This paper discusses the role of latent human failures in the breakdown of complex, well-defended systems. It distinguishes between failure types and failure tokens, and argues that remedial measures must be directed at identifying failure types through the use of various proactive indicators. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this approach for the management of organizational safety.
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