The U.S. Supreme Court’s invitations for congressional action have been the subject of extensive interest but with limited empirical study. As a result, despite the obvious political implications of the cross-institutional policy and rule construction interactions, little is understood of the factors precipitating such requests or their efficacy. In this article, I propose a legal development hypothesis. Specifically, I argue invitations are useful for the majority seeking to secure their policy preferences in the law, as the invitation serves to strategically frame subsequent debate at the Court through identifying Congress as the venue for any future reversal of the majority’s policy preferences. Utilizing an original data set of Supreme Court requests for congressional action, I find strong and consistent evidence to support the legal development hypothesis. By inviting congressional action, justices structure in their favor future debates at the Court over policy intervention.
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