The president’s party normally loses seats in the House of Representatives during US midterm elections. While many studies have examined the causes of seat loss, one area often mentioned by media pundits but not examined in midterm elections is the role of presidential agendas. In this paper, I examine whether legislative success is costly for the president’s party during midterm elections. I find passing a larger number of legislative items and passing a larger percentage of the president’s agenda costs the president’s party seats in the midterm election. However, the president’s party only suffers this penalty when the president’s party also controls Congress. The president’s party is not punished for legislative success when the president serves under divided government.
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