Researchers disagree on appropriate models to employ to analyze accident investigations. This paper describes several proposed accident investigation models. Unique aspects of accident investigations, particularly in comparison to empirical research, can partly explain some of these differences. More likely, the difficulty in documenting and describing the often considerable operator interactions and system changes that occur during accident sequences may account for the lack of agreement on a single model by investigators. Nonetheless, some models have affected the way investigators document and analyze investigation-related data. Despite differences in investigative methodology, in general the logic of investigations appears to be similar, across industries and countries.
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