To what extent and under which conditions do presidents challenge foreign policy legislation through Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)? While the presidents’ use of executive orders and signing statements has been studied extensively, this paper argues that SAPs are a subtler and less politically costly tool that is more important than scholars realized. Delivered at a crucial intervention point along the legislative process, these communications provide a key gateway for assertive presidential challenges. Relying on a novel assertiveness-score, this paper finds that SAPs target legislative content more aggressively over time and that the composition of government predicts executive assertiveness particularly well. Next to that, I show that presidents are more assertive when their term comes to an end. These insights contribute to our understanding of spiking interbranch tensions in American Politics.
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