Competing Redistricting Plans As Evidence of Political Motives

Abstract

Redistricting is a thoroughly political act, but the political strategies of the various actors often have been lost amid legal and representational arguments. This article looks at one set of actors—state legislators—and examines how they pursue personal and partisan interests during redistricting. Rather than treating legislators as uniform in their preferences, we divide them into two categories: those who are ambitious for higher office and those who are not. These two groups of legislators face dramatically different sets of incentives and constraints, and these differences are reflected by their strategies in the redistricting process. Using North Carolina's 1992 redistricting as exemplar, this article outlines the redistricting debates, describes the interests of the various actors, and presents an analysis of eight redistricting plans using JudgeIt. The findings indicate that members balance individual and partisan interests when proposing plans and that for ambitious legislators, individual ambition generally outweighs partisan loyalty.