A resilient system is able to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can continue to perform as required after a disruption or a major mishap, and in the presence of continuous stresses. This paper examines decision making in a large transportation firm as it anticipated and dealt with major disruptions resulting from hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2012. Results offer lessons of interest to researchers as well as organizations seeking to bolster their own resilience.
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