Who Are Independents? Are They Moderate in Political Ideology?

Abstract

Political polarization and division between the two major U.S. political parties has sparked a growing interest in independent voters - individuals who prefer not to align with the two major political parties. Independents make up the largest proportion of the U.S. electorate. Despite the growth of independent identifiers, scholars continue to debate whether independents are truly distinct or merely weak partisans, and there has been little prior research on the characteristics of independents and how the public perceives them. This study assesses how independents differ demographically, ideologically, and perceptually from partisans. Evidence from voter file data suggests independents are younger, less educated, and more likely to be moderates. Analysis of a unique 2022 national survey finds independents want a political system that is more inclusive, offers better representation, and allows for increased political flexibility (with less categorization). The results suggest independents seek a greater sense of participation in the political process.

Keywords

independents partisanship unaffiliated voters identity public opinion nonpartisan

In the United States, political independents are individuals who do not affiliate with either the Democratic or Republican Parties. They frequently identify with smaller parties, such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party, or are nonpartisan (no party affiliation). Despite the growing number of Americans identifying as independents, political scientists have understudied this segment of the electorate.¹ Gallup, for example, found the percentage of the population identifying as independent increased from 33% in 1988 to 43% as of 2023-24 and 45% as of 2026.² While more than a third of Americans are unaffiliated in terms of party registration, these individuals are often excluded from participating in crucial stages of the electoral process, such as party primaries. Analyzing voter file data, a Unite America report finds that 22 states held closed primaries in 2022, excluding over 27 million voters not registered with a major party from the right to vote in primary elections.³ Who are independents, and how does the public understand them? Do independents have a moderate political ideology? Are independents just a reference category, or are they a meaningful segment of the electorate that could help solve America’s intractable political polarization problems (Holliday et al., 2025).

While this study does not directly test whether independents mitigate polarization, understanding how independents are perceived is itself a contribution to the debate. Perceptions of independents influence how parties mobilize voters, how electoral reforms are publicly justified, and how independents construct and express their own political identity. Establishing the empirical basis for these perceptions is a necessary step toward understanding whether and how independents could serve as a moderating force in an era of heightened partisan conflict in American politics.

Independents are often overlooked in contemporary studies of American voters. Independents are thought of as hidden partisans who avoid partisan conflict (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016), leading prior research to largely argue that most independents lean towards one of the two major political parties and hold opinions on issues and candidates similar to strong partisans (Keith et al., 1992). Other evidence suggests that voting behavior among independents does not differ meaningfully from partisan in elections (Keith et al., 1992; Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Petrocik, 1974). Independents also tend to be “cross-pressured” on important policy issues, such as being supportive of abortion rights and environmental protections while supporting tougher immigration policy and gun rights.⁴

At the same time, independents differ from partisans in important ways in politics. For instance, independents report feeling unrepresented by the major political parties (Dennis, 1992; Doherty et al., 2022; Klar & Krupnikov, 2016), favor nonpartisan elections (Bowler et al., 2009), and have significantly lower political trust and efficacy (Donovan & Bowler, 2004). They are more likely than partisans to express political cynicism, concern about special interests, and dislike of partisan infighting in open-ended survey responses (see Allamong et al., 2026). This is important because independents tend to represent a distinct yet significant share of the American electorate. A recent Pew Research Center survey of registered independents finds that nearly half report having always been registered as independents, and they strongly favor more political parties (Doherty et al., 2022). These individuals share a commonality of not affiliating with either of the two major political parties and prioritizing independence (Klar, 2014; Weisberg, 1980). How do perceptions toward independent voters differ between partisans and nonpartisans? Why are people political independents rather than partisans?

This study examines the demographic and ideological characteristics of unaffiliated voters and the attributes that partisans and nonpartisans attribute to this group. Unlike most prior research that relies on self-reported ideology from surveys, which can be limited by sampling frames that overrepresent registered voters, likely voters, or by non-response bias, this study first uses voter file data—which has become widely used in political science research—on the near universe of U.S. adults to offer a different perspective. This is coupled with an original survey question battery to identify characteristics people think define independents and to assess differences between nonpartisans and partisans.

The results show that people who are younger, less educated, and hold moderate ideologies are more likely to be categorized as independent in the voter file data. National survey data build on these patterns. Independents are more likely to report wanting a political system characterized by more compromise, better representation of citizens, and less rigid labeling (i.e., more political flexibility). Additionally, independents desire a stronger sense of political inclusion in the American political process. The results also suggest that partisans do not view independents negatively and instead view them as a group that can facilitate greater political compromise on important political issues. These results highlight prior work suggesting self-identified independents place greater substantive value on “independence” from the political system, separate from views toward the major political parties (Weisberg, 1980).

These results matter for how political scientists study partisanship and political behavior, for whether independent leaners should be grouped with partisans or constitute a distinct category, and for election reform debates.

Revisiting Independence as a Component of Partisanship

The share of independents in the U.S. is unusually high compared to other democracies (Dalton, 2008). Early research on political independents suggests that being an independent is a dimension within partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960). For instance, Weisberg (1980) argues there are four separate components of party identification: an independent factor, a partisan direction factor, a strength of partisanship factor, and a party system factor. From this view, identifying as an independent represents a distinct orientation toward political parties rather than simple detachment from them (see Allamong et al., 2026). However, more recent work treats partisanship primarily as an attachment to the Democratic or Republican parties and the intensity of affect toward the parties (Greene et al., 2002; Iyengar et al., 2012). Yet correlational evidence from feeling thermometer scales suggests attitudes toward partisans and independents vary; some partisans dislike independents, some independents dislike partisans, and others express similar attitudes toward both groups (Valentine and Van Wingen, 1980). These patterns suggest that valuing political independence may constitute a distinct dimension of political identity, separate from partisan strength or evaluations of the two-party system (Klar, 2014).

Other important work suggests that independents are often engaged and politically motivated despite not identifying with a political party. Petrocik (1974) finds that leaning independents are less likely to vote straight-ticket but are often more politically involved than weak partisan identifiers. Other evidence suggests independents are a response to dissatisfaction with the two-party system (Reilly et al., 2022) and political polarization (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). Kamieniecki (1988) finds that political independents exhibit greater positive affect for other nonpartisans than disdain for the parties; people high on the strength of independence scale are more likely to reject both parties. Recent work also shows that independence can coexist with strong affective reactions toward political parties. For example, Blankert (2022) finds that partisanship among independents predicts turnout and engagement, suggesting that being unaffiliated reflects motivated opposition rather than political apathy (see Abramowitz, 2022, Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Lee et al., 2022 on negative partisanship).

Competing Perspectives (Theories) on Independent Voters in U.S. Politics

Scholars have long debated what it means for Americans to identify as political independents. Are independents disengaged and low-informed about politics, covertly partisan, or a distinct political constituency seeking alternatives to party-centered politics? Three influential perspectives, advanced in The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960), Independent Politics (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016), and The Independent Voter (Reilly et al., 2022), offer different answers, both empirically and theoretically. But none of these accounts argues that independents are ideologically moderate. In contrast, our research using voter-file data finds that independents in U.S. politics are overwhelmingly moderate, younger, and less educated, suggesting that existing theories capture important dynamics while overlooking a central empirical reality.

Campbell et al. (1960)’s The American Voter presents an early and skeptical account of people not affiliated with a political party. Within the Michigan Model, party identification functions as a perceptual screen that organizes political information and motivates engagement. Independents, lacking this anchor, are less informed about politics, less interested in politics, and less consistent in their voting behavior than partisan identifiers. Party identification is treated as a durable psychological attachment that structures political engagement and behavior. Greene, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) extended this understanding of partisanship as both rational and affective (emotional) attachment to parties. In the American Voter, independents, lacking this attachment, are portrayed not as centrists but as disengaged and uninformed about politics.

The American Voter rejects the assumption—common in the mid-twentieth century before it was written—that independence reflects ideological moderation or political sophistication. This framework implicitly treats independents as a deficit rather than a meaningful political orientation. It does not conceive of independents as holding coherent views or systematically distinct preferences about how politics should function.

Klar and Krupnikov’s (2016) landmark book, Independent Politics, challenged the disengagement narrative by reframing independent identification as a strategic choice shaped by social context. In their account, many independents are not ideologically ambiguous but rather “undercover partisans” who avoid partisan labels because partisanship carries social stigma. This is especially the case for partisan leaners, who are the largest group of unaffiliated voters.

“Undercover partisans”—individuals with clear partisan preferences—avoid partisan labels because of social costs. In this view, being unaffiliated is less about ideological position than about a polarized and normatively anti-partisan social environment.

Using experiments and observational data, the authors show that people are more likely to identify as independent when partisanship is framed as socially undesirable and that these same individuals often behave like partisans when social pressures are removed. Importantly, the authors also argue that this identity management has political consequences: to preserve a non-partisan image, undercover partisans often avoid political discussion, activism, or other forms of political engagement. This account convincingly explains why many independents appear politically inactive despite holding strong policy preferences.

The book’s most important claim is that people who disguise their true preferences tend to avoid other forms of political engagement. As a result, the authors suggest, a sizable portion of the electorate remains politically inactive and doesn’t vote because they wish to preserve a socially desirable identity rather than express a partisan one. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) and Campbell et al. (1960) share that independents have lower participation and engagement, which is problematic and warrants study. However, genuinely moderate independents risk being absorbed into a category of hidden Democrats and Republicans.

Finally, Reilly et al. (2022) offer yet a third perspective on who are independents in US politics. The Independent Voter argues that unaffiliated voters represent a substantive political identity rooted in distrust of the two-party system and a desire for alternatives to entrenched partisan conflict (see Allamong et al., 2026). For example, the Pew Research Center finds year after year roughly 40% of Americans prefer more political parties than two in the U.S. (2026). Rather than viewing independents as disengaged or undercover, the authors emphasize shared attitudes toward the political system itself, including dissatisfaction with party gatekeeping, closed primaries, and restrictive ballot access. Independents are rooted in dissatisfaction with the two-party system. Their contribution is to shift attention from vote choice to system-level attitudes, arguing that independents are united less by ideology than by opposition to two-party dominance. While independent leaners may share views on substantive policy issues with partisans, their views of the party system are distinct.

Their argument pushes back on the “hidden partisan” thesis, arguing that even when independents vary ideologically on substantive policy issues, their orientations toward governance and representation are meaningfully distinct from those of partisans. Yet here too, ideological moderation is not central to the argument. Independents are defined primarily by anti-partisan sentiment and system-level critique. As the authors acknowledge, the category of “independent” remains heterogeneous, encompassing voters with divergent ideological positions but shared dissatisfaction with parties.

Prior literature in political science frames independents as disengaged voters, disguised partisans, or disaffected citizens, yet rarely as centrists. The study of independents deserves more attention, consistent with recent work showing that people prioritize compromise and process even if it means losing policy debates (Wolak, 2020) and that a large segment of the population is indeed moderate in terms of ideology (Fowler et al., 2023).

Evidence From Voter-File and Survey Data

Our findings complicate and build on the existing literature by uncovering the nuances around who independents are in American politics. Using voter-file data, we find that independents are overwhelmingly moderate in ideological terms, younger, and less educated than partisan identifiers. While our results resonate with claims that independents constitute a distinct group (Klar, 2014; Reilly et al., 2022), we find that forward-looking views on political flexibility—rather than opposition to the existing party structure—are a defining feature based on the survey data.

This study addresses two major questions: (1) whether independents are distinct demographically and in terms of ideology, (2) whether they are perceived as distinct, and why. Perceptions matter beyond describing who independents are because they have implications for representation in a plurality (two-party) voting system, for arguments about election reform, for coalition building, and for how campaigns and the media talk about independents.

The Motivation of Independents

Independents and moderates often see themselves as outside the polarized party system.

Differing from existing research on independents, we hypothesize that independents are more likely to be moderates (see Fowler et al., 2023 on moderates). We expect:

Independents are more likely to hold a moderate ideology compared to partisans.

Research on partisanship among marginalized groups finds that Latinos and Asians often fail to develop ties to either major party because the parties do not sufficiently address issues of race and immigration (Hajnal & Lee, 2011). For similar reasons, young people are more likely to not adhere to either major political party and to favor third parties (Dalton, 2020; Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Southwell, 2003). This evidence suggests that when people feel alienated or unaligned with the two major political parties, they hold a preference for broader perspective-taking on political issues. Similarly, if political independence signals rejection of narrow political conflict, those who identify as independents should see open-mindedness as central to the independent identity. We expect:

Independents are more likely to perceive perspective-taking or being open to opposing views as a reason people are independents compared to partisans.

Independents are the out-group in U.S. two-party politics (Brewer, 1999), yet independence is a meaningful political identity that can explain what motivates people to vote (Klar, 2014). Survey evidence supports this notion. For instance, on the 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey, 44% of independents reported that partisanship is important to their identity, which is only slightly less than Republicans (50%) and Democrats (58%). This suggests that independence itself operates as a meaningful political identity (Enns et al., 2022). A 2022 Pew survey found that independent leaners do not want to put a political label on their views and believe they are not like those who identify with a political party (Doherty et al., 2022). This finding is consistent with Weisberg’s (1980) argument that some people prioritize independence from the party system, a dimension separate from the strength of partisanship.

Despite this, independents are often labeled as weak partisans rather than recognized as possessing a distinct political identity. Mislabeling occurs when someone is described in a way that does not align with their self-identification (McDonald, 2020, p. 14). This tendency to mislabel independents highlights how they are often misunderstood within the American two-party system. We expect:

Independents are more likely to agree that a flexible political identity (i.e., not wanting to be labeled) is a reason people are independents compared to partisans.

Social Implications

Previous research argues that independents seek to avoid partisan conflict and that leaning independents keep their true partisan identity hidden to avoid contentious politics (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). Political polarization in the U.S. has led many Americans—partisans and nonpartisans—to be concerned about inter-party hostility (Barber and McCartney, 2015). Public frustration with both major political parties has grown sharply in recent decades. Today only 4 in 10 Americans hold a favorable view of either major political party, and nearly half of independents dislike both parties (Doherty et al., 2022).⁵ Other evidence suggests that independent leaners are much less likely to believe that the political parties represent their interests (Bowler et al., 2009). Given growing frustration with the two parties, partisans and nonpartisans are more likely to associate being an independent with a desire to avoid political conflict. We therefore expect individuals, regardless of political affiliation, to perceive conflict avoidance as a defining attribute of independents.

Individuals associate conflict avoidance as a reason people are independents regardless of whether they are partisans or nonpartisans.

Compromise refers to the willingness of opposing political groups to make mutual concessions to reach a shared goal or reduce conflict, despite the fact that doing so may challenge their loyalty to their own side. Prior work shows that citizens want more from elected officials than just ideological representation and instead prefer representatives who seek political compromise. For instance, Wolak (2020) finds consistent support for compromise across various political contexts, even when compromise may come at the expense of partisan goals and policy wins (but see Huddy & Yair, 2021). Independents may be especially associated with political compromise given they tend to be less tied to partisan identities and often hold more moderate views. Their distance from partisan conflict positions them as bridge builders who are able to “work across party lines.” Consistent with this idea, independents tends to maintain more diverse political discussion networks and are less likely than partisans to end friendships over political disagreements (Reilly & Hedberg, 2022). These cross-cutting social ties may further reinforce the perception of independents as potential mediators in a polarized political environment.

Partisans are more likely to perceive compromise and working across party lines as an attribute of independents compared to nonpartisans.

Administrative Data

This study first analyzes trends among independents using voter files for registered voters nationwide, combined with commercial data to measure unregistered individuals and propensity to vote for one party or the other. We utilize these administrative and commercial data to obtain the largest possible sample of independents in U.S. politics over the past decade, thereby avoiding sample bias problems, as surveys tend to oversample likely voters and registered voters, who often include fewer independents. These data are random 1% samples from the 2020, 2022, and 2023 voter files from the vendor Catalist of 265 million U.S. adults, with a combined sample of more than 7.5 million observations.⁶ The voter file combines official voting records from all state voter files with government and commercial data (i.e., cell phone records), as well as survey and campaign canvass records from the near universe of the adult U.S. population. Catalist provides a random 1% sample to researchers, with a growing number of studies showing the utility of these data.⁷

These data include an ideology plus score for each respondent on a 0-100 scale, with 100 indicating a high likelihood of being a strong liberal and zero a strong conservative; this variable is provided to researchers by Catalist and is based on voting history (including voting in primary elections), survey data, canvassing data, campaign contributions, commercial data, etc. The ideological scale is recoded into binary variables for liberal, moderate, and conservative.

We code independents, including leaners, as individuals scoring between 40-60 on the 0-100 synthetic partisanship variable available for all U.S. adults where higher values equate to strong Democrat.⁸ These partisanship scores extend beyond an individual’s party registration (which is only available for registered voters) to include all U.S. adults; in many states, more than a third of registered voters are unaffiliated. Crosstabs of this independent score in the 2023 file and state party registration indicate that only 1.9% of 3.6 million U.S. adults are registered Democrats, and just 2% are registered Republicans. Thus, more than 96% of people categorized as independent for this analysis were also unaffiliated voters in terms of party registration nationwide.

In the voter file data, independents largely reflect unaffiliated registration. In survey data, independent self-identification is based on identifying as a pure independent or an independent who leans towards one of the two political parties. The voter file data doesn’t allow analysis of leaners and pure independents separately, like survey data. This difference is part of the research design and allows us to better measure this concept.

These data were also validated against self-reported partisanship by merging the partisanship scores with national survey data (2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey, CMS) among a sample of over 2200 respondents willing to provide their name and address. This allowed their voter file data to be merged with the survey responses. The results show that self-identification of partisanship closely tracks the partisanship scores in this vendor’s voter files (Donovan et al., 2025).

Demographics, including age (measured in years) and gender, are included in the voter file data. These data also include probabilistic estimates of an individual’s race (in some states, race is reported on the state voter files), marital status, and education from administrative data (coded on a 0-100 scale for the probability of having a BA degree).⁹

A limitation is that the ideology plus metrics in the Catalist voter file models are probabilistic, and the data are vendor-imputed based on both administrative and commercial data. It is useful for identifying patterns, but it is not the same as self-reported ideology. However, merged national survey data with the voter file data indicate a close match of the ideology and partisanship scores to self-reported ideology and partisanship in large sample national survey data (Donovan et al., 2025).

Table 1 presents crosstabs comparing independents with the overall U.S. adult population across the three time periods. The table should be read down the columns. Among independents, what percentage are young people compared to the percentage in the general population, based on over 7 million people. Consistent with previous research, young people (ages 25-39) are consistently more likely to be categorized as independents compared to the overall population. In 2023, for example, 30% of people in this age group were independents compared to roughly 24.5% of the general population, a 5-point difference. Older people (73 years and older) are significantly less likely to be independent. While there are no significant differences by gender, independents are more likely to lack a college degree, which is noteworthy given the growing educational divides. Asian Americans and non-Hispanic whites continue to be more likely to be independents than the population overall. Black Americans are significantly less likely to be independents (just over 1% are coded as independents), but Latinos are roughly similar in their propensity to be independent as the general population (10% of all independents and the overall population).

Table 1.

Voter File Data Comparing Independents to the US Population (Percent of Each demographic Group Column Sum to 100%, Read Table Down the Columns)

	2020 1% File		2022 1% File		2023 1% File
	Independent	Overall	Independent	Overall	Independent	Overall
Age: Below 25	7.85	7.03	7.70	6.55	7.18	6.10
Age: 25-39	30.38	25.52	29.83	24.87	29.51	24.57
Age: 40-54	25.94	24.71	26.00	24.71	26.05	24.71
Age: 55-72	24.29	27.82	24.21	27.76	24.50	27.95
Age 73+	11.54	14.92	12.27	16.11	12.76	16.66
White non-Latino	84.34	73.30	83.74	72.38	81.91	70.74
Black	1.23	12.09	1.24	12.38	1.25	12.08
Latino	9.93	10.80	10.32	11.22	10.00	11.00
Asian	4.19	3.39	4.36	3.55	4.24	3.47
Male	46.67	46.47	46.90	46.48	46.99	46.53
Female	53.33	53.53	53.10	53.52	53.01	53.47
College degree	18.18	21.74	17.30	20.76	17.36%	20.83
Ideology Conservative	4.64	23.44	4.84	23.75	27.62	35.30
Moderate	92.61	47.24	92.47	47.26	69.96	46.77
Liberal	2.75	29.33	2.69	28.99	2.42	17.93
Married	52.31	52.11	52.32	51.70	52.08	51.68

Note. Catalist 1% random samples drawn in 2020, 2022 and 2023.

A significant difference is that independents are more likely to have a moderate ideology, consistent with hypothesis 1.¹⁰ In 2023, 70% of independents were categorized as moderate ideology compared to just under half of the general public. In the 2020 and 2022 data, over 90% of independents were categorized as moderates compared to less than half of the general public. The results are consistent with research showing that many Americans do not adhere to consistent ideologies (Barber & Pope, 2019; Converse, 1964; Fowler et al., 2023; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). While scholars debate who constitutes an independent voter and whether they behave like partisans in elections, these data suggest that they differ in some discernible ways, including age, education, race, and ideology. Using millions of cases, the administrative data provides a more precise and current look at who are independents, showing how they differ from the general population.

Public Opinion About Independents

To better understand who independents are, we turn to a nationally representative survey from Cornell University, the 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey (CMS), funded by NSF.¹¹ The primary explanatory variable is self-identified partisanship, measured on a 7-point scale from (1) strong Democrat to (7) strong Republican. Among the 19,500 valid responses in the CMS survey, 29% reported being strong Democrats and nearly 20% strong Republicans. Important for this study, 14% identified as independent-leaning Democrats, and nearly 13% of independents leaned towards the Republican party. A small percentage (under 5) were pure independents. We focus on leaners since they make up a majority of the people who self-identify as independents (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). In Table 2, pure independents are excluded due to their small sample size. This matters because some people think of independents as pure independents when most are actually independent leaners.

Table 2.

Percent of Each Partisan Group Agreeing With the Following Statements/Attributes of Independents, Varying Partisanship (7-Point scale)—Read Down Columns

	Overall	Strong Dem	Dem	Lean Dem	Lean GOP	GOP	Strong GOP
Work across party lines (strategic)	56	62	53	62	59	56	54
Less emotional about politics	34	33	29	36	40	34	33
Represent views not expressed by either party (representation)	47	51	44	54	49	45	44
Are more willing to consider opposing viewpoints (perspective taking)	55	59	55	63	60	53	49
No one should have to choose a party to vote in America (labeling)	50	54	46	60	56	50	43
Inter-party competition is exhausting and futile (conflict avoidance)	40	46	37	44	43	41	37
Number of cases	6381	1725	796	740	688	595	1164

Data from the 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey. Pure independents (less than 5% sample) were omitted from the table. Grey highlights categories where independent leaners are statistically different from partisans in their perceptions of why people choose to be independent by five percentage points or higher.

The primary outcome variable measures attributes of independents. Respondents were asked, “Below are statements that have been used to describe independents that are not affiliated with either of the two major political parties in the U.S. (Democrats and Republicans). Check any of the following box(es) that you agree with. Independents…” Respondents answered “agree”, “disagree”, or “don’t know” to the following statements that were randomized:

(1) Are willing to work across party lines.

(2) Are less emotional about politics.

(3) Represent views not expressed by either of the major political parties.

(4) Are more willing to consider opposing viewpoints.

(5) Mean no one should have to choose a party to vote in America.

(6) Believe inter-party competition is exhausting and futile.

Table 2 reports the percentage of respondents who agree with each statement (column 1) and is then broken down by partisan groups. Overall, a majority of Americans believe independents work across party lines and are more willing to consider opposing viewpoints. Only a third of Americans think independents are less emotional.¹² About half of Americans overall believe that one should not have to be a member of the Democratic or Republican party to vote (for example, closed party primaries). There are also distinct differences based on partisanship (see columns 2-7). The most frequently cited attribute named by partisans (strong and moderate Democrats and Republicans) is that independents “work across party lines.” Notable is that partisans do not hold strong negative stereotypes about independents as a group.

Compared to strong partisans, leaners are roughly 7-10 percentage points more likely to say independents “represent views not expressed by either party.” More importantly, nearly two thirds (63% of lean Democrats) and 60% of lean Republicans say independents “are more willing to consider opposing viewpoints.” This statement is cited the most frequently by independent leaners; leaners are more than 10 percentage points more likely to agree with this statement than strong partisans. Consistent with prior research, leaners are much more likely to agree that one doesn’t need party labels to participate in politics, with 56% and 60% of leaners agreeing with this statement (Doherty et al., 2022). Leaners were unique in rating these attributes of independents the highest compared to partisans.

Some of the findings are mixed. There are few differences across groups on conflict avoidance, consistent with hypothesis 4, but there are differences on other traits, such as whether independents are seen as willing to work across party lines. These simple descriptive statistics and large sample data suggest that there are important differences between partisans and nonpartisans in how they define the attributes of independents. This suggests that independents view other independents differently and more favorably than partisans.

Table 3 extends Table 2 by estimating logistic regression models of support for each statement, with one coded as agree and zero as either disagree or no response. The primary explanatory variables are partisanship measured on a 7-point scale with strong Democrats as the reference (comparison) group. The models control for demographic factors including gender (female = 1, males = 0), age (in years), race (binary variables for Black, Latino, Asian, and others with white non-Hispanic as the reference group), educational attainment (1-5 scale), income, and ideology (coded 5 for very conservative and 1 for very liberal). The coefficients are reported as odds ratios to ease the substantive interpretation of the results given the logistic regression models. Coefficients greater than 1 represent a positive relationship while those below 1 a negative relationship.

Table 3.

Predictors of People Who Agree With the Statements “Have Been Used to Describe Independents Not Affiliated With Either of the Two Major Parties in the US…..” (Odds Ratios)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Work across party lines	Less emotional about politics	Represent views not expressed 2 parties	Consider opposing viewpoints	Don’t have to choose a party to vote	Inter-party conflict Useless
Strong Democrats reference group
Weak Dem	.797***	.795***	.783***	.908	.808***	.748***
	(.057)	(.061)	(.055)	(.065)	(.057)	(.054)
Lean Dem	1.116	1.071	1.146**	1.287***	1.403***	.984
	(.083)	(.080)	(.082)	(.096)	(.102)	(.071)
Lean GOP	.935	1.340***	0.915	1.054	1.156**	.988
	(.071)	(.103)	(.068)	(.079)	(.086)	(.074)
Weak GOP	.828**	1.081	0.765***	0.780***	.918	.936
	(.066)	(.089)	(.060)	(.061)	(.072)	(.074)
Strong GOP	0.758***	1.028	0.705***	0.659***	0.689***	0.812***
	(.055)	(.077)	(.050)	(.047)	(.049)	(.059)
Age	1.015***	.988***	1.004***	1.010***	1.014***	0.996***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.735***	.793***	.826***	.856***	0.852***	.833***
	(.029)	(.033)	(.033)	(.034)	(.034)	(.033)
Asian	.954	.935	.885	.942	.813**	.983
	(.080)	(.081)	(.073)	(.078)	(.067)	(.081)
Black	.863**	1.138**	.885**	.884**	.954	.820***
	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.049)
Latino	.856***	1.046	1.057	.986	1.002	1.088
	(.051)	(.064)	(.062)	(.058)	(.059)	(.065)
Other	.884	1.059	1.015	.816***	0.827**	.780***
Race	(.069)	(.084)	(.078)	(.063)	(.064)	(.062)
Education	1.152***	1.077***	1.149***	1.119***	1.073***	1.151***
	(.016)	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)	(.015)	(.016)
Income	1,000	1,000	1.001	1.015**	1.001	1.001
	(.000802)	(.000781)	(.000928)	(.00639)	(.000882)	(.000784)
Conservative	0.946**	1.033	1.023	0.979	.937***	0.928***
ideology	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	.767***	.726***	.638***	.736***	.661***	.935
	(.075)	(.073)	(.061)	(.074)	(.0634)	(.091)
Observations	6,248	6,251	6,249	6,251	6,252	6,251
LR X² sig	√	√	√	√	√	√

Odds ratios from logistic regression models with robust standard errors in parentheses. 2022 CMS survey weights used ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Values above 1 positive relationship and below 1 negative relationship. Inclusion of state fixed effects doesn’t change results reported here.

Compared to strong Democrats, independents leaning Democrat are statistically different than strong partisans in three attributes of independents (see Table 3). Holding other factors constant, they have a 15% increased probability of believing independents represent views not expressed by the two parties and are 29% more likely to believe independents consider opposing viewpoints. Compared to strong Democrats, Democratic leaners have 40% increased odds of saying party labels are not important in voting in U.S. elections; these findings are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. The results of the multivariate analysis are less consistent for Republican leaners, who have 34% increased odds of saying independents are less emotional than strong Democrats and 16% increased odds of agreeing with the statement one doesn’t have to be a Democrat or Republican to vote, i.e. labeling (both covariates are statistically significant).

These results expand on recent research findings that partisan identification is both expressive and grounded in political realities. Klar et al. (2022) find that modern-day Republican leaners are ideologically more moderate and less willing to support their party’s candidates; they are largely motivated by dissatisfaction with their own political party.

Consistent with hypothesis 5, not-strong Democrats, not-strong Republicans, and strong Republicans are less likely than strong Democrats to believe independents work across party lines; the odds ratio for every other partisan group is negative compared to strong Democrats. For Strong Democrats, the purpose of being an independent is to help create compromise among the parties.

There are no major differences between partisans and leaners in believing independents provide an escape from contentious politics, as proposed by hypothesis 4. This implies that all three groups (independents, Democrats, and Republicans) see independence as avoiding contentious two-party politics; but weak Democrats and Strong Republicans are less likely than the reference category, strong Democrats, to agree to this statement.

Notably, more educated individuals are significantly more likely to agree with all six of the statements about independents, consistent with survey research reporting that over 40% of people with a college degree would like more parties to choose from (Doherty et al., 2022). However, the analysis of voter file data revealed that individuals without a college degree were most likely to identify as independent. Further research on education is necessary. There are no significant differences among racial and ethnic groups for Asians and Latinos compared to whites, but Black Americans are less likely than the reference group, white non-Hispanic individuals, to agree with any of the statements. Across the board, females are less likely to agree with the positive attributes of independents compared to males, consistent with research findings that women are more affectively polarized (Ondercin & Lizotte, 2020). There is evidence to support each of the five research hypotheses.

Limitations

This study has several limitations. First, registration-based independents in the voter file data and survey self-identified independents are not fully interchangeable measures; voter file measures reflect a formal administrative decision, while survey-based measures capture psychological identification. These two populations may differ in meaningful ways, such as strength of partisan affect or likelihood of being an “undercover partisan.” Second, the ideology plus score used in the voter file analysis is a model-based, vendor measure derived from commercial and administrative data inputs. Given this, the findings may be sensitive to the assumptions underlying the Catalist model and the 40-60 cutoff used to define ideological moderates in our analysis. Finally, the perception items analyzed are limited to those available in the 2022 CMS. While these items map onto the identity and social dimensions central to our theoretical framework, other relevant dimensions—including political trust, efficacy, political knowledge, and preference for institutional reforms—are not captured, representing productive avenues for future research.

Discussion and Conclusion

As political polarization fractures U.S. politics (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022), independents and unaffiliated voters, as well as moderates, grow in importance as a key swing group. Yet, we know relatively little about independents in American politics. This study fills a gap on a large segment of the United States electorate. It challenges the “myth of the independent voter” (Keith et al., 1992) and builds on work by Klar (2014), Reilly et al. (2022) and others.

Using voter file data from the U.S. adult population confirms existing research based on survey data that independents are younger. It also finds that independents are more likely to lack a college degree and overwhelmingly hold a moderate ideology, consistent with recent research (Fowler et al., 2023). It then uses unique survey questions from the 2022 CMS finding that independents perceive other independents as representing more than political compromise; instead, they represent views outside of the two-party system, perspective-taking, and flexible political identity (avoiding being mislabeled). The results are more consistent for Democratic leaners than Republican leaners, noting important differences between the two groups (Klar et al., 2022). In contrast, partisans are more likely to view independents strategically as potential mediators for reaching political compromises.

Taken together, these findings suggest that independents may reflect a substantively moderate electorate that seeks a more flexible and open political system rather than a constrained environment based on rigid party boundaries. By foregrounding ideology alongside identity and behavior, our research helps reconcile long-standing debates in the literature and highlights the need to rethink how independents are conceptualized in contemporary American politics.

Despite the varying perspectives or theories about who are independents outlined in the introduction, almost all work from the American Voter (1960) onward notes their low rates of political participation. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) argue that avoidance of partisanship has broader consequences, including reduced political participation and engagement for independents. The voter file data confirms these patterns. In the high-turnout 2016 presidential elections, people who scored as independents were 14-24 percentage points less likely to vote than their partisan counterparts. In the 2020 presidential election, independents were 10-20 points less likely to vote than partisans. The low participation rates of independents are troubling.

The findings of this study also have implications for current debates about election reform. Downs (1957) argues that winner-take-all election systems strongly encourage two-party competition, pushing candidates toward the median voter as they compete to win the most votes. For example, Grose (2020) shows that the top-two (nonpartisan) primary system is associated with reducing ideological extremity among legislators who are incentivized to moderate their views. If independents are largely moderate—as the voter file data suggest—and are broadly perceived as willing to work across party lines and compromise, this provides empirical grounding for arguments that reforms expanding independent participation could produce more moderate representation outcomes. As such, the findings speak directly to ongoing debates about closed primaries, which exclude unaffiliated voters, as well as top-four nonpartisan primaries and ranked choice voting that are designed to elevate moderate candidates and reduce partisan extremism. Rather than leaving the link between independents and depolarization implicit, this study establishes the perceptual and ideological foundation on which that argument rests.

The results of this study thus have implications for debates on primary reform, including closed primaries (Donovan et al., 2025; Micatka et al., 2024). They have implications for other reforms that seek to improve the representation of unaffiliated voters, such as forms of proportional representation, campaign finance reform, and nonpartisan redistricting. The findings are consistent with research contending that some independents are critical citizens (Norris, 1999) who favor political reforms that give independents a greater voice in selecting political leaders and more choice among candidates/parties (Alvarez & Nagler, 1995).

Finally, the findings have implications for how citizens think about compromise, coalition building, and working across party lines. The study of independents deserves more attention, consistent with recent work showing that people prioritize compromise and process even if it means losing policy debates (Wolak, 2020) and that a large segment of the population are moderates (Fowler et al., 2023). As unaffiliated voters continue to increase, especially among young people, a better understanding of independent voters could provide insights into reforming election rules to boost participation by unaffiliated voters and the election of more moderate candidates (Donovan et al., 2025; Wright et al., 2025).

We structured the paper to address the question, “Why are people independent?” The survey findings offer insights into the reasons behind individuals’ decisions to remain independent, including holding more moderate ideologies.

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Eveline Dowling

Nathan K. Micatka

Caroline Tolbert

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

Data file data will be published on Dataverse upon publication. Collaborative Midterm Survey data available online: .

Human subjects

The study used third-party administrative and survey data use did not involve human subjects.

Notes

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