A wavering equilibrium theory of subsystem politics is developed to distinguish between three types of subsystem politics. I suggest that subsystem players' ability to control the policy agenda varies with changes in subsystem politics. This article uses correlation analysis with data on bill sponsorship and referral to examine the impact of subsystem variation on policy making in three subsystems. I find that subsystem political variation is associated with changes in subsystem players' ability to control bill introduction and referral.
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