As the US Army invests in automation for battle command, it is important to define how this technology impacts (either positively or negatively) on the team and organizational decision-making process. While many studies have taken a traditional task modeling approach to assessing battle command performance, this paper examines performance issues from a different level of systems analysis. Specifically, the paper seeks to identify a number of behavioral characteristics or “proficiencies” that are associated with effective decision-making performance at the team and organizational level. Each of these proficiencies, in turn, suggests a possible measurement taxonomy for assessing the enabling or degrading influence of digitization (combined with leader development, staff training, and organizational design) on decision-making performance in battle command.
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