Biosafety Levels for Animal Agriculture Pathogens

Abstract

Due to the size and importance of agriculture to many countries, it is vital to safely contain highly virulent animal pathogens while conducting research or diagnostics involving those pathogens. Most agricultural pathogens can be studied safely in the laboratory or vivarium at Biosafety Level (BSL) -2 or -3, or Animal Biosafety Level (ABSL) -2 or -3. However, when animals are infected with certain highly virulent agricultural pathogens and there is no alternative other than loose-housing in a room, special requirements for containment are needed. This standard has become known as Biosafety Level 3 Agriculture (BSL-3-Ag) in North America and constitutes a special set of facility, operational and personnel requirements. In order to determine which biosafety level is appropriate for the containment of the animal pathogen being studied, an onsite risk assessment must be conducted, which takes into account many different factors. In addition, the final approval to work with a particular agricultural pathogen is often provided by the local and/or national government and may require further assessments.

References

Barbeito

M. S.

, Abraham

, Best

, Cairns

, Langevin

, Sterritt

W. G.

(1995). Recommended biocontainment features for research and diagnostic facilities where animal pathogens are used. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 14, 873–887.

Best

(1996). Containment Standards for Veterinary Facilities. Animal and Plant Health Directorate, Nepean, Canada.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health. (2007). Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) (5th edition), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Chalk

(2004). Hitting America's Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against U.S. Agricultural and Food Industries, Rand Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.

Chapman

M. A.

, Burke

J. M.

(2006). Letting the gene out of the bottle: The population genetics of genetically modified crops, New Phytologist, Tansley Review, 170, 429–443.

Delfosse

E. S.

(2005). Risk and ethics in biological control. Biological Control, 35, 319–329.

Heckert

, Kozlovac

(2006). Special Considerations for Agricultural Pathogen Biosafety. In Fleming

, Hunt

, (Eds.), Biological Safety: Principles and Practices (4th ed.), (pp. 579–586). Washington, DC: ASM Press.

Lautner

, Meyer

(2003). U.S. Agriculture in Context: Sector's Importance to the American Economy and its Role in Global Trade. In Kelley

, Chalk

, Bonomo

, Jackson

, Cecchine

, (Eds.), Conference Proceedings of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on the Threat of Biological Terrorism Directed Against Livestock, December 8–9, 2003.

Molak

(1997). Introduction and overview. In Molak

(Ed.), Fundamentals of Risk Analysis and Risk Management, (pp. 1–10). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

10.

National Academy of Sciences. (1983). Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

11.

National Agriculture Statistics Service. (2006). Available at: www.nass.usda.gov/index.asp. Accessed 2006.

12.

Rusk

J. S.

(2000). Biosafety Classification of Livestock and Poultry Animal Pathogens. In Brown

, Bolin

, (Eds.), Emerging Diseases of Animals, (pp. 13–22). Washington, DC: ASM Press.

13.

Scott

T. W.

(2005). Containment of Arthropod Disease Vectors. ILAR Journal, 46(1), 53–61.

14.

Traynor

P. L.

, Adair

, Irwin

(2001). A Practical Guide to Containment: Greenhouse Research with Transgenic Plants and Microbes, Information Systems for Biotechnology, Blacksburg, Virginia. Available at: www.isb.vt.edu. Accessed online 2007.

15.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service (2002). Manual 242.1 “Facility Design Standards.” Available at: www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01m.htm. Accessed online 2007.