Enabling Within Constraints: Assessing International Aid's Impact Upon Cypriot Peacebuilding Organisations

Abstract

Indigenous civil society organisations (CSOs) are receiving a larger proportion of international aid than ever before. The international community supplies them with financial support owing to the belief that they can effectively mediate between disputant communities. The impact of this situation attracts scholarly debate. Whereas scholars traditionally assert that recipients transform into service-delivery organisations tied to the interests of their donors, some allege that CSOs retain the agency to negotiate how funds are spent in accordance with their own priorities. By focusing on Cypriot peacebuilding CSOs, I add further nuance to this debate. I argue that international aid enables CSOs to carry out peacebuilding initiatives according to their underlying agenda, owing to several contextual factors, providing they adhere to donors’ expectations and restrictions. International aid cannot therefore be reduced to having a solely positive or negative impact – a more complex picture emerges, to some degree suiting both donors and CSOs.

Introduction

In recent decades, researchers and policymakers have increasingly argued that indigenous civil society organisations (CSOs) – here understood as voluntary organisations comprised of shared interests, purposes and values, distinct from the state, market and family – play a critical role in post-conflict peacebuilding. As they are ingrained into disputant communities, they understand their ‘cultural context and nuanced dynamics’ (Jewett, 2019, p. 119) and can thereby develop effective, working relationships with conflicting parties, who commonly perceive them as legitimate and well-meaning actors. This is typically in contrast with external actors who lack deep awareness of a conflict's complex internal politics, which can be a barrier to successfully engaging with disputants.

However, CSOs are also increasingly reliant upon international donors – namely international organisations (IOs) and foreign governments who provide them with financial support. Indeed, it is now widely conceived in academic and policy circles that they are receiving ‘a larger share of international aid than ever before’ (Krawczyk, 2018, p. 296). The impact this situation has upon CSOs is a matter of continued debate. Scholars widely argue that they effectively transition into professionalised, service-delivery organisations which complete specified tasks on behalf of donors – who they ultimately become accountable to – and lose sight of their original, context specific intentions (Bebbington, 1997; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Suleiman, 2013). This view is challenged by some who claim that CSOs have the agency to negotiate how the funds they receive are spent, so can therefore use them to support their own priorities and those advocated by grassroots communities they represent (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003; Puljek-Shank, 2018).

This investigation tests and adds to the debate by exploring the impact of international aid upon peacebuilding CSOs operating in Cyprus against the backdrop of the island's ongoing conflict. There are good reasons for choosing Cyprus as a case study for this investigation. Recent decades have seen the development of peacebuilding CSOs across the island. Many of these CSOs facilitate Track II (T2) peacebuilding initiatives, including bicommunal projects, ‘peace education’ programs and dialogue forums. Some are also hugely benefitting from external funding from international donors, most notably the European Union (EU) (Flynn, 2016; Jarraud et al., 2013). However, the consequences of this financial reliance upon their identity and peacebuilding efforts require further attention. It is not clear whether funded CSOs become shaped by the interests and demands of their donors, and thereby approach peacebuilding from a less contextual and locally driven perspective, or if they have the capacity to receive financial support whilst also pursuing their own peacebuilding goals and strategies.

Literature Review

Local Turn

The belief that indigenous CSOs are effective peacebuilders became particularly salient during the aftermath of the failed peacebuilding missions of the 1990s. These missions closely followed the ‘liberal internationalist’ paradigm, by adhering to the idea that peace can only be ordained if democratic elections, marketisation programs and constitutional reforms codifying civil rights are established in areas of conflict – as outlined in the United Nation's (UN) 1992 Agenda for Peace report (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para.82). However, this approach was quickly deemed ineffective and unsuccessful in establishing peace, not least because war-torn societies do not tend to possess the required infrastructure, socio-economic stability or political will to embark on elections (Kumar, 1998, p. 7; Mac Ginty, 2013; Paris, 1997, p. 57). Indeed, this one size fits all approach to peacebuilding, consisting of imposing Western ideals of market democracy onto radically different countries decimated by conflict, was soon regarded as naïve and unrealistic (John, 2021, p. 35).

Consequently, there was a general sense that alternative approaches to peacebuilding were required. One such alternative, termed the social constructivist approach, advances that peace does not have a universally accepted definition, given it means ‘different things to different actors in different contexts’ (Wallis, 2021, p. 77). Rather than peace being imposed onto a particular setting, social constructivists believe it should be based on the ideas and practices of human agents within intersubjective social contexts, thereby including the input of indigenous and contextual knowledge. Such an approach is reflected in the ‘local turn’ literature, which emphasises the active involvement of people on the ground in peacebuilding efforts (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 825; Odendaal, 2021, p. 627). Most of these studies begin by citing John Paul Lederach. In his 1997 ‘integrated framework for peacebuilding’, Lederach taught that sustainable peace is rooted in local people, who must become drivers of peacebuilding efforts if peace is to be ordained (Lederach, 1997, p. 100).

Given this increased focus on building peace from the local community and grassroots level, theorists and practitioners commonly perceive indigenous CSOs as indispensable to successful and long-lasting peace. The inclusion of civil society is discussed as a silver bullet to overcoming problems associated with external actors imposing their own version of peace onto societies they are unfamiliar with. This is because CSOs can help peacebuilding efforts to ‘gain broader public legitimacy and in turn become more durable’ (McKeon, 2004), given that they are in touch with citizens on the ground and have a deep awareness of a conflict's internal dynamics and developments. These beliefs are reflected in the international community's assessments for why CSOs need to become actively involved in peacebuilding. The United Nations (UN) claims that ‘real progress’ depends upon accessing their knowledge and resources, besides ‘actively including them in their work’ (United Nations Security Council, 2015, p. 14). The European Union (EU) has spoken of how an ‘empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system’ and is an ‘important player in fostering peace’ (European Commission, 2012, p. 3). These claims are supported by a wealth of academic research which has sought to empirically test the extent to which CSO involvement means peace is more likely to prevail in the long term. Desiree Nilsson's quantitative study assessed 83 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2004, determining that CSO inclusion is beneficial to the durability of peace (Nilsson, 2012, p. 246). Similarly, Roberto Belloni argues that including civil society in the Bosnian peace process is vital for its ‘long-term sustainability’ (Belloni, 2001, p. 164), whilst David Roberts claims that ’indigenous organisations’ are vital to creating a ’meaningful, stable and viable’ peace in Cambodia (Roberts, 2008, p. 67).

The inclusion of civil society is discussed as a silver bullet to overcoming problems associated with external actors imposing their own version of peace onto societies they are unfamiliar with.

T2 Peacebuilding

In terms of how indigenous CSOs can practically influence peacebuilding operations, focus is generally placed on their role as facilitators of T2 initiatives: unofficial and informal activities, such as inter-ethnic dialogue sessions and workshops, designed to enhance interaction and understanding between disputant parties. They are intended to complement Track I diplomacy, or official negotiations and peace talks carried out by government and IO officials or diplomats (Schluter & Ive, 2018, p. 155; Federer, 2021, p. 428). T2 efforts help to stimulate a ‘peace constituency’ by emphasising the value of peaceful relations and building trust between disputants (Burgess & Burgess, 2010, p. 16), thereby creating conditions where official peace negotiations and strategies are more likely to succeed. Indigenous CSOs are considered particularly effective in facilitating them. They are generally trusted by conflicting parties, who regard their aims as more legitimate and genuine than those of official actors. Consequently, CSOs can access a greater number of communities than officials whose lack of knowledge of a conflict's complex internal politics can be a barrier to engaging with disputants. It should be noted, however, that indigenous CSOs are diverse in their objectives and actions, so some are better suited to peacebuilding than others. Faith-based organisations are believed to be particularly effective, owing to their experience as educators and intermediaries (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009, p. 176). There are also weaknesses and limitations to indigenous CSOs facilitating T2 activities. Unlike official state or IO representatives, they cannot offer financial or diplomatic incentives to conflicting parties to help them reach a mutual understanding.

International Aid and ‘Donorisation’ of CSOs

IOs and foreign governments are increasingly channelling funding directly to indigenous CSOs. Their growing mistrust in the integrity of official aid channels, combined with assumptions that CSOs are reliable groups with well-meaning intentions, convinces donors that this approach limits the danger of funds being misused or wasted. A further incentive for funding CSOs directly is that donors tend to have greater control over their commitment, and the flexibility to shift priorities if their wish to (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003; Novak, 2017).

Scholars typically contend that CSOs receiving such funding effectively become ‘service-delivery’ organisations which are primarily accountable to donors and derive legitimacy from completing tasks and matching an agenda externally set by them (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Examples of ‘service delivery’ could include distributing medical supplies, improving access between communities and staffing community centres – any ‘service’ which donors regard as fundamental to their operations (Banks et al., 2015, p. 710). This process is said to be underlined by the ‘professionalisation’ or ‘NGOisation’ of CSOs, whereby funds are used to employ trained, full-time staff members to deliver specified projects, maintain permanent premises, and develop formal policies and reporting procedures – all of which donors deem necessary if recipient organisations are to fulfil their responsibilities effectively. Focus becomes placed on delivering services or initiatives with ‘short-term outcomes’ and clearly monitored ‘deliverables’ (Andrews, 2014, p. 101).

However, this ‘professionalisation’ process is simultaneously believed to weaken CSOs’ ties with local, grassroots communities and decreases ‘broad-based community participation’ in their activities (Chahim & Prakash, 2014, p. 491). As CSOs become responsive to the needs and demands of external donors, their attention becomes diverted from internal constituents and community-based issues. This causes local communities to perceive professionalised CSOs as elitist organisations removed from their concerns, only artificially interested in projects or initiatives which apparent beneficiaries may not want or need (Elbers et al., 2022; Krawczyk, 2018; Rodionov et al., 2021). Indeed, some commentators conclude that funded CSOs effectively become ‘subcontracted development consultants’ (Bebbington, 1997, p. 1,759) or ‘private consultancy firms’ with professional networks and specialities in policy monitoring and service delivery (Alvarez, 2009, p. 180). This is believed to be in contrast with unfunded, membership based CSOs, which are responsive to the needs and priorities of their own members and communities they are accountable to.

As CSOs become responsive to the needs and demands of external donors, their attention becomes diverted from internal constituents and community-based issues.

Some studies have pushed back against this narrative, by arguing that CSOs can continue to pursue their own interests in addition to representing and involving local communities in their activities whilst also receiving financial support from donors (Andrews, 2014; Banks et al., 2015; Zihnioglu, 2019). In practice, this is said to occur through CSOs effectively becoming ‘intermediaries between donor and local interests’ (Puljek-Shank, 2018, p. 881). They receive donor funds but apply them to the needs of communities, who influence how resources are allocated. To some degree, this approach appeases both donors and grassroots communities – donors can be sure their financial aid is directed towards the most pressing issues, whilst communities can state their priorities (Banks et al., 2015; Puljek-Shank, 2018). A related argument is that CSOs retain the agency and influence to ‘negotiate’ with donors as to how funds are spent, by persuading them to match their funding to the needs and priorities of local communities (Andrews, 2014, p. 107). Such an approach is believed to safeguard CSOs’ representative function and legitimacy amongst the grassroots, which donors may regard as an important consideration when apportioning financial resources (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003; Zihnioglu, 2019). The impact of international aid upon individual CSOs is therefore subject to scholarly debate.

Case Study and Methods

Cypriot Conflict

A contextual overview of the Cypriot conflict and the island's civil society is required before delving into the study's empirics. The Mediterranean Island has been divided into two political and ethnic areas since 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (RoC) comprises the southern two-thirds of the island and is dominated by the Greek Cypriot (GC) community (numbering approximately 650,000 people). The northern one-third is principally occupied by the Turkish Cypriot (TC) community (around 382,000 people) – though with a sizeable Turkish population – and was unilaterally declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. The TRNC is only recognised by Turkey and is internationally considered to be part of the RoC. Though the political and ethnic division can be traced back to the island's long history of colonisation, the Turkish intervention of 1974 at least explains the current phase of the Cyprus problem. This occurred during an intense period of intercommunal violence between GCs and TCs. It saw radical GC factions, with support from the Greek military junta which had recently come to power in Greece, organise acts of sabotage in the name of ‘enosis’ (the term applied to describe Cypriot unification with the Greek ‘motherland’). They included attacks on TC villages and enclaves, culminating in a coup and assassination attempt against the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 43). This provided cause for Turkish intervention in line with the island's constitution, which granted military intervention if the country's territorial integrity was deemed to be in jeopardy (Fisher, 2001, p. 310). After diplomatic efforts failed, Turkish forces moved to occupy 37% of the northern part of the island. This ultimately led to the country being divided, with the UN brokering a ceasefire by committing to guarding the Green Line splitting the entire length of the island in two (Hadjipavlou, 2007; Papadakis et al., 2006).

Both communities have historically blamed each other for what happened, which is a common defining feature of intractable conflicts. TCs typically regard the invasion as a legitimate and necessary act to prevent enosis and protect them against the GCs, whilst GCs see it as a premeditated and illegal act of aggression. This narrative has been built into different sectors of society on both sides of the divide, thereby socialising people into accepting an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy which demonises and dehumanises ‘the other’ community. For instance, the education curriculum is renowned for producing an ethnonationalist history centred on constructing an ‘enemy image’ (Dieronitou, 2014; Zembylas & Karahasan, 2017). GC school textbooks describe 1974 as a tragic end for the ‘Greek nation’ and the culmination of Turkish attempts to ‘grab Cyprus’ (Papadakis, 2008, p. 8), whilst TC textbooks perceive the intervention as a ‘Happy Peace Operation’ when the ‘Heroic Turkish Army’ came to rescue Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriot savagery (Papadakis, 2008, p. 14).

Despite persistent hostility between both communities, settling the conflict has been on the agenda of the international community for decades, though resolution attempts have repeatedly failed to reach a compromise between the fundamental concerns of each side. The 2004 Annan Plan was the most politically consequential negotiation effort. In line with previous arrangements, the plan was to create a new United Republic of Cyprus, consisting of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot states and joined by a federal government apparatus (Jarraud et al., 2013; Lönnqvist, 2008). The plan was tied to Cyprus being admitted into the EU (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 61). Though the proposals were subsequently accepted by 65% of TCs, they were only accepted by a minority (24%) of GCs, who believed some of their main concerns, such as the stationing of Turkish troops on the island, had not been addressed (Papadakis et al., 2006; Şahin, 2022). The plan therefore failed, but this did not prevent Cyprus from becoming an EU member state. Peacebuilding CSOs have subsequently financially benefitted from EU funds (see below).

Civil Society

There is a widescale belief that Cypriot civil society, on both sides of the divide, has traditionally been weak and undeveloped, lacking institutional coherence and momentum for mobilisation. One notable explanation is the dominant role played by political parties across society. They have traditionally dictated economic decision-making and mediated citizens’ concerns and ideas. Individuals have tended to consider parties as the only channel to convey their concerns and for all issues facing society to be dealt with by politicians. Besides ensuring political parties’ control much of the island's political debate, this clientelist relationship has resulted in an underdevelopment of civil society (Kanol, 2010, p. 36; Ladini, 2009, p. 53; Tziarras, 2018, p. 25). Furthermore, the ethnic division and hostility existing between communities has to some degree prevented the development of a multi-ethnic civil society focused on uniting TCs and GCs rather than reinforcing their differences. As demonstrated by the education curriculum, the Cypriot population is near constantly exposed to divisive attitudes which are embedded into the fabric of society. There has consequently been little opportunity for an alternative narrative to gain credibility among the population.

However, some hope has arisen over the past two decades. Owing to the distinct lack of progress through official peace talks, there have been growing calls for a ‘Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned’ peace process, involving wider Cypriot society rather than just the political elite. This phrase stems from a speech made by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. He claimed that future peacebuilding efforts must lay ‘first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves’ if they are to have any realistic chance of success (Michael, 2013, p. 531). Consequently, IOs have become committed to developing and working with the island's civil society network. The UN's peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has developed a Civil Affairs department with the intention of working with indigenous groups on a range of initiatives and activities designed to build bicommunal confidence and trust. Such endeavours have helped Cypriot civil society to grow in confidence and find a common purpose. Moreover, the aforementioned Annan Plan was ‘accompanied by the first opening of crossings across the Green Line’, thereby enabling Greek and Turkish Cypriots to safely meet and communicate for the first time in decades – free movement across the island was disabled following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Lönnqvist, 2008, p. 3). As a result, some of the island's bicommunal CSOs – committed to uniting both communities and resolving hostilities – formed around this time, with peacebuilding CSOs subsequently becoming more widespread. Therefore, despite the Annan Plan's failure, it at least sparked increased contact and communication between GCs and TCs. The island's developing civil society is one of the main reasons for this investigation's focus on Cyprus.

CSO Selection

Given practical constraints, this study focuses on three peacebuilding CSOs operating in Cyprus. They were selected based on their ongoing activeness in peacebuilding efforts, their bicommunalism (the involvement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in their activities), and their dependency on international aid:

Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR): This group was established in 2003 with the intention of enhancing understanding, respect and cooperation among all communities in Cyprus, by promoting a culture of peace through educational practices. It specialises in developing ‘peace education’ initiatives to help build stronger ties between communities.

Famagusta Avenue Garage (FAG): This bicommunal organisation was established in 2018 to encourage individuals (particularly young people) from both communities, across the divided Famagusta region, to work together to promote a culture of coexistence and the sharing of experiences.

Cyprus Youth Council (CYC): CYC was formed in 1996 with the aim of promoting dialogue and cooperation between youth in Cyprus whilst connecting them to the wider world. Its areas of interest in relation to young people include human rights, employment and education issues.

There are fundamental similarities between these groups. Most notably, they are focused on bringing together people from across the divide and regard a ‘united Cyprus’ as the only acceptable means of resolving the conflict. They have sourced at least some level of financial support and continue to be active in facilitating T2 peacebuilding initiatives. However, it is important to also emphasise how there are differences between these CSOs. AHDR and CYC possess a ‘formal organisational structure’ (Novak, 2017, p. 128), given they employ staff members, have formal decision-making procedures and a physical base – indicators of their ‘professionalisation’. In contrast, FAG is essentially a ‘membership-based grassroots organisation’ reliant on volunteers (Chahim & Prakash, 2014, p. 489). FAG is also different in being based in the Famagusta region, and therefore not in the capital city, Nicosia, unlike AHDR and CYC. Though they are all committed to a united Cyprus, their immediate objectives and priorities also indicate differences. AHDR is primarily focused on ‘peace education’ as a means of building bridges between communities, whilst CYC is focused on working with young people in a more general sense. FAG represents Cypriots on a regional basis whereas AHDR and CYC are focused on working with Cypriots from across the country. It was felt that the differences between the CSOs, in addition to their shared impetus on resolving the conflict, would add an interesting dynamic to the discussion.

Some ‘desk-based’ research was initially carried out. The author analysed the websites and social media content of each CSO, in addition to a range of reports and documents circulated by them. This was followed by an ethnographic approach. The author spent considerable time in Cyprus, across two different periods, interviewing members and employees of each CSO and attending their activities – including workshops and dialogue forums. Relevant international donors have also been interviewed. This ethnographic approach engendered a firm grasp of the contextual considerations impacting the CSOs and accounted for local experiences of peace interventions.

Discussion

Enabling Effect

The findings, to some degree at least, contrast with the typical narrative propelled in the ‘donorisation’ literature, particularly the claim that funded CSOs experience a complete convergence towards donor interests, at the expense of their original ambitions, ‘in terms of setting priorities and determining strategy’ (Parks, 2008, p. 217). This is because international aid serves an ‘enabling’ or ‘facilitating’ purpose – providing beneficiaries with the means and resources to develop initiatives according to their own agenda and priorities. The CSOs purposely search for financial support, typically in the form of ‘project funds’, so they can design and develop peacebuilding programs matching their objectives, which are structured by the most pressing needs and interests of those demographics they represent. Funding is specifically required to cover staffing costs – the CSO may need to recruit designated project officers or alternatively reallocate full-time employees to develop the project. Funding is also sought for other project requirements, including necessary printed and online resources, such as websites and marketing materials; transportation costs (travelling to specific venues); and booking external experts or guest speakers. Given the CSOs’ projects are centred on building trust between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, in addition to overcoming divisive stereotypes and attitudes, international aid enables them to make a grassroots and community-focused peacebuilding contribution.

International aid serves an ‘enabling’ or ‘facilitating’ purpose – providing beneficiaries with the means and resources to develop initiatives according to their own agenda and priorities.

We can see evidence of this when surveying projects coordinated by the three CSOs. For example, AHDR facilitates an ‘Imagine’ program, financially supported by the German foreign office. The program is designed to promote peace, understanding and anti-racism across Cyprus, so has an education focus in line with the organisation's overall objectives. The funding means AHDR can continue to employ ‘education officers’, who visit schools and closely collaborate with teachers in the design of workshops and classes where existing conflict-inducing stereotypes, discrimination and attitudes – described as elements of the ‘prevailing culture of violence’ – are critically interrogated and replaced with alternative viewpoints and perceptions (AHDR Website Report, 2023). Therefore, this funded program trains young people to understand that different perceptions and attitudes exist in relation to the causes of the conflict and its various impacts. This training is intended to overcome the ‘nationalism’ and ‘blame game’ narratives integrated into the formal education curriculum on both sides of the island, which characterise ‘the other’ as the perpetrators and reason why the conflict persists (Interview with AHDR, 2023).

International aid similarly allows CYC to design and implement its initiatives. The CSO's projects are mainly supported by the EU's Erasmus+ programme, with additional support from the US Embassy and the Cyprus University of Technology. Their funded programs include a ‘Co-creating Media Literate Youth’ project, designed to raise awareness among school-aged Turkish and Greek Cypriots of the amount of fake news and misinformation plaguing both communities – which is rooted in aspects of the conflict. Financial aid ensured CYC's educators could train project participants in ‘media literacy’, by teaching them to recognise the propagation of false narratives, particularly in an online context. Participants were also exposed to practical methods in how to overcome and even respond to such misinformation (CYC Project press release 2023). This project personifies the overall intentions of the CSO – to facilitate contact between young people from both communities, whilst enabling them to understand and confront the various interrelated issues impacting society.

A similar narrative emerges when looking at the work carried out by FAG. As mentioned, the level of professionalisation separates this CSO from AHDR and CYC. Unlike those two groups, FAG is reliant on volunteers and does not employ staff members on a consistent basis. However, the group has still accessed financial assistance for the purpose of developing projects adhering with its overall objective of increasing collaboration between Greek and Turkish Cypriots across the Famagusta region. Most notably, the EU has recently funded their ‘Empowering the Youth of Famagusta’ project – designed in collaboration with two other CSOs based in Famagusta. The financial aid was largely allocated towards recruiting and sustaining a ‘project manager’ (who was the lead member of FAG) for the predefined duration of the initiative. The project's aims included ‘empowering’ young Turkish and Greek Cypriots from the relatively rural Famagusta region by encouraging their participation in ‘human rights education’ and ‘intercommunal collaboration’. It encompassed several different activities, including ‘weekend camps’ where participants attended ‘a series of workshops’, designed to help them appreciate different points of view, in addition to ‘entertaining activities’ including film screenings (FAG Project Report, 2023). It is therefore another example of financial support enabling CSOs to put their own peacebuilding plans into practice.

Explanations

Several contextual reasons explain how this situation has occurred. One principal explanation is that CSOs purposely access funding from donors who broadly agree with and are sympathetic to their own peacebuilding intentions. Ensuring their priorities align helps to prevent recipients from following an agenda which deviates from their ‘own goals’ (Interview with CYC, 2023). For instance, AHDR has received funding from the German foreign office given it regards education-based activities as ‘integral’ to peacebuilding. Meanwhile, CYC's financial dependence on the EU's Erasmus+ program relates to their mutual focus on youth-based initiatives – CYC is of course dedicated to ‘working with and representing young people from across the island’ (Interview with CYC, 2023). FAG's ‘Empowering the Youth of Famagusta’ project matches multiple EU priorities, including instigating collaboration among young people and connecting Turkish and Greek Cypriots from regions other than Nicosia – the usual centre of bicommunal peace efforts. ¹ Therefore, this practice of locating favourable funding streams, broadly matching their agendas, helps ensure CSOs can pursue their interests, and those of the constituents they represent, whilst receiving international aid.

Their ability to source favourable funds is partly helped by the high proportion of donors and funding streams operating in Cyprus, meaning beneficiaries are not restricted to one particular source with prescribed objectives. As can already be inferred, the most active and generous international donor is the EU – which is perhaps unsurprising given the country's EU membership. Its financial aid is channelled through several distinct funding streams and programs – including the Erasmus+ program. EU funding also facilitates the United National Development Program (UNDP), which supports initiatives designed to ‘encourage dialogue and cooperation between all of the communities of Cyprus’ (UNDP website, 2023). Other international donors include the UN's peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), though its financial support is generally limited to small grants covering necessary expenses like transportation costs. Several embassies and foreign governments are also active. As demonstrated, the German Foreign office funds initiatives relating to crisis prevention, stabilisation and post-conflict peacebuilding (German Foreign Office Website, 2022). Likewise, the Swedish government continues to support Cypriot peacebuilding efforts.

A further explanatory factor is that a process of negotiation often takes place between donors and recipients during the project planning stage, to ensure initiatives broadly match the aims of both parties. CSOs admit they are not afraid to ‘push back’ against suggestions advocated by donors during the planning stage if they are felt to contradict or interfere with their own ambitions (Interview with CYC, 2023). This chimes with the arguments put forward by those scholars, such as Bebbington and Puljek-Shank, who question the ‘donorisation’ narrative by claiming that CSOs retain the agency to negotiate with donors to ensure financial resources are allocated according to their agenda and the interests of the people they represent – who the CSOs work alongside when planning initiatives. As also echoed by revisionist scholars, including Gilham and Edwards, this process simultaneously helps to safeguard the organisations’ legitimacy by illustrating that their primary motivation is to ‘work on behalf of’ certain constituencies and communities (Interview with AHDR, 2023).

A process of negotiation often takes place between donors and recipients during the project planning stage, to ensure initiatives broadly match the aims of both parties.

Constraints

However, the CSOs highlight how there are limits or constraints to which international aid enables them to put their peacebuilding plans into practice, relating to donors’ expectations and interests. Most notably, international donors only typically support CSO initiatives for a prescribed, short period of time. This point is expressed in the ‘donorisation’ literature, with scholars claiming that funding leads to CSOs focusing ‘on projects with short-term measurable outcomes’ (Chahim & Prakash, 2014, p. 491). As donors are required to internally ‘justify’ that their funds are ‘put to good use’, they expect beneficiaries to measure and document their impact and positive influence within short timeframes. FAG's ‘Empowering the Youth of Famagusta’ project was only funded for an eight-month period, between July 2022 and March 2023, with the project officer's paid contract only existing for this period. Similarly, funding for CYC's ‘Co-creating Media Literate Youth’ program was specifically allocated to the delivery of ten ‘media literacy’ workshops, held between November 2020 and February 2021.

The short-term nature of CSOs’ projects has several consequences. It clearly means that international aid does not enable them to implement their own projects – matching their wider peacebuilding ambitions – indefinitely and continuously, but only within a restricted period. For more professionalised CSOs, like AHDR and CYC, this does not necessarily have a significant institutional impact, as they are typically working on several projects simultaneously. However, the situation is far different for CSOs relying on volunteers and which only usually facilitate one major project at any one time, such as FAG, as their overall impact is at least ‘severely reduced’ upon a project's completion. Furthermore, all three CSOs indicate that projects which are only operational for a restricted period cannot have the same level of success or effectiveness as ones which may operate on a more long-term basis. Ultimately, they are all attempting to positively influence the attitudes of GCs and TCs and thereby build stronger relations between the two communities. However, influencing attitudes and perceptions is a long-term endeavour, one which cannot be achieved ‘overnight’ or within a very short time period (Interview with CYC, 2023).

International aid does not enable them to implement their own projects – matching their wider peacebuilding ambitions – indefinitely and continuously, but only within a restricted period.

A logical solution to this problem would be for CSOs to reapply for international aid to help prolong and sustain their projects. However, CSOs cannot typically receive funding to merely extend a project with the same set of objectives – donors expect funded programs to ‘achieve their aims’ by the set date of termination (Interview with NGO Support Centre, 2023). As a result, funding can only be sought for new projects, or ones which build upon the achievements of previous initiatives, and additional funding applications are required. AHDR's ‘Imagine’ program is a case in point. The program was established in 2017, with its original objectives involving education officers visiting schools across the island. However, a subsequent ‘second stage’ was added, comprising of school children and their teachers –already familiar with AHDR's work – visiting the CSO's premises at the Home for Cooperation to engage in further peace education activities. ² They specifically take part in sports activities – facilitated by another CSO, ‘Cyprus Peace Players’ – where students develop skills for teamwork, tolerance and trust. AHDR believe it is only appropriate to bring students to the buffer zone after they have become familiar with the peace education narrative and curriculum within their own schools, and when they are therefore more understanding of the program's objectives. However, adding a second stage, with revised aims, has also helped AHDR to continue receiving project funding from the German foreign office. However, adding additional components to funded projects is not as straightforward for the likes of FAG. The absence of full-time staff members means it is practically very difficult for them to submit new funding applications on a consistent basis and continuously consider how projects can be revised or amended. They admit how ‘everyday responsibilities’, such as volunteers’ work and family commitments, means there is ‘little time’ for such structured planning and organising. It also makes other bureaucratic expectations logistically difficult, such as the need to compile project reports, either at the conclusion of the project or on a more interim basis, documenting ‘what the projects have achieved’ (Interview with CYC, 2023).

Another potentially limiting and constraining factor is that even when CSOs have secured funding towards projects, there is no guarantee that donors will not reprioritise their funding commitments, thus potentially constraining a project's timeframe or ambitions. Indeed, it is relatively common for donors to oversee ‘shifts in funding levels across countries, programme areas and recipients’ (Parks, 2008, p. 214), owing to greater financial restraints or evolving international ambitions. The most notable example of such an occurrence taking place in Cyprus involved the Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT) Programme, which had been facilitated by UNDP with financial support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). It was specifically used to support ‘civil society initiatives’ aimed at ‘peacebuilding and confidence building’ between both communities, including cultural heritage and educational projects (UNDP website, 2023). However, the programme was discontinued in March 2016, as USAID decided to stop funding Cypriot projects principally owing to the amount of financial support now being offered by the EU (Interview with USAID, 2023). The closing of this programme naturally impacted those organisations which had been benefitting from it. Some of AHDR's initiatives had previously been supported by this fund, including their ‘Multiperspectivity and Intercultural Dialogue in Education’ project, designed to strengthen the capacity of educators to develop linkages between teaching and intercultural dialogue. Though the program had already achieved many of its aims, the closure of the ACT programme prevented AHDR from expanding on the project, as has been the case with ‘Imagine’. They also lost one of their lucrative funding streams, though alternative sources have clearly remained available. This case indicates the potential damaging and destabilising impact donors’ changing priorities can have upon individual CSOs.

Conclusion

These findings add further nuance and complexity to the ‘donorisation’ debate on several levels. They firstly indicate how international aid cannot be reduced to having solely positive or negative consequences. Much of the debate indicates a degree of mutual exclusivity – that funded CSOs either become tied to the interests and objectives of donors leading to ‘reduced CSO autonomy’ (Krawczyk, 2018, p. 300), or retain the agency and ‘leeway’ to negotiate and decide how funds are spent according to their own priorities (Andrews, 2014, p. 107). However, a more complex and multifaceted picture has emerged here. Although the CSOs cannot be described as donors’ consultants, ‘clients’ or ‘service-delivery’ organisations working on a ‘limited set of agendas’ (Banks et al., 2015, p. 708), this does not mean they are completely removed from donors’ expectations. They are still required to carry out projects within prescribed and short time periods whilst emphasising ‘quick impacts’ rather than ‘longer-term strategic responses’ (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 826). These expectations can have a constraining effect, particularly on the length and continuity of programs, but this should not take away from the reality that international aid simultaneously enables CSOs to design and deliver peacebuilding initiatives according to their own agenda. They continue to ensure their projects involve close collaboration with TC and GC communities, thereby overcoming the claim that funded CSOs are removed from citizen concerns and solely interested in delivering artificial initiatives or services, which is said to ‘delegitimise’ CSOs ‘in the eyes of the grassroots’ (Elbers et al., 2022, p. 930). Understanding the reasons behind this requires a deep awareness of contextual factors – namely, the diversity of donors and funding streams operating in Cyprus, which allows CSOs to access support from those which most closely align with their own objectives, in addition to the process of negotiation taking place between donors and recipients. In short, the findings speak to both sides of the debate to some extent – international aid enables recipient CSOs to carry out initiatives according to their underlying agenda, providing they adhere to donors' requirements and restrictions.

In short, the findings speak to both sides of the debate to some extent – international aid enables recipient CSOs to carry out initiatives according to their underlying agenda, providing they adhere to donors’ requirements and restrictions.

A further factor to be considered, one lacking adequate reflection in the literature, is the importance of differentiating between peacebuilding CSOs – as the effects of international aid are not necessarily the same for them all. Though all three CSOs are clearly united in their hope for resolving the conflict and connecting TC and GC communities, there are differences between them in terms of their immediate objectives, location, and – crucially for this investigation – their degree of ‘professionalisation’. Whereas AHDR and CYC can be described as ‘professionalised organisations’ (Elbers et al., 2022, p. 925), given they maintain formal structures and employ permanent staff members, FAG is essentially a membership-based organisation reliant on ‘volunteers’ who have not received any ‘technical training’ (Zihnioglu, 2019, p. 661). This means that AHDR and CYC are somewhat shielded from the constraints related to allocating international aid, unlike FAG. For example, they have the means and resources to devise several projects simultaneously, so their short-term nature does not have significant institutional consequences – there are always other initiatives underway. However, FAG's usual reliance on volunteers means it does not have the capacity to continuously propose new projects, so its ability to fulfil its peacebuilding objectives is severely impacted by the ending of a specific program. Recognising the institutional differences between CSOs is therefore essential to assessing the impact of international aid.

Recognising the institutional differences between CSOs is therefore essential to assessing the impact of international aid.

It is hoped this paper will spark additional research on two fronts. Firstly, Cypriot peacebuilding CSOs still lack adequate empirical investigation. Though this paper has focused on three such CSOs, there are many more operating on the island – it is difficult to provide an accurate total given new group are consistently forming whilst others do not operate on a continuous basis. There are countless ways they should be interpreted, not just from an economic perspective. Assessing the effectiveness and impact of their peacebuilding endeavours would be especially helpful – the island is increasingly reliant on T2 efforts given the absence of official, high-level negotiations. Secondly, there is clearly still need to explore the impact of international aid upon peacebuilding CSOs in a range of conflict settings. As these findings are dependent on contextual matters, such as the diversity of funding streams active in Cyprus, we should caution against their generalisation. That said, they highlight the importance of moving beyond a binary interpretation of international aid's impact – whereby it is either regarded in a positive or negative light – by accounting for relevant contextual and organisational complexities.