Many Americans think campaign money has a corrupting influence on Congress. Yet how they think about money in politics is a relatively unexplored topic. This article investigates how the public reasons about campaign money and corruption. Our survey experiments demonstrate that attitudes about campaign money are structured by partisan interest and are also driven by information about sources of campaign money and the amount spent (particularly for large independent expenditures made possible by Citizens United), the method of delivery, and about what the money is spent on. Mass perceptions about corruption of Congress, furthermore, may reflect aversion to negative campaigns as well as attitudes about campaign financiers having undue influence over representatives. These findings not only provide a more nuanced picture of attitudes about campaign money but also have consequences for how we assess reform proposals relating to money and politics.
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