Reading the Fine Print: Issue Advertisements and the Persuasive Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosures

Abstract

There is an expectation among practitioners that advertising disclosures work to inform voters about who is speaking and whether they should trust the information in the advertisement. However, existing research suggests that current disclosure regulations may not perform as reformers expect. These studies indicate that voters may be deceived by strategically chosen interest group names that falsely project knowledge or trustworthiness. In this study, I measure how actual campaign names and interest groups are perceived by individuals in terms of their knowledge and trustworthiness. I then experimentally vary the campaign finance disclosure within a ballot initiative advertisement to see how these disclosures affect respondents’ issue preferences. This study found that in some cases, there was no difference between an advertisement with no disclosure and one with a veiled disclosure message. In other cases, this level of disclosure reduced support for the issue. In most cases, respondents appear to condition their support on the credibility of the campaign donor disclosed. In some cases, respondents are deceived by the perceived credibility of campaign names when less comprehensive disclosure is used.