We examine the dynamics of Senate advice and consent for executive branch nominations from 1885 to 1996 using multinomial logit and hazard analysis. We add to the literature by considering the importance of elections on the process. In particular, we assess how presidential mandates might influence the duration and success of nominations to the executive branch. The analysis captures political nuances previously unconsidered that follow from the different ways that nominations terminate, whether through confirmation, rejection or withdrawal by the president, or expiration. As shown previously, divided government matters, especially during periods of ideological polarization in the Senate. Nominations fail more of ten and take longer. However, perceptions of electoral mandate strengthen the president’s position vis-à-vis the Senate, smoothing the president’s path to a more effective transition and staffing of the federal bureaucracy.
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