Congressional pay raises, perhaps better than any other issue, pit members’ personal interests against their constituents’ preferences. And yet, various studies find that members rarely pay a political price for supporting pay raises. Such findings call into question the mechanism behind the large body of literature tying members’ votes to their constituents’ desires. Taking the stance that the electoral accountability theory is better than the empirical results, this article tries to uncover an electoral punishment. Three results stand out. First, electorally vulnerable members and members from poor districts are the least likely to vote for pay raises. Second, pay raise supporters suffer systematically lower reelection percentages. Third, members who support pay raises are more likely to lose. The latter two findings do not hold in every case, but rather under systematically special circumstances.
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