A research program addressing amusement ride safety required a means to study and compare investigations and inspections. A model was needed that could apply to both inspection and investigation, focusing on the failure made possible by the hazard(s) and explaining the actual or potential device failure or error. A “failure framework” was developed that incorporates elements of both deviation/aberration accident models and normal accident models. The framework has been used to study reports of amusement ride accidents, and will be used to develop interventions such as job aids and training to aid both inspection and investigations.
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