Because the Supreme Court can decide only so many cases per term, justices carefully target which cases they hear and which parties they supervise. We focus on their decisions to hear cases involving states as parties. We believe justices use the agenda power to target states with whom they disagree ideologically. Granting review allows justices to keep an eye on wayward states and to remind them of the ever-present threat of Supreme Court review. The results support our theory. Justices are significantly more likely to grant review to cases involving ideologically unfriendly states—and these results are exacerbated in salient cases. These findings suggest justices are more aggressive agenda setters than commonly believed. In addition, the findings suggest that even the so-called federalism revolution of the Rehnquist Court was driven by policy goals.
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