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Abstract

By providing limited information for voters who have neither the time nor the inclination to be more fully informed on a range of political issues, elite cues can serve as effective heuristics. Yet to be truly effective in that role, elite cues should not only persuade; they should facilitate participation. This facilitation should be especially noteworthy in proposition elections, which lack the traditional heuristic of partisan identification. This article uses data from California proposition contests from 1994 to 2000 to explore whether elite cues serve as effective heuristics, either in terms of persuasion or in the facilitation of electoral participation. In the latter case, their effectiveness was confirmed: There was a small but robust relationship between elite cues and participation in proposition elections. However, the persuasive impact of elite cues was mixed, with opposition cues pulling votes away from the propositions and supportive cues having little directional impact.

Keywords

ballot initiatives propositions elite cues heuristics political participation turnout direct democracy California politics

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The Effectiveness of Elite Cues as Heuristics in Proposition Elections

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