A variety of scholars and political actors in both the modern and founding eras have thought that members of Congress may personally grow apart from their constituents over time. There has been little empirical evidence for this proposition, however. Using logit regression analysis, this article suggests that members become less personally rooted in their home constituencies and more focused on life in Washington as their tenure increases. Specifically, the more years served by members of the House, (a) the less likely they are to return home after leaving office and (b) the more likely they are to work as lobbyists in Washington, even after controlling for multiple personal and political factors. Longer serving senators are somewhat less likely to return home but are not more likely to become lobbyists. The article discusses the problems this dynamic phenomenon of psychological distance may pose for the member-constituent relationship.
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