Attempts to reform regulation by introducing economic incentives raise questions about how admimstrative agencies choose regulatory forms. The Environmental Protection Agency's emissions trading program provides one of the few opportunities to explore such questions. Analysis of data from interviews with individuals who participated in developing the program reveals that professional background, support for key environmentalist values, and political ideology played varying roles in shaping policymakers' decisions about air pollution regulatory form. One possible argument that links these factors is that professional paradigms and social movements provide the conceptual schema for ideologically based decisions about regulatory form. The potential role of ideology in administrative decisions about regulatory form points to further avenues for research on administrative policymaking.
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