Defendant Wealth and Civil Litigation: The Effects of Profit Levels on Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Abstract

An experiment was conducted in order to examine the effects of defendant wealth on civil litigation damage award decisions. Wealth was manipulated in the form of company profits. This study combined two moderate profit values with the two extremes used in past research (Paige, et al 2003). All participants read three trial scenarios in which the Defendant Manufacturer was found responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and awarded either economic, punitive, or pain and suffering damages. Interestingly, with the inclusion of more moderate values, profit information was found to significantly influence punitive, pain and suffering, as well as economic damage awards. The pain and suffering relationship was not found in the previous study.

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