The Prospects-Based Dynamics of the House Candidacy Decision

Abstract

Strategic politicians thesis studies examine the candidacy phenomenon in general and primary elections, typically testing the influence electoral prospects have on the candidacy decision (indirectly in general elections, directly in primary elections). However, because the candidacy phenomena are different in the two arenas, they offer varying opportunities for theory development. Primary elections, where the phenomena are candidacy decisions, offer the richer laboratory for theory development. Here, I examine primary elections to the House of Representatives and develop a general theoretical framework of the influence electoral prospects have on the candidacy decisions of electively experienced and electively inexperienced candidates. I find that although improving electoral prospects encourage strong and weak candidates to enter primaries, the anticipated increase in primary competition discourages their entry, with weak candidates facing the more severe crowd-out pressures. Observation of district-level candidacy patterns in open-seat and incumbent-challenge primaries confirm my theoretical framework.