It is commonly accepted that members of Congress influence federal agencies informally, and that in turn the federal agencies strategically accommodate members of Congress. However, in recent years allegations of accommodation of congressional interests by federal agencies has been met with some skepticism. In this study I frame a critical test of the informal gains of U.S. House subcommittee members and leaders against that of substantive policy criteria in the awarding of distributive grants, specifically with respect to the Title I public works program of the Economic Development Administration during the period from 1978 to 1982. Utilizing a multinomial probit model of grant distributions to House members' districts, I find no substan tively strong or statistically significant "political benefits" for subcommittee members. However, subcommittee leaders are found to receive political benefits only during the critical test, and only enough to return the flow of grants to that which prevailed before the critical period.
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