This research note presents a model in which fiscal policy, measured by changes in the ratio of federal outlays to gross national product between election years, is a factor in explaining and forecasting the outcome of the past 30 presidential elections. Compared with six forecasting models assembled in a special issue of this journal in the fall of 1996, the model performs satisfactorily. The model implies that to win reelection or extend his party's tenure in the White House, a president should reject a policy of fiscal expansion. It is hoped that this article will stimulate students of presidential elections to add policy variables to their forecasting models.
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