To understand why Congress is prompted to react to Supreme Court federal statutory construction decisions, we examine two different explanations of this phenomenon. The first focuses on the role that political actors, such as the president, the public, and interest groups, and salient issues play in the legislative process. The second explanation is based on the work of scholars who argue that ideological differences between the Supreme Court and Congress are important in provoking legislative reactions to Court rulings. The results of our analysis indicate that public opinion, salient cases, and Court invitations to Congress to revise its rulings are statistically significant predictors of some minimal level of congressional reaction, whereas the position of the president and partisan control of government help determine when the Congress is able to pass decision modification legislation. Ideological differences between the High Court and congressional committees and the full chambers are generally statistically insignificant factors.
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