Both local and national political considerations may play a role in determining the distribution of intergovernmental grant funds. This article focuses on the Community Oriented Policing Services program from 1993 to 1997 to examine how local politicians weigh their electoral desires against community needs in their decisions to apply for grants and how national politicians and bureaucrats similarly determine their responses to cities’ requests. Due to electoral pressures, mayors were more likely than city managers to seek the short-term grants. National party politics also seemed to affect the allocation of grant funds. Finally, community needs played a role, as cities with high crime rates, police-funding shortages, and the ability to support the new officers after the grants expired were more likely to request grants. Communities with larger minority populations were less likely to request grants and were given fewer funds.
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