, it becomes especially important to analyze how these political realities will affect the possibility of the potential peacebuilding process.

Vladimir Putin outlined the goals of the military operation in Ukraine as “denazification” and “demilitarization,” while questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the artificial nature of Ukrainian statehood. Russian state-owned media further propagated the narrative, portraying the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazi and anti-Russian. The lack of clear achievable targets and structural issues in the Russian military have changed a swift military intervention into a protracted stand-off with regular Ukrainian troops. The main propaganda narrative has changed, with the confrontation with the “Collective West” becoming the new focus (Foreign Affairs, 2023). Despite facing initial military aggression, Ukraine was able to secure significant military assistance from its Western partners. This has become essential to maintain the Ukrainian force’s effectiveness and allowed them to re-take a significant part of the occupied territory. The intensity of the warfare is resulting in an increasing number of casualties, prisoners of war, and collateral damage among civilians. This has led to documented cases of violations of the customs of war, as well as human rights abuses. Those are especially numerous in the Russian military, known to have committed several war crimes while occupying the suburbs and outskirts of Kyiv (PBS Frontline, 2023).

The intensification of the war in Ukraine leads to two conclusions: a) the war will be long-lasting; and b) the damage caused by Russia will be difficult to repair and forgive (Bufacchi, 2022). Ukrainian President Zelensky has repeatedly stated that negotiations with Russia are not possible as long as any part of Ukraine is under occupation, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014 (Politico, 2023). This stance makes the idea of a peaceful resolution to the conflict seem unrealistic. In this context, the application of the “Quality Peace” theory is necessary to assess the potential for a lasting peace agreement.

Quality Peace theory in its modern sense has mostly been systemized and conceptualized by Peter Wallensteen (Wallensteen, 2015). It builds on von Clausewitz's idea that peace exists in different dimensions, each contributing to the sustainability of peace. The theory defines five basic criteria for quality peace: governance dimension, equal security, economic growth and new possibilities, and reconciliation between sides of conflict and civil society. The lack of any of these indicates an overall fragility of the specific peace configuration. Here we analyze how many criteria can potentially be met in the case of a potential peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Organizing Effective Governance

The first criterion is the ability of Ukraine and Russia to establish functioning post-war governance. Both sides of the conflict have demonstrated their capacity to maintain strong territorial control. Ukraine has demonstrated effective governance over unoccupied territories despite facing a formidable foe. Meanwhile, Russia has rapidly appointed local pro-Russian administrations to establish administrative control over newly acquired Ukrainian territories. It remains uncertain whether there will be any de facto territorial concessions from either side. However, both countries possess the capability to successfully govern these territories.

The governance criterion also includes the international aspect, which is crucial to guarantee peace and ensure adherence to a potential treaty. Ukraine and Russia have shown interest in the involvement of other nations in negotiations. In the first round of peace talks, Ukraine proposed the participation of Eastern European countries as guarantors of its security and can do that again. The United States and countries of the European Union, being close allies of Ukraine, can also serve as mediators and guarantors in the process. Meanwhile, Russia has lost most of its diplomatic capabilities and can only rely on China to serve as an intermediary. In February 2023, the Chinese government published a non-specific peaceful resolution plan for the war between Russia and Ukraine, which affirms the principle of sovereignty but fails to attribute blame to Russia (China's Position, 2023).

Ensuring Security

Achieving a long-lasting peace requires ensuring equal non-discriminatory security for both sides of the conflict, including active disarmament and reducing levels of violence. However, security is not limited to physical safety, as the general feeling of security is also crucial. The cessation of military action alone does not guarantee overall security, particularly given the potential for black-market arms sales. In the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia, arms trafficking in the region is expected to skyrocket, allowing various criminal organizations to obtain heavy weaponry.

Another issue is the future reintegration of discharged soldiers into society. In the cases of Afghanistan and Chechnya, Russian soldiers have turned to criminal activities due to unemployment and lack of support. Current news about skyrocketing levels of violent crimes among the recently demobilized soldiers indicates that this is already the case with modern-day Russia as well (The Moscow Times, 2023). In Ukraine, successful foreign aid allocation and rapid national reconstruction are crucial for addressing similar issues.

Even if a peace agreement is reached, many, including President Zelensky, feel that the regime of Vladimir Putin is not reliable enough to maintain the accords in the long term. This uncertainty creates a potential threat to overall security in the region.

Thus, the security criterion appears to be met in the short term for the conflict between Ukraine and Russia; but in the long run, the prospects for the regional security remain uncertain.

Economic Development and Opportunities

The third criterion is economic growth and equal access to development opportunities. A mutually beneficial deal is crucial, as one or both parties may feel cheated, leading to a relapse into conflict. In the case of post-war Ukraine, economic reconstruction is likely to occur with foreign aid from the European Union and the United States, due to its vital role in the upcoming security configuration in Europe. Western nations are directly interested in helping Ukraine stay strong economically and politically to serve as a counterweight to Russia in the region.

In contrast, Russia is facing a declining economy, with real incomes of Russian people stagnating rapidly ever since 2014. Russian “import substitution” strategy has been recognized as a failure, and “parallel import” has been implemented to fulfill the demand for essential IT equipment and other necessary imports (Reuters, 2023). However, this contributes to the rapid growth of the shadow economy, as businesses receive clear motivation to switch to semi-legal schemes to avoid taxes and regulations (Independent Gazette, 2022). Retail of digital electronics is a good example: small enterprises using small-scale “parallel import” schemes can avoid customs and taxation, thus winning any competition with big retailers.

Another factor contributing to Russia's economic stagnation is the constantly rising war-related expenditures, happening at the expense of critical and socially significant infrastructure. The construction of a line of anti-tank and anti-infantry defense in the Belgorod region cost 10 billion rubles, several times higher than many critical expenses of the local budget, including healthcare and education. On a federal level, military spending has seriously undermined all other critical expenditures, leading to a record budget deficit in 2022 and 2023, and a drop in the overall level of life in Russia. In addition to that, The Collective Security Treaty Organization members, as well as Turkey and China, have been reluctant at risking getting under secondary sanctions for the sake of Russian economic needs.

Thus, economic development and opportunities will not likely be equal for Russia and Ukraine, making it challenging to meet this quality peace criterion fully. A change in political leadership in Russia may be the only possible way for reintegration into the world economy.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is essential for a long-lasting peace. To achieve this, both sides must be willing to forgive and let go. Possible ways to achieve reconciliation include financial compensation, public admission of guilt, criminal prosecution for war crimes, and human rights violations (Wallensteen, 2015). However, the specificity of the conflict at hand poses a significant challenge to achieving reconciliation due to the number of casualties and war crimes (Dukalskis et al., 2018, pp. 148–152).

Given that Russia initiated the conflict without any legitimate cause, it is crucial for Moscow to acknowledge its guilt. One of the most difficult aspects of this will be addressing war atrocities. Both sides have violated the customs of war and human rights, but Russia's transgressions are more extensive and well-documented. Conversely, Ukraine has responded appropriately to such cases by condemning them and launching investigations.

Russia, however, has refused to accept responsibility for its actions and has instead attempted to shift the blame to Ukraine by labeling such cases as fabricated. Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia will agree to any trials or investigations regarding war crimes. Moreover, the Russian Federation's limited economic capabilities would not enable it to offer financial aid to Ukraine, despite discussions at the UN level regarding reparations (UN News, 2022). Additionally, any concessions to Ukraine may threaten the stability of the current Russian government, which relies on support from proponents of war.

Thus, reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine is unlikely, while Vladimir Putin remains in power and the current expansionist foreign-policy agenda persists. Therefore, the criterion of quality peace cannot be considered properly met, even if the conflict between the two nations ends.

Civil Society

A robust civil society can hold politicians accountable and prevent radicalization of rhetoric that may lead to the renewal of conflict. Additionally, civil society can provide whistleblowers who can alert international authorities about potential signs of relapse.

In Ukraine, the war has significantly consolidated civil society (RTI International, 2023). In addition, future foreign aid for reconstruction purposes from the European Union and the United States is expected to positively influence the adoption of progressive and liberal values (The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, 2023).

In contrast, Russia has introduced harsh war censorship and repressive laws that prevent people from expressing their opinions on the war and sharing relevant information (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Criticizing the government and military is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. The lack of clarity regarding terms like “fake news” and “discreditation of the army” has allowed the government to oppress any opposition. The government has fabricated criminal cases against notable opposition politicians, leading to forced immigration or imprisonment (Hall, 2023; Tertytchnaya, 2023). As a result, civil society in Russia is virtually non-existent, and social activists are under substantial threat. The only real choices out there are to keep internal disagreement or immigrate; and about 1 million qualified specialists have already left the country (Insider, 2022). The absence of civil society in Russia means that the country is unlikely to be able to hold the government accountable and prevent possible conflict reoccurrence. The change of power may open a window of opportunity for the nation to become more liberal and democratic, but even if this does not happen, whistleblowing may still be possible, as the majority of those against the war remain unsupportive of the existing political establishment. Thus, the civil society criterion can only be considered partially met in our scenario.

Conclusion

The conflict in Ukraine presents a significant challenge to the liberal international order, which was previously weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The foreign policy principles of Western nations towards autocratic Russia have been ineffective, painfully resembling the “pacifying the aggressor” strategy of the 1930s. The EU's economic interests in gas and oil have often taken precedence over opposing human rights violations. The lack of commitment to ensure Ukraine's security after 2014 has led to the escalation of a full-frontal war in Europe. The war in Ukraine is not only catastrophic for the direct participants but also poses a significant challenge for Western countries, which must learn to coordinate their policies more effectively.

After evaluating the current state of the war in Ukraine, it is evident that while some of the criteria for a quality peace accord have been fully or partially met, others remain troublesome. As the current scholarship on the quality of peace suggests, such agreements would turn out to be fragile and a significant possibility of conflict relapse will remain in long-term perspective (Davenport et al., 2018; Wallensteen, 2015).

The only way to increase the chances of achieving a long-lasting peace in Ukraine is a change of power in Russia with a subsequent revision of foreign policy and other political agendas. However, this is an unlikely scenario, as the current leadership under Vladimir Putin has a firm grip on power and has access to ultimate repressive mechanisms able to quell any protests. Well-funded law enforcement, a compliant political establishment, and a fearful society make it difficult for any change of power to take place. Therefore, the only option left appears to be achieving peace through a combination of battlefield efforts and smart international pressure (Panasyuk, 2023).