The Republican Revolution reshaped many congressional practices, including the mix of interest groups testifying before House committees, in ways that promote partisan responsiveness. A comparison of the 104th and 103rd Congresses reveals significantly more testimony in 1995 by groups sympathetic to the Revolution, less testimony by other groups. Comparisons of individual committees, although more ambiguous, also reveal differences between traditionally partisan and traditionally bipartisan committees.
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