In this article, the author uses probit models to test the hypothesis that the strength at the state level of a Union veterans group was correlated to legislators'votes on proposals to extend pension benefits. Results indicate that the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the veterans group in question, affected legislators' votes on both the Arrears Act of 1879 and the Disability Pension Act of 1890. The GAR was one of the first broadly based groups able to provide voters with an alternative, group-based linkage to their legislators. Within Congress, parties were surprisingly unorganized, allowing the GAR to strengthen its independence from strictly partisan coalitions. The author draws parallels between results here and results from other scholars' analyses of more recent group activity.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Ainsworth, Scott. Forthcoming. Lobbyists as interest group entrepreneurs: The mobilization of Union veterans. American Review of Politics.
2.
Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson.1984. Linear probability, logit, and probit models. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
3.
—. 1986. Logit and probit models for multivariate analysis with qualitative dependent variables. In New tools for social scientists , edited by William D. Berry and Michael S. Lewis-Beck.Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
4.
Arnold, R. Douglas.1982. Overtilled and undertilled fields in political science . Political Science Quarterly97:91-103.
5.
Arrears Act of 1879. Statutes at Large. Vol. 20, Chap. 23, p. 265.
6.
Bensel, Richard Franklin.1984. Sectionalism and American political development: 1880-1980 . Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
7.
Brady, David, and Mark Morgan.1987. Reforming the structure of the House appropriation process . In Congress: Structure and policy, edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Burnham, Walter D.1965. The changing shape of the American political universe . American Political Science Review59:7-28.
9.
Dearing, M.R.1952. Veterans in politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
10.
Disability Pension Act of 1890. Statutes at Large. Vol. 26, Chap. 634, p. 182.
11.
Follett, Mary P.1918. The new state. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
12.
Galloway, George B.1961. History of the House of Representatives. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
13.
Garand, James C., Kenneth Wink, and Bryan Vincent.1993. Changing meanings of electoral marginality m U.S. House elections, 1824-1978. Political Research Quarterly46:27-48.
14.
Glasson, William H.1918. Federal military pensions in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press.
15.
Gopoian, J.D.1984. What makes PACs tick? An analysis of the allocation patterns of economic interest groups. American Journal of Political Science28:259-81.
16.
Grenzke, Janet M.1988. Campaign contributions to U.S. House members from outside their districts. Legislative Studies Quarterly13:83-103.
17.
—. 1989. Candidate attributes and PAC contributions. Western Political Quarterly42:245-64.
18.
Grier, Kevin B., and Michael C. Munger.1991. Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions to House incumbents. Economic Inquiry29:24-43.
19.
Hall, R.L., and F.L. Wayman.1990. Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science Review84:797-820.
20.
Hansen, John Mark.1987. Choosing sides. Studies in American Political Development2:183-229.
21.
—. 1991. Gaining access. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
22.
Herndon, J.F.1982. Access, record and competition as influences on interest group contributions to congressional campaigns. Journal of Politics44:996-1019.
23.
Herring, E.P.1929. Group representation before Congress. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
24.
Kau, James B., and Paul H. Rubin.1979. Public interest lobbies. Public Choice34:45-54.
25.
Kernell, Samuel.1977. Toward understanding 19th century congressional careers. Ambition, competition, and rotation. American Journal of Political Science21:669-93.
26.
Krehbiel, Keith.1993. Where's the party? British Journal of Political Science23:235-66.
27.
Langbein, Laura I.1986. Money and access: Some empirical evidence. Journal of Politics48:1052-62.
28.
Langbein, Laura I., and Mark A. Lotwis.1990. The political efficacy of lobbying and money. Legislative Studies Quarterly15:413-40.
29.
McConachie, Lauros.1898. Congressional committees. New York : Thomas Y. Crowell.
30.
McConnell, Stuart.1992Glorious contentment. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
31.
McDonagh, Eileen Lorenzi.1992. Representative democracy and state building in the Progressive Era. American Political Science Review86:938-50.
32.
—. 1993. Constituency influence on House roll-call votes in the Progressive Era, 1913-1915. Legislative Studies Quarterly28:185-210.
33.
McMurry, Donald L.1922. The political significance of the pension question, 1885-1897 . Mississippi Valley Historical Review9:19-36.
34.
Munger, Michael C.1989. A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions. Public Choice62:181-86.
35.
Oliver, J.W.1915. History of the Civil War military pensions, 1861-1885 . Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin.
36.
Pincus, Jonathan J.1975. Pressure groups and the pattern of tariffs. Journal of Political Economy83:757-78.
37.
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune.1982. The logic of comparative social inquiry. Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger.
38.
Quadagno, Jill.1988. The transformation of old age security. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
39.
Rohde, David W.1994. Parties and committees in the House: Member motivations, issues, and institutional arrangements. Legislative Studies Quarterly19:341-59.
40.
Sanders, H.T.1980. Paying for the "bloody shirt." In Political benefits, edited by B. S. Rundquist.Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
41.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney.1983. More of the same: Washington group activity in a decade of change. Journal of Politics45:351-75.
42.
Silbey, Joel H.1990. The rise and fall of American political parties. In The parties respond, edited by L. Sandy Maisel.Boulder, CO: Westview.
43.
Skocpol, Theda.1992. Protecting soldiers and mothers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
44.
Skocpol, Theda, and John Ikenberry.1983. The political formation of the American welfare state in historical and comparative perspective. In Comparative social research: The welfare state (vol. 6), edited by Richard S. Thomasson.Greenwich, CT: JAI.
45.
Stewart, Charles H. III.1989. Budget reform politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
46.
Sundquist, James L.1973. Dynamics of the party system. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
47.
Thompson, Margaret Susan.1985. The "spider web ": Congress and lobbying in the age of Grant. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
48.
Truman, David B.1951. The governmental process. New York : Alfred A. Knopf.
49.
Wilson, James Q.1975. The rise of the bureaucratic state. The Public Interest41:77-103.
50.
Wright, John R.1985. PACs, contributions, and roll calls: An organizational perspective. American Political Science Review79:400-14.
51.
—. 1989. PAC contributions, lobbying, and representation. Journal of Politics51:713-29.
52.
—. 1990. Contributions, lobbying, and committee voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. American Political Science Review84:417-38.
