Using principal-agent theory, Brent found that support for claimants before the U.S. Courts of Appeals in religious free exercise cases declined following the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and rose again following congressional passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The present study attempts to determine how the Courts of Appeals responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was unconstitutional. A multivariate analysis controlling on political and case-fact variables reveals that support for free exercise claimants did decline again following the Boerne decision. The Supreme Court apparently succeeded in reestablishing itself as the relevant principal in free exercise cases.
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