In 2021, congressional Democrats brought back earmarks. Proponents of earmarks argue that they can help members of Congress in their quest for reelection by giving them crucial credit claiming fodder, and as a result can help build support for legislation by adding particularistic benefits to legislative packages. Earlier research provides some support for these arguments, but changes to American politics over the last few decades call into question whether past research on the electoral benefits of earmarks holds today. This paper presents the results of two original survey experiments that seek to test the electoral benefits of earmarks. Our results suggest that earmarks have only a limited impact on public attitudes toward lawmakers. In particular, credit claiming around earmarks only appears to improve the support among political independents, and some cross-partisan voters. However, taking an anti-earmark stance seems most helpful in winning the approval of self-identifying Republicans.
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