This study examines whether voters employ a collectively based evaluation of tax policies when voting. We model public opinion toward Bob Dole’s 15% income tax cut proposal and assess the issue’s impact on presidential vote choice in 1996. A preelection survey experiment offered two versions of a question about tax cuts: One presents the issue in terms of what is right or wrong for the country (collective version), whereas the other poses a “favor or oppose” question (individual version). We find that support for the tax cut is far greater in the individual version than in the collective version, and asking voters to consider the potential fiscal consequences of the tax cut drives down its popularity. However, logit models of vote choice show that support for the tax cut has a greater effect on vote choice when judgment of the policy is based on its collective consequences.
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